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ABSTRACT
As a critical theory, feminisms and feminist legal theory 
challenge existing norms. Of necessity, the values behind this 
methodology must in turn be critiqued. Feminist methodology, 
essentialism is dependent on the experience of women, distilled 
into a particular type of woman for academic ease. Gender is only 
one of the defining traits of a woman. Depending on the 
specificities of the context, other traits will impact on the 
life experiences of a woman and how she experiences 
discriminatory practices.
In a context where a particular racial group do not form the 
dominant culture, race will be an important defining trait. 
Therefore to be a Black woman in the Western world will shape a 
woman's experience of discrimination. To be a Black African woman 
in the West will also further determine the types of 
discrimination suffered in addition to gender discrimination 
which must be differentiated from the experiences of Black 
Western women and White Western woman. These experiences affect 
the realisation of women's human rights.
Discrimination suffered by an African woman as a woman in Africa 
is contextually specific. It is identified as culturally 
specific. Yet, culturally identified or determined gender 
discrimination is arguably no more than the location of 
institutionalised gender discrimination in the private sphere. 
It is considered a cultural problem because the positionality of 
the dominant theory of feminism, which is Western, locates alien 
cultures as other and separates the experiences of women in that 
culture. The location of such gender based institutional 
discrimination primarily within a cultural sphere places it 
firmly within the cultural relativist paradigm which challenges 
the universality of human rights, including women's human rights, 
and further detaches gender based discrimination from the rights 
discourse.
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Therefore, not only is race peripheral to feminisms, culture, or 
the manifestation of culturally identified gender discrimination, 
is also marginalised. The separation of women from each other 
based on factors such as race, class and ethnicity limits the 
potential of feminist legal approaches to the promotion and 
protection of women's human rights. Feminist legal theory can 
promote, protect and assure all women's human rights if it is
inclusive and if it is representative. To be representative, the 
manifestations of racial and cultural discrimination must form 
an integral part of the theory.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis suggests that feminist approaches to international 
human rights law fail African women in the reconceptualisation 
of the international legal order. It is a theoretical hypothesis 
concerned with the omission of race, culture and with the 
reliance on essentialism in feminist theory within the context 
of human rights law. This omission is important for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, feminism seeks to change at the most and 
influence at the least, the structures of societal organisation 
to achieve a gender sensitive perspective and approach. Secondly, 
it seeks to ensure a gender sensitive implementation of policy 
decisions. Thirdly, it aims to achieve equitable gender 
participation in the processes of society; political, economic 
and social. To have global application and hence, success, 
feminist legal theory must be representative.
At present, its success is only partial. It is partial because 
there are certain areas, such as race and culture, which are not 
yet sufficiently assimilated into the theory. This omission fails 
African women because not only are they not fully represented by 
feminism but also because any influence of the legal discourse, 
as it stands at present, will result in the implementation of 
policy decisions which may not address their needs and 
requirements. Further, not only is the language of rights not 
fluent within most African communities, the discourse itself and 
the implementation of rights is challenged by culture, the 
operation of cultural practices and the arguments of cultural 
relativism; the realisation of rights is adversely affected by 
restricted democratic and participatory rights under most African 
governments and it is adversely affected by inadequate 
implementation.
This thesis accepts that human rights have universal application 
and that women's rights are an integral and indivisible part of
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human rights. It also accepts feminist legal theory as a means 
of achieving actual rather than formal equality for all women. 
To achieve this, it suggests that feminist legal theory must be 
truly representative and its purpose is to demonstrate the 
current omissions and suggestions for inclusion, using an African 
perspective in the desire that these omissions will be remedied.
In its challenge to the international order, particularly with 
respect to human rights law, feminist aims to have women's rights 
recognised as enforceable human rights have been achieved in 
theory.1 The implementation of women's human rights, as with 
other human rights in domestic jurisdictions, is more difficult 
to achieve. The difficulties vary from the reduction of states 
parties' obligations to treaty terms through the use of 
reservations, clawback provisions, lack of incorporation into 
national law, tension between customary and statutory laws and 
restricted access to legal redress, either because of financial 
hardship or lack of knowledge of rights.
In an African context, the human rights discourse is challenged 
by cultural relativism and further, core democratic rights which 
would otherwise enable challenges to be made to violations of 
human rights by states are either severely restricted or 
suspended under authoritarian regimes, despite the current wave 
of democratisation on the continent. Moreover, the number of 
internal armed conflicts within the region means that legal 
redress is not the most expedient or useful form of redress, nor 
even a priority in that context. In the light of the 
specificities of the African context - uneven commitment by 
various Governments to participatory political representation of 
the population, limited participation by the people in their 
social and economic affairs, internal conflicts whose roots may 
be traced back to the legacy of colonialism - it is apparent that 
the foundations of the type of civil society in which the 
protection and promotion of human rights can flourish has yet to
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23 
1993, see para. 18, p.7.
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be fully established. This does not mean that protection of human 
rights and the rights discourse has no application to African 
societies; it merely serves as a practical reminder that its 
application will be affected by the specificities of developments 
on the continent. In spite of these difficulties, there are many 
national and international non-governmental organisations and 
grass roots organisations working to ensure that as a part of the 
development of Africa, the promotion and protection of human 
rights have an integral role.
Cultural relativism, the argument that human rights must be 
applied within the cultural structures of a particular society, 
challenges the universal application of human rights, not least 
because it translates to mean that these rights will apply only 
in so far as they do not conflict with established cultural 
practices or customary law. This is a problem because implicitly 
it means that human rights are not, by definition, universal, and 
in the context of women who are primarily affected by these 
practices, it means that in those areas where culture is 
entrenched to their detriment, any protection afforded by 
universal standards are excepted. The argument of non­
interference in domestic jurisdictions, coupled with the 
developmental problems the continent faces, means that the 
situation of women needs to be approached with a sensitivity to 
their predicament. Using two legal principles, the right to 
self-determination and the right to development, the thesis 
attempts to demonstrate how women, with other groups, in Africa 
are affected differently by the application of international 
standards and how this ought to inform approaches to protection 
and implementation of human rights.
African values are argued to be based on communitarianism which 
is at odds with the concept of individually based rights upon 
which international standards are predicated. The fact that these 
standards are derived from western philosophy is an additional 
factor of tension because they are regarded as a new form of 
imperialism. This position is understandable, given the African
17
experience of coercive, external influence in the form of 
colonialism. However, Africa, as a continent, is in a uniquely 
placed position to decide its approach to its development. Most 
African states are young, they are relatively newly independent 
and the end of the Cold War has meant that the cynical use of 
African states as strategic pawns is largely ended. Further, the 
resurgence of internal conflicts, the diversion of interest and 
aid to Eastern and Central European countries and the concomitant 
marginalisation of Africa means that perhaps, for the first time, 
African leaders are having to resolve, with limited external 
interference, pressing issues affecting the continent.2 In this 
dynamic situation, it is imperative that a gender sensitive 
approach is included in the consideration of possible solutions 
to African problems.
If we accept the notion of African values, it is necessary to 
ascertain if there is evidence of an African approach in Africa's 
regional mechanisms that marks them uniquely from other 
international and regional organisations. This thesis 
demonstrates, through a consideration of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU),3 Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)4 and other select regional mechanisms, that African 
regional organisations are structured similarly to other regional 
and international organisations and that the legal principles 
relied upon are equally similar. The similarity of these 
organisations is based on the concept of state sovereignty, which 
as a legal principle admits of no cultural influence or 
difference and is especially pertinent in Africa where newly
2see further Keller, E.J. & Rothchild, D., AFRICA IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER:RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL 
SECURITY, London, 1996.
3 constituted at a conference of African heads of state and 
government in Addis Ababa held between May 23-26, 1963 to promote 
the unity and solidarity of African and Malagasy states. For text 
of the Charter see 2 ILM, 1963, 766.
4for Articles of Association establishing ECOWAS see Sohn, 
L., (ed) DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1005, 
Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, 1971.
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independent states are anxious to assert their equality with 
established states. These African regional structures, rather 
than evidencing an African approach, replicate existing 
structures of international organisation and are based on similar 
legal principles. These principles have been and are inherently 
challenged by feminist approaches to law. Therefore, not only is 
there no evidence in the organisation of regional institutions 
of a quintessential African value, the legal foundational basis 
of these institutions have been shown to be androcentric. For 
African women, cultural relativist arguments adversely affect the 
guarantee of their rights, it is essentially a gendered 
relativist argument. There is no notion of African values that 
can serve to promote their rights because regionally based 
treaties such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR and also referred to as the Banjul Charter)5 and other 
regional organisations are essentially based on existing 
structures. The existing structures have marginalised women and 
feminist legal theory has been instrumental in exposing this.
Feminist theory emerged from the West and ignores indigenous 
feminisms both substantively and its processes. It is 
historically rooted in its own experiences. This is not to say 
that feminist activism and theory did not exist in other parts 
of the world. It did, but the theoretical development of feminism 
as a political force, occurred primarily in the West and it is 
this development, and its omission of women who are not a part 
of that tradition that this thesis is concerned with. However, 
feminist theory itself has not taken sufficient account of the 
experiences of African women. This omission or oversight is 
important because if it is to influence policy on an 
international level, as it aims to do, feminist legal theory must 
be truly representative. To be truly representative, feminist 
legal theory in its approaches to human rights law must 
incorporate the differences of race and culture as these have
5adopted 17th June, 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of 
Government and States of the OAU and entered into force on 21st 
October, 1986, reprinted 21 ILM, 58, 1982.
19
differing cumulative effects in addition to gender subordination 
in the lives of many women.
The inefficacy of traditional human rights to assure the human 
rights of women has been attributed to their exclusion from the 
organisational, normative and doctrinal structures of human 
rights law. Feminist approaches to international law has shown 
it to be androcentric. In challenging the status quo of the legal 
order, despite their internal diffeences, feminist theory 
presents a unified front. The purported cohesiveness of feminist 
theory has been challenged on the grounds of the failure of 
essentialism to take race into sufficient account. My intention 
is to introduce an additional element to the debate in terms of 
an African perspective with a case study of Yoruba women. While 
it is important to be aware of the dangers of splintering 
feminist theory, essentialism could potentially run the same 
error of exclusion if all women's experiences do not form the 
foundational core of feminist theory in impugning the existing 
legal order.
The marginalisation at the least, and exclusion, at the most, of 
women from the legal processes of the international world order 
attributed to western liberal theory has been replicated in new 
states like Nigeria, to the detriment of the development of the 
country and new states like it. Indigenous organisational and 
normative structures enabled participation in the government of 
the country, however imperfect. However, colonialism wrought 
changes that decimated existing indigenous structures, supplanted 
new structures without enabling participatory structures that 
were equivalent to, or that allowed the same level of 
participation from all strata of society, especially with regard 
to women.
Chapter 2 of the thesis begins, in Part I, with a consideration 
of the notion of an African concept of human rights evident in 
the paradigm of cultural relativism. The notion of 'African 
Values' is integral to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
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Rights. The Chapter attempts to discover if there is an African 
way or values. Part II discusses the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples1 Rights and other regional promulgations on rights 
protection in addition to the work of the African Commission on 
Human Rights. Part III looks at African regional systems, in 
particular, the Organization of African Unity, OAU, the primary 
regional organization and its contribution to the resolution of 
African problems. The Chapter will demonstrate, through the 
structure and norms of the OAU and the African Charter, that 
African regional organisations replicate the international order 
of institutional structures, not only in its organisational and 
normative values, but also in its processes. This will illustrate 
that the challenge feminist legal theory poses to international 
law inherently applies to African regional institutions. If there 
exist no African values which can serve to protect women and the 
regional institutional structures are inherently challenged by 
feminist legal theory, it is clearly imperative that feminist 
theory be representative of all women.
In order to demonstrate the complexities of the rights discourse 
in an African context, I evaluate in Chapter 3 certain legal 
principles - self-determination and the right to development - 
in order to demonstrate that legal principles do not necessarily 
result in the protection of and may further marginalise women in 
these areas. Self-determination, in the African context, is 
interpreted to mean external self-determination not internal 
self-determination. Hence, there does not exist in practice the 
right to participate in the government of one's country. There 
is no accountability or transparency and no means to influence 
or assure certain rights. Similarly, the right to development 
means the right of the country or state to development, not the 
right of the people. Women are major contributors to the African 
economy through agriculture, therefore it is important that they 
have access to land and possessory rights in land. Customary law 
in many African countries limits the right of women to own land. 
The discriminatory effect of customary law is affirmed by 
statutory law in most cases. Key rights that would enable women
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to work towards their development are restricted by customary 
law. Development projects aimed at redressing the balance have 
little or no participation by women in the formulation of policy 
and its implementation. Internal structures are discriminatory, 
external efforts aimed at ameliorating the status of women and 
increase their opportunities operate on a basis of assumptions. 
Interventions, both internal and external, aimed at improving the 
status of women tend to have limited participation by the women 
who are to be the beneficiaries of these efforts.
Cultural relativity, or the right to retain an African value or 
integrity, has meant a maintenance of the status quo even when 
certain cultural practices result in clear and unequivocal 
discrimination. For instance, women are discriminated against in 
terms of inheritance laws and custodial rights. Where these 
manifestations of discrimination are not sanctioned by customary 
law, change is resisted on the grounds of culture. The purpose 
of using the legal principles is not only to demonstrate the 
marginalisation of women from these areas but to show that for 
the purposes of implementation of human rights in an African 
context in a way that would benefit women, there are core 
problems in using legal discourse. These problems may be 
peculiarly African but they are germane to the discourse. 
Feminist critiques of human rights law at the international level 
have evidenced its androcentric nature. Essentialism must include 
an African perspective in order to be truly effective since 
implementation can only take place at the domestic level. It is 
equally important that while the development of theory is 
progressing, the practicalities which may influence the 
implementation and protection of guaranteed rights are taken into 
account.
Chapter 4 looks at feminist critiques and approaches to 
international law. International law has been shown to be 
androcentric in its normative and organisational structures. The 
foundational basis for this is western liberal theory which is 
based on the distinction between the public and private sphere.
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The structure of the international legal order has affected the 
development of women's human rights. The inadequacies of the 
Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW or the Women's Convention),6 including enforcement and 
implementation, may be attributed to the core foundational basis 
of the theory of human rights which distinguishes between the 
public and the private sphere; the latter being where women's 
rights are most crucial. The problems of implementation 
internationally and within domestic jurisdictions will be 
considered in the light of inadequacies with formal guarantees 
of women's human rights. The use of reservations to the Women's 
Convention is demonstrative. Part I of the Chapter looks at the 
growth of the concept(s) of women's rights and the challenges 
posed to international law in terms of necessitating a rethinking 
of sovereignty, culture and challenging the participation of only 
state actors in international law. There is an overview on law 
making within the UN system on matters relating to women's 
rights. Part II discusses the omission of race and culture in 
feminist legal theory through an essentialist perspective and 
considers theorisations of Black feminisms and the theory of 
cultural or gendered relativism and its impact on women's rights 
with a feminist critique of cultural relativism.
Chapter 5 looks at indigenous systems, through a case study of 
Yoruba Egba women, of societal organisation prior to colonialism, 
including legal systems, the role of women and the substance of 
customary law. It will then consider how colonialism has affected 
the gender aspects of legal structures and its impact on 
familial/kinship relationships using case law. This will 
illuminate the tension between indigenous systems and the new 
legal systems resulting in a cultural lag. A practical problem 
is that the language of rights discourse is not yet fluent while 
the old ways have been desecrated. Women's human rights obtain 
primarily in the private sphere and this Chapter will concentrate 
on these areas; namely rights subsisting on marriage, divorce,
6UN Do c . A/34/46, adopted 18th December, 1979, 1249 UNTS 14, 
reprinted in 19 ILM 33, 1980.
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inheritance and custody of children. These rights will be looked 
at under customary law in addition to statutory law.
Chapter 6, the conclusion, will analyse the reason why so-called 
universal norms of human rights are not wholly accepted and why 
there is a need to rely on cultural difference or diversity in 
emerging countries. At the time the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)7 was promulgated in 1948, a number of states 
who would later sign the Declaration were still under colonial 
rule. As they gained independence, they subscribed to these 
principles. Cultural relativism, it will be argued, should be 
seen on inception as nationalist fervour by a people keen to 
assert their independence and autonomy. 'People' may be and is 
used variously to refer to the state, government as 
representative of the people, ethnic groups within the state or 
minorities and other groups such as women within groups. The 
problem is that those who assert are not necessarily 
representative of the heterogenous groupings of people contained 
within an artificially constructed nation state. Claims of 
cultural relativism are challenged within its framework. At 
domestic level, there has been little or no participation by 
women in national decision making. State structures take little 
account of their needs. In terms of the cultural relativist 
argument, it is important to establish whose culture is being 
promoted. Culture is neither common nor monolithic nor static. 
Not all citizens of a state participate in equal part and to the 
same extent in this culture. The culture that is being presented 
in international fora is the culture of government and of the 
elite and that usually means the culture of an unelected group 
of people keen to perpetuate their power. The acceptance of the 
argument of culture also implicitly implies acceptance that a 
certain group of people on the basis of sex, age, class or 
ethnicity are excluded from, and are consequently not deserving, 
of human rights.
7UN Do c . A/811, adopted 10th December, 1948 by the United 
Nations General Assembly, Res. 217A(III).
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The inability of the state in new countries such as Nigeria, to 
be fully representative of women is not a phenomenon restricted 
to developing countries. The law, including international law, 
is being shown to be very specifically gendered. Despite 
international obligations and the accompanying rhetoric, women's 
rights are inadequately protected. It is very important also, 
that the perspectives of African women and the issues that affect 
them are taken into account lest feminist legal theory replicates 
male structures of dominance and social construct. The problems 
faced by Nigerian women are compounded by the peculiar socio­
cultural and historical development of the country. 
Discrimination under customary law, the legacy of colonialism, 
religious inequalities, developmental problems, military 
oppression and the lack of popular participation in the political 
system are contributory factors to their oppression. There is a 
tendency to look at these issues in isolation but the import is 
such that until there is a means of tackling these issues in a 
comprehensive manner, the realisation of women's rights in Africa 
will remain unfulfilled. The development of women's human rights 
internationally will have little relevance to their rights in 
exactly the same way that international law has been shown to be 
androcentric and exclusionary.
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CHAPTER 2
THE AFRICAN REGIONAL SYSTEM OF RIGHTS PROTECTION:A REPLICATION 
OF THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORDER.
INTRODUCTION
Independence from colonialism, the fruits of which began to 
appear from the late 1950s, signalled the beginning of Africa's 
contemporary problems in a number of ways. Apart from the efforts 
of the newly created states to establish their sovereignty on 
the world stage, formerly autonomous, homogenous ethnic groups 
became composite parts of several new states without a common 
interest except the experience of oppressive colonial force. The 
acceptance of the principle of ut is possidetis by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)1 established territorial 
boundaries as inviolable.2 Yet within those boundaries there was 
no basis for true unity between the ethnic groups. Without a 
common enemy, the tension between the groups as a result of their 
conflicting interests, based on social, cultural and even 
political differences, surfaced, often exacerbated by previous 
colonial history. It was possible in some instances to contain 
these divisions by a number of compromises and at times, use of 
force. In others, however, the underlying tension and conflict 
led to more serious consequences. The situation in Nigeria 
ultimately led to the Biafra-Nigeria civil war of 1967-1970, 
although tension and conflict was not restricted to the Eastern 
region of Nigeria. More recently, in the 1990s, these 
differences, exacerbated by environmental degradation due to oil 
exploration in the eastern region of Nigeria has resulted in 
unrest by the Ogoni people and there are sporadic outbreaks of 
violence based on religious differences between Muslims and
*OAU Charter, adopted 25th May, 1963, 47 UNTS 39, reprinted 
in 2 ILM 1963, 766.
Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers AGH/Res.16(1) , 
1964. See Brownlie, I., BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN 
AFFAIRS,Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, 360 for text.
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Christians in the northern part of the country.
Administratively, the influence of colonisation remained. 
Official languages in most newly independent countries remain the 
foreign language of the colonial masters; English in the case of 
Nigeria. Previous indigenous modes of societal organisation, with 
differences in various communities, remained either supplanted 
by foreign models or subsidiary thereto, even though the foreign 
models had existed to ease the burden of administration of the 
colonies for the administrators. In the immediate aftermath of 
independence, many economies remained linked to that of the 
former colonising country. While in theory, these countries were 
independent, in practice they retained the influence of the 
political systems of the former colonising countries, imported 
to institute formal democracy and representation in government 
and they remained heavily tied and influenced by the economic 
policies of (and benefits to )their former masters. The economic 
policies of most African countries remain influenced to date by 
external forces and the basis of their political systems, when 
operative, also retains that influence. The globalisation of 
economics and finance under the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs, the World Trade Organisation and the Bretton Woods 
institutions, notably the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development (the World Bank), remain a pervasive and 
interventionist influence on the economies of African countries.3
The development of international human rights, the philosophy 
underlying that development and the universal applicability 
thereto have given rise to tensions. Human rights norms, as 
drafted in the International Bill of Rights,4 are derived from
3For example, through the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes. See further Chapter 3 for a discussion of 
the intervention of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank in the economy of developing countries and the effects of 
such intervention.
4These are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 
UN Doc A/811, (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) and the
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the tradition of western liberal philosophy and many countries 
of a different culture, for instance in Africa and Asia, argue 
that rights are culturally relative. Firstly, the argument 
suggests that rights are derived from the cultural traditions of 
a particular culture, secondly that each culture has its own 
notion of rights which may be equated with the rights enumerated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and thirdly, if the 
so-called universal rights are globally applicable, they must be 
implemented within the cultural milieu of any given society, 
rights must be relative. In Africa, cultural relativity is 
referred to interchangeably with the notion of African values. 
My position is that there can be no such thing as "African 
values", it is too diverse and heterogenous a continent for that. 
Homogenous groups within states may have values and cultures but 
a continent cannot. It is conceded that these communities may 
have their own notion of rights which may correspond broadly to 
those rights in the Universal Declaration but they do not have 
the legal imperative that the International Bill of Rights accord 
the rights enumerated and protected. Moreover, it is given that 
all rights must be implemented within a culturally relevant 
social milieu to have legitimacy.5
This Chapter demonstrates that, despite claims to African values 
and an African way of doing things, the African regional model 
of organisation and rights protection models itself so closely 
on the existing international model that, not only does it accept 
the underlying legal principles on which the structure and 
substance of these models are based, it also fails women on the 
basis of its normative, organisational and institutionalised 
structures as feminist challenges to law have demonstrated.6 
Further, the notion of culture on which African values rely, 
impacts so adversely on women and their rights that culture and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).
5see infra Part I of this Chapter.
6 see Chapter 4 of this work.
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cultural relativist arguments afford women minimal rights 
protection. Consequently, it is important to factor culture and
its effects into feminist legal theory.
All interstate modes of organisation are primarily concerned with 
the retention of state sovereignty and will only in exceptional 
cases, human rights law being one, deviate from that. The basic 
model then is standard. To that extent, the arguments that 
feminist theory has presented against international law and its 
organisation apply to African regional institutional mechanisms. 
Given the concern of this thesis, particularly with regard to 
culture, it is important to ascertain firstly, if there exists
an African world view, secondly, if it exists, how it has
manifested itself in its regional modes of organisation and 
thirdly how this manifestation affects the position of women 
within their communities in the different sub-Saharan countries, 
if at all. The primary illustration in this study is the position 
of Yoruba women in Nigeria and consequently there will only be 
passing reference to women in other countries.
This Chapter begins, in Part I, with a discussion of cultural 
relativism. Part II discusses regional promulgations on rights 
protection such as the African Charter of Human and Peoples' 
Rights (ACHPR),7 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child8 and the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples ■ Rights on the Rights of Women9 in addition to the 
work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and 
proposals for an African Court of Human Rights. Part III 
considers whether there is an African approach to regional 
protection and conflict resolution through an overview of African 
regional institutions, both political and economic to ascertain
71981, adopted 17th June, 1981 by 18th Assembly of Heads of 
Government and States of the OAU and entered into force 21st 
October, 1986, reprinted in 21 ILM, 58, 1982.
8adopted July, 1990, reprinted in 3 RADIC 1991, 173.
9copy on file with candidate, see appendix to this work.
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if there exists an African way of "doing things". It also looks 
at the current position of Africa in the new international order 
following the collapse of the Cold War and the new wave of 
international relations which favours democratisation set against 
economic globalisation and continual economic dependence.
On the question of an Africa world view or perspective, it is 
important to emphasise from the outset that Africa is a 
continent, not a country. Yet there is a tendency to discuss the 
problems of one country as applicable to all African countries. 
There are certain commonalities in the problems that beset many 
countries in Africa. Africa is however, treated in theory and in 
fact as a unity consisting of two regions, sub-Saharan Africa, 
or Black Africa, and Arab Africa.10 Thus, when we refer to Africa, 
we must be aware of the dangers of ' essentialising' Africa 
itself. The commonalities of many sub-Saharan African countries 
derive from their colonial experience, the struggle for 
independence, the formation of arbitrarily defined multi-ethnic 
states, the inevitable potential for regional and continental 
conflict as a direct result, the influence of the Cold War and 
the proxy claims of the USA and USSR and their struggle for 
economic independence. Within these commonalities there exist 
great difference, particularly politically. Some states are or 
have been ruled by the military, some have been ruled by despots, 
self-proclaimed life rulers, while others have or have had 
democratically elected governments. There are obvious differences 
of language, religion and culture. Africa is not homogenous and 
care needs to be taken that prescriptive solutions to one 
country's problems do not become the prescription for the whole 
of sub-Saharan Africa.
This applies equally to the notion of African values. African
10NGOs such as Human Rights Watch treat Africa as two 
distinct regions; north African countries are considered a part 
of the Middle East. The foreign office of Government departments 
also make the same distinction e.g. in the UK and USA.
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values have been heralded variously.11 But surely what is meant 
is the value of a certain community in a particular country at 
a specific time? In human rights law, some Africanists12 have 
tended to eschew human rights as being universally applicable on 
the ground that they are western in inception and represent a 
form of imperialism.13 They argue that cultural standards 
determine the nature of human rights and this will vary from 
culture to culture. Further, where they accept that human rights 
exist, they argue that its meaning varies from culture to 
culture.14 Whereas human rights have been acknowledged as 
universal and women's rights also have been declared universal, 
indivisible and integral to human rights,15 the importance of 
culture on the implementation of human rights cannot be 
understated. Legal proclamations do not result in immediate 
changes in cultural identification or practice. There is 
certainly a differing world view that emanates from Africa but 
differences exist amongst different countries. This difference 
or perception of difference may derive from a different mode of 
societal organisation, the communitarian ideal which is common 
in sufficient sub-Saharan countries for it to be referred to as 
"African". The difficulty with this cultural relativist position 
is that it makes insufficient allowance for change and dynamism 
in societies. Colonialism has definitely impacted on the
n see for instance, Shivji, I. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA, CODESRIA BOOK SERIES, 1989.
12In referring to Africanists, I mean supporters of the view 
that there exists within various African cultures, concepts of 
rights comparable to human rights norms as enumerated in the UDHR 
and other covenants. This includes scholars of African origin as 
well as those of different races.
13This viewpoint is not restricted to African countries, 
many developing or Third World countries have posited this view 
also.
14see Teson, F., "International human rights and cultural 
relativism", 25 VJIL n4 (1985), 869. See Chapters 2 and 5 on the 
impact of culture on Yoruba women, a form of gendered relativism.
15Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, UN 
Doc A/CONF.157/23.
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organisation of life and will have modified it; industrialisation 
has also modified societal organisation. Exposure to other 
cultures will have also impacted on social development. These 
developments have affected the status quo and communitarian 
values or way of life no longer exist in an unmodified form. This 
requires a corresponding modification of Africanist viewpoints 
and a more accurate reflection of modern societal organisation 
in African countries.
PART I. CULTURAL RELATIVITY OR CROSS-CULTURAL FERTILISATION?
1. Universalism vs Cultural Relativity
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR), promulgated by 
the United Nations in 1948, 16 was the first set of rights deemed 
applicable worldwide.17 Its adoption was directly related to 
particular historical factors in Europe at that time, the second 
world war, and the devastation that resulted from that war. While 
its roots lay in the geo-political developments of the European 
continent, the values from which the rights are derived are 
generally regarded to have no geographical boundaries.
At the time of the Declaration only four African countries were 
independent.18 As African countries gained their independence, 
legal guarantees of rights were included in their constitutions.19
16 Adopted 10th December, 1948, General Assembly Res. 217A(III), 
UN Doc A/811.
17 Other bills of rights guaranteeing the rights of men 
existed prior to that time but application was limited to a 
particular jurisdiction. For example, the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man, 1789.
18 Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt and Liberia.
19 It has been noted that constitutional rights 
protection, which the colonial powers were not concerned with 
when they ruled over the various territories, was in part to 
safeguard the interests, mainly economic and property, of the 
remaining expatriate minority. See Motala, Z., "Human Rights in 
Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination", Hastings
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The formal protection of rights through constitutional guarantees 
was perhaps influenced by developments at the international level 
although in the case of Nigeria, the need to allay the fear of 
minority ethnic groups from being dominated by the majority 
ethnic groups of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo played a part.20 
With independence, many of the newly created countries 
demonstrated their allegiance to these principles by becoming 
members of the United Nations and signing the UDHR, in addition 
to the other instruments guaranteeing formal protection of 
rights. This signalled their participation in the world order and 
was also an assertion of sovereignty. These new countries were 
faced with problems of a unique nature. They were faced with an 
artificially constructed state that was multi-lingual, 
heteregenous, economically unstable and which lacked cohesion. 
Their primary concerns were to buttress their sovereignty, 
eradicate colonialism, racism and apartheid from the continent 
and realign the world economic order so that existing inequities 
might be reduced sufficiently for their countries to develop 
economically.21 While they nominally subscribed to the values in 
the international documents that protected human rights by 
signing or ratifying them, implementation and enforcement were 
not a priority, as with other ratifying countries. In any event, 
at the time, implementation mechanisms were limited.
The instability in many African countries, including Nigeria, 
that subsequently manifested itself in the form of coup d'etats,
political detentions and civil wars resulted in widespread abuse 
and infringements of human rights. While the instability may be
Int. & Comp. Law Rev., vl2 (2), 1989, 373-410 and Welch, C.,
"Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa", in Welch, C., 
and Meltzer,R ., (eds) HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 
State University of New York Press:Albany, 1984, at 13, 
hereafter, Welch and Meltzer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT.
20 see further Odinkalu, C., "The Judiciary and Legal 
Protection of Human Rights in Common Law Africa: Allocating
responsibility for the failure of post-independence bills of 
rights", ASICL Pro. 8 (1996), 124.
21 see further Chapter 3.
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attributed in part to the geo-political and socio-economic 
history of the continent, human rights abuses were not excusable 
on any grounds. Once created, the continental organisation, the 
OAU, was hampered by its internal doctrine of non-interference,22 
and had little or no political will to act. External appeals for 
the protection of human rights were parried on two grounds; 
a)economic development took precedence over civil and political 
rights and b)the human rights discourse was Eurocentric and 
inherently contrasted with an African position on the rights 
discourse - the notion that human rights are culturally relative.
The human rights discourse in the 1980s was focussed on the 
debate of universalism versus cultural relativism. Since then, 
it has been affirmed at the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna in 1993 that ' [t]he universal nature of these [human] 
rights and freedoms is beyond question.,23 The debate currently 
appears to focus on cross-fertilisation of the recognised rights 
and freedoms with the values of different cultures.24 The primary 
purpose of informing the human rights debate with the values of 
a different culture is to facilitate the incorporation of the 
rights discourse into that culture and hence ease implementation. 
Once people are aware of their rights and are able to use the 
language of rights discourse, they can demand respect for those 
rights, the obligation of which is incumbent on the governments 
who have freely undertaken to guarantee and protect those rights 
under international law.
22 article 3(2), OAU Charter.
23 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
A/CONF.157/23, reprinted in 32 ILM 1661, 1993, para. 1.
24 see Mutua, M., "The Banjul Charter and the African 
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of
Duties",VJIL, vol 35(2), 1995, 339, hereafter, Mutua, "African 
Cultural Fingerprint".
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Shivji25 identified four levels of the universalism discourse. The 
first is the historical and philosophical basis of human rights, 
the second is the nature of the applicability of rights, the 
third is the identification of rights in traditional African 
society similar to modern conceptions of human rights and the 
fourth level locates human rights in a culturally specific 
paradigm. It is possible, however, to deal with all four levels 
coherently under the universality and cultural relativity 
paradigm.
The philosophical basis of human rights is generally regarded as 
western in origin deriving from a western liberal tradition.26 
Some scholars argue, however, that conceptions of human rights 
existed in other cultures. Opponents of this view refute the 
argument.
"There is no specifically African Concept of human 
rights. The argument for such concept is based on a 
philosophical confusion of human dignity with human 
rights, and on an inadequate understanding of 
structural organization and social changes in African 
society. "27
25 Shivji, Issa, G. , THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA, CODESRIA BOOK SERIES, 1989.
26 I do not intend to go into an exposition of the 
philosophical basis of human rights. My premise is that human 
rights are universal in application irrespective of their 
derivation. In any event, it has been declared categorically by 
the General Assembly of the UN that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are universal in the Vienna Declaration and Platform for 
Action. My intent is to explore the tension between proponents 
of African values and proponents of absolute universalism with 
a purpose to establishing a means of rights implementation and 
enforcement in any cultural, and particularly in the African, 
context. However, for a cross-section of materials on differing 
approaches see for example, Steiner, H.J., & Alston, P., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT;LAW, POLITICS,MORALS, 1996, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, Chapter 4 in addition to other 
references in this work on an African perspective.
27 Howard, Rhoda, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA, 
New Jersey:Rowman & Littlefield, 1986, p23, hereafter, Howard,
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Howard's argument runs thus. Peoples' rights is equated in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) with the 
right of sovereign states. The Charter uses the term 'peoples' 
to consolidate the African ideal of communitarianism and national 
interests, which she equates with elite interests, and hence to 
simulate the idea of cohesion. She argues that the difficulty in 
protecting human rights in Africa can be ascribed to its 
underdeveloped status which limits the realisation of economic 
rights and the social conditions necessary for the protection of 
civil and political rights. What she terms 'regime 
consolidation', primarily by the ruling elites, has led to 
violations of rights. Commonwealth28 Africa is affected by three 
main economic circumstances; a colonial heritage of labour and 
raw material exploitation, vulnerability in the world economic 
order and domination of the internal economy by the state/ruling 
class. Having identified these economic obstacles to the 
maintenance of the social conditions necessary for rights 
protection in Africa, Howard asserts that human rights 
performance can be discussed without taking into account any 
cultural uniqueness. While these economic and development 
obstacles to rights protection do not amount to cultural 
uniqueness, they are nonetheless specificities that inform the 
rights discourse in an African context and, in my view, Howard 
should have placed more emphasis on their potential to hinder the 
application of rights.
On cultural relativism, Howard's premise is that contact with the 
western world has meant that any cultural distinctness that 
African societies have has been diluted, consequently, aspects
COMMONWEALTH AFRICA. A caveat needs to be attached to the nature 
of Howard's work. While the countries discussed have the same 
colonial history they have a different development. None of them 
are homogenous, Nigeria itself is not homogenous. The term 
African society is nonsense - there is no such definitive thing.
28essentially former colonies with similar legal and 
originally similar institutionalised political systems on 
independence, derived from colonisation by the UK with the 
exeption of Mozambique.
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of African needs and ideals are closer to the West than might 
have been imagined or credited. Rights are inherent in the 
individual and therefore must not be contingent on the fulfilment 
of obligation to a group or on granting of rights by a state. She 
argues that stress on group rights in the ACHPR derogates from 
the concept of individual rights by placing emphasis on the 
rights of nation states or the ruling class.
"I do not accept any relativity in the substance of 
rights. I do accept that implementation may vary and, 
further, the interpretation may vary in societies 
whose social norms (for instance, regarding marriage) 
do not accept particular rights. However, this 
derogation from the standard of absolute international 
human rights is acceptable only in the rare cases in 
which a weakened interpretation of a right does not 
support the entrenchment of a ruling class.
Thus while the principle of cultural relativity 
should not be raised to an absolute standard to excuse 
any and all deviations from international human rights 
standards, it may be used as a check on radical 
universalism in very carefully defined circumstances.
These circumstances are rare in Commonwealth Africa, 
where changes in the direction of increased individual 
autonomy are occurring, partly because of severe 
structural dislocation and partly because of the 
introduction of new ideologies. Cultural stasis is 
unlikely, however indigenous culture may be. African 
cultures are changing to reflect the emergence of new 
social classes with differential access to property 
and power. Most assertions of cultural relativity in 
fact are an ideological tool to serve the interests of 
powerful emergent groups in Commonwealth African 
society.1,29
29Howard, COMMONWEALTH AFRICA at 16-17
37
I have quoted at length from Howard because most critiques of her 
work centre around her assertion of confusion of human dignity 
and human rights. Her position, however, is very clear; that the 
substance of human rights is universal while the implementation 
may vary in form. While I do not accept that there is a confusion 
of the African concept of dignity with human rights, there is a 
truth in that whatever form of rights protection existed in 
precolonial Africa, they were not articulated in the form of a 
rights discourse. Further, they were applicable only within a 
circumscribed, communal, kinship group within which there 
certainly existed inequalities. Proponents of cultural relativism 
do not take adequate account of the dynamic nature of custom and 
the fact that it must have been influenced by European 
colonisation. Custom is not static; the milieu in which people 
place traditional African values no longer exists in a meaningful 
way.30 Howard's views on the ruling elite would appear to be borne 
out by some post-independence events. Nevertheless, it is not 
entirely true that a culturally relative view is solely to 
entrench power. Power is complex and multiple; there is the power 
of elders in a society, religious forms of power, power 
structures within family settings as well as elite political 
power.
There does exist a different world view and that can be accounted 
for in the implementation of rights which she accepts may vary. 
It is this variance that other commentators31 have been at pains
30 see for example, Ilumoka, Adetoun, 'African Women's 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Towards a Relevant Theory 
and Practice' in Cook, R. (ed) HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1994 at 317 -319 for a discussion of the erosion of traditional 
support systems for women without its replacement by a modern 
equivalent. This illustrates the dynamic changes occurring in 
modern African society today. Account needs to be taken of this 
fact and relevant theories must be used to tackle the issues, 
instead of assuming that modern African society has not changed.
31 Mutua, "African Cultural Fingerprint", ibid note 24 
and Cobbah, J.A.M. "African Values and the Human Rights Debate:An 
African Perspective", 9 HRQ, 1987, 309, hereafter, "African
Values".
38
to establish. Those32 who disagree with an extreme cultural 
relative position do so because it is clearly open to abuse yet 
they would not disagree with a need to locate the implementation 
of international human rights norms within a specific social 
context.33 Society in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, is in a 
constant flux. The rights discourse is a useful tool in the fight 
for accountable government precisely because they are rights that 
can be asserted against a state.
Although the legal formalisation of human rights as entitlements 
against the state are western in origin and philosophical basis, 
they are regarded as universally applicable. Cultural relativists 
argue that the philosophical basis of human rights are contrary 
to African conceptions. The notion of human rights vested in the 
individual is regarded as contrary to the African concept of 
communitarianism. For example, Cobbah34 suggests that the rights 
discourse should take place within a cultural context. He 
presents an africentric concept of human dignity as a valid 
worldview which should inform the cross-fertilisation of ideas.35
"Within the organisation of African social life one 
can discern various organizing principles. As a 
people, Africans emphasize groupness, sameness, and 
commonality. Rather than survival of the fittest and 
control over nature, the African worldview is tempered 
with the general guiding principle of the survival of 
the entire community and a sense of cooperation, 
interdependence, and collective responsibility."36
32 Mahmud, Sakah, "The State and Human Rights in the 
1990s", 15 HRQ, 1993, pp485-498.
33 see Motala, Ziyad, "Human Rights in Africa:A 
Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination", note 19.
34 Cobbah, J.A.M, "African Values and the Human Rights 
Debate:An African Perspective", 9 HRQ, 1987, 309.
35ibid at 310
36ibid at 320.
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Welch is of the view that there was recognition and protection 
of human rights in the precolonial period. These however differed 
from the Western concept because a "web of kinship provided a 
framework within which individuals exercised their economic, 
political and social liberties and duties".37 The African 
framework has been markedly influenced by external factors: 
artificially constructed nation-states for imperial economic 
convenience; a marginalised indigenous system of justice and 
rights protection in favour of a colonial ruling framework; 
incomplete codification of indigenous customary law by colonial 
administrators resulting in a parallel but unequal legal system; 
the introduction of constitutional rights protection primarily 
for the protection of the expatriate minority prior to 
independence; and constitutional provisions based on the colonial 
model which was lacking in popular support and ultimately 
legitimacy.
Subscribing to the communitarian view, Welch notes that rights 
were exercised in traditional African societies within a 
particular social context. These rights were not enforceable 
against a state or government. Protection of these rights was 
ensured through the social context of kinship relationship and 
expectation of behaviour. While undoubtedly, as with most systems 
of rights protection, there existed inequities in terms of age, 
gender and ethnic groups in the guarantee and operation of these 
rights, the ignorance of Europeans of the way the system worked 
meant they had little regard or understanding for it and imposed 
their own values, perhaps also for administrative ease. Erroneous 
perceptions also led to belief that there existed no form of 
rights in traditional African societies.
Mahmud38 critiques communitarian ideals and dismisses them as a 
politically expedient means of shoring up political power by the
37 op cit., note 19, in Welch and Meltzer (eds) HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT at 11.
38 Mahmud, Sakah, op cit., note 32.
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ruling elite. He notes that most of these traditional values - 
provision of food, shelter - were subject to inequalities in 
terms of age, gender, lineage; they were essentially privileges 
not necessarily available on an equal basis to all members of 
society, they could not be laid claim to and they were privileges 
granted to members of the community.
Mutua39 also identifies what he describes as an African cultural 
fingerprint but he approaches the debate from a different aspect. 
In a paper in which he argues for a reconfiguration of a rights 
regime that would have legitimacy in Africa, he identifies and 
elaborates on human rights ideals in existence in indigenous 
societies prior to colonisation. He is critical of universalists 
or "cultural chauvinists" who are dismissive of the African 
cultural fingerprint firstly because it is implicit in their work 
that only European liberalism, which is claimed to be inevitable 
under modernisation, can be the foundation for the concept of 
human rights. There is a likelihood that their stress on 
universality may lead to a reinforcement of culture as a 
reaction. In any event, he argues that by making liberalism a 
concomitant development with modernisation, this places the 
concept of human rights, for which there is widespread consensus 
on its derivation, within a specific culture. Secondly, a 
universal argument implies a duty to impose that concept of human 
rights on non-European cultures because it is universal. Mutua 
is also critical of Africanist writers who claim a distinctively 
African concept of human rights because they exaggerate its 
uniqueness. This unique value they assert fails to recognise that 
concepts of human dignity - the basis of human rights - are 
inherent in all human societies. African traditional communities 
were communitarian40 but changes have been wrought in modern day 
African urban society through a combination of colonisation, 
industrialisation and modernisation. These have not combined to
39 "African Cultural Fingerprint", op cit., note 24.
40see generally Fadipe, N.A., THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE 
YORUBA, Ibadan University Press, 1970, reprinted, 1990 for the 
structure of Yoruba society.
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totally transmute or even transform the pre-existing society into 
a wholly modern society. In fact, rural society remains largely 
unchanged by the effects of industrialisation and modern society 
and traditional values still hold sway. In urban areas, modern 
African society remains an uneasy mix of traditional values and 
modern influences.
"What may best characterise contemporary Africa is a 
richness, or confusion, of norms: expectations imposed 
during the colonial period, presuppositions inherited 
from earlier periods, and new ideas developed since 
independence.1141
A shift of emphasis in the whole debate, which is overlooked and 
with which I agree, was recognised by Pollis and Schwab and 
clarifies the whole issue;
"It should not be forgotten that the San Francisco 
Conference which established the United Nations in 
1945 was dominated by the West, and that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted at a time when 
most Third World countries were still under colonial 
rule. Thus to argue that human rights has a standing 
which is universal in character is to contradict 
historical reality. What ought to be admitted by those 
who argue universality is that human rights as a 
western concept based on natural right should become
the standard upon which all nations ought to agree, 
recognizing however, that this is only one particular 
value system. 1,42
41 Welch in Welch & Meltzer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, op cit., note 19, at 15.
42 Pollis, A., & Schwab, P., 'Human RightsrA Western 
construct with limited Applicability1 in Pollis, A. & Schwab, P., 
(eds) HUMAN RIGHTS:CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, Praeger 
Press:New York, 1979 at 4.
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They go on to state further that " [i] f the notion of human rights 
is to be a viable universal concept it will be necessary to 
analyze the different cultural and ideological conceptions of 
human rights and the impact of one on the other."43
Essentially, the tensions within the human rights discourse are 
artificial, even if genuine. The crux of the matter appears to 
be that there may exist norms within variable cultures around the 
world which correspond to the human rights contained within 
international documents. These norms have been variously decribed 
as principles of human dignity or traditional African values. It 
has been suggested that the Western concept of dignity is 
expressed as human rights.44 All the commentators agree that 
cognisance needs to be taken of these values; it is the extent 
to which recognition is given and the level of legal formulation 
that appears to be thorny. Differing cultures and values do not 
obliterate the problems of abuse in any milieu. Where 
discrimination exists, it must still be addressed, either with 
regard to the value system of a specific culture or with 
reference to accepted human rights norms.
Eugene Kamenka has written that "Peoples... are...members of the 
human race. As such, they are entitled to dignity, respect, and 
the recognition that they are fully members of the human race. 
They are not entitled to immunity from outside or internal 
criticism of their dominant customs, practices and traditions in 
so far as these are themselves destructive of respect for 
persons, of moral compassion and of the recognition of the moral 
equality of all people and the destructive character of pain,
43 ibid at pl5.
44 Leary, V., 'The Effect of Western Perspectives on 
International Human Rights' in An-Naim, A. and Deng, F., (eds) 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, Brookings 
Institute, 1990, chapter 2, hereafter An-Naim and Deng, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA.
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suffering, and deprivation as regular features of social life."45
It is possible to argue that despite the fact that human rights 
are Western in inception, they are and should be considered 
universal as Pollis and Schwab posit because they have been 
accepted all over the world. Communitarian values may be more 
important in African societies but it does not invalidate the 
relevance of human rights norms to their society. Human rights 
serve to protect people individually and within groups and can 
help to regulate competing claims.46 Further, there have been 
considerable contributions by developing countries to the 
development of human rights.47 The approach in the African Charter 
and the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, discussed
45 Kamenka, E., 'Human Rights:Peoples Rights' in 
Crawford, J. (ed) RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1988 at 133.
46 Howard, R., 'Group versus Individual Identity in 
the African Debate on Human Rights' in An-Naim and Deng, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA, chapter 7. Howard states that the argument of 
human rights equalling anomic individualism is based on a 
misperception of the reality of Western based societies. Rights 
based philosophy and individualism simply occurred around the 
same time and are not an inevitable consequence of 
industrialisation. Yet, in an earlier work HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
COMMONWEALTH AFRICA, she argued that modernisation in the modern 
African nation states has resulted in a dislocation of the 
communitarian values of traditional societes resulting in more 
individualism and as such human rights are the ideal tool to 
regulate and protect the relationship between the individual and 
the state. To note this does not invalidate her argument of the 
relevance of human rights norms within communitarian societies. 
But the premise of her earlier argument that modern society has 
influenced and informed behavioural norms to the extent that the 
appropriate safeguard is the notion of human rights appears to 
have shifted to a more radical universal strain where the value 
of human rights norms is not obviated by a differing value 
system.
47 This is particularly true with the development of 
so-called third generation rights like the right to development, 
a declaration on which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1986. Clearly, existing documents did not adequately address 
the whole gamut of issues and areas important to developing 
countries. While the proliferation of Declarations may be 
counter-productive in the long term, they do serve as persuasive 
reminders of the values considered to deserve the moral 
imperative of rights.
44
below, which couples rights and duties is illustrative.
The central issue, however, is the enforcement and implementation 
of human rights. For enforcement to be effective, principles need 
legitimacy within any cultural context; they need acceptance by 
the community which is expected to rely on them for the 
protection of their rights. As Abdullahi An-Naim48 has stated, the 
inefficacy of the implementation of established rights may lie 
in the lack of cultural acceptance. Cultural legitimacy acts as 
a framework for internal implementation and gives the requisite 
acceptance of values that is required for effective enforcement. 
Obstacles to effective implementation also include the 
underdeveloped nature of most African economies and the lack of 
the social conditions necessary for rights protection and these 
factors make it imperative that the rights discourse is imbued 
with a sensitivity to the practical realities. The specificities 
of the African continent, with respect to the limitations of the 
rights discourse49 must inform and influence approaches to 
implementation. Cultural legitimacy is an important aspect of 
this, not only because it aids implementation, but because it is 
operative at the implementation stage. It means that cultural 
aspects of a society can be assimilated into the application of 
the substance of the rights. Cultural legitimacy carries the 
scope of universality of rights with cultural implementation.
Official recognition of human rights instruments through 
ratification does not amount to internal legitimacy. This is 
particularly important in an African context given the uneasy 
relationship between the formal State and the people. 
Identification of nationality tends to be primarily with one's 
ethnic group with all the cultural implications as opposed to the 
state. Legitimacy of values, societal organisation, dispute 
resolution and intra-ethnic socialisation is determined by that
48 An-Naim, A.A., in An-Naim and Deng, (eds), HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA, chapter 13.
49 see further Chapter 3.
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cultural identification. The role of the state and the activities 
of government are detached from societal organisation. It remains 
difficult to attach cultural significance to governmental action. 
Consequently, human rights are to be viewed in a cross-cultural 
perspective, within a relativist sensitivity in order to be 
legitimate within any society. The substance of rights are 
universal while the implementation may vary in form. Shwartz50 
posits the view that universal support for human rights is 
possible if it draws on elements from differing cultural 
traditions, if there is sufficient integration of civil, 
political and economic rights and if it enables self- 
determination of all nations. This culture of human rights can 
provide a system for governing and regulating world society.
PART II
A.REGIONAL PROMULGATIONS ON RIGHTS PROTECTION
1. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights took essentially 
a holistic view of rights, primarily due to geo-political and 
historical reasons. The success of the breadth of rights tackled 
within such a framework has yet to be proven. The inclusion of 
notions of African values and traditions has enabled assertion 
of a differing but valid world view. This world view does not 
obviate nor invalidate the universal nature of international 
human rights principles.
Historical factors play an important role in the extent to which 
African states independently and collectively through the 
Organization of African Unity have been able to contribute to the 
development of international law.51 At the time of the
50 "Human Rights in an Evolving World Culture", in An- 
Naim and Deng (eds) HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, chapter 14.
51 See Elias, T.O., NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff Publishers B.V. :The Netherlands, 1979, 
Chapter 2, pp21-34, on the contribution of Asia and Africa to 
contemporary international law.
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proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most 
African countries were still under colonial rule. As African 
states began to gain independence, the primary issues of concern 
were self-determination, racism and apartheid. State territorial 
integrity and sovereignty were considered the most important 
forms of rights protection. Safeguards against any future 
attempts at territorial or sovereign subjugation were of the 
paramount importance. The new state, then was the primary organ 
requiring protection. This history, and the perceived threat of 
future harm informed the establishment of the OAU and the 
contents of its Charter.
The following section will briefly look at the factors that led 
to the establishment of the OAU, some of its substantive 
contents, the principal institutions, factors that led to the 
drafting of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and 
the concept of African values. It demonstrates that in following 
established organisational structures of political organisation 
and human rights protection, the African system of rights 
protection has replicated the exclusionary nature of the 
international legal order which is detrimental to the protection 
of women's human rights.
1.1 The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
The Organization of African Unity52 was constituted at a 
conference of African heads of state and government in Addis 
Ababa held from May 23 to 26, 1963 to promote the unity and
solidarity of African and Malagasy states.53 There were initially 
30 signatories to the Charter but that number has since increased 
to 53. Namibia joined after independence in March 1990 and
52OAU Charter, adopted 25 thMay, 1963, 47 UNTS 39,
reprinted 2 ILM, 766, 1963, see also Sohn, L. (ed) DOCUMENTS OF 
AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Vol. 1, 62, Inter-American
Institute of International Legal Studies, 1971 and also 
Degenhardt, Henry, W. (ed), Day, Alan, J. (Gen. Ed.), TREATY 
ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD, 3rd edition, (Keesing's reference 
publications), Longman Group Ltd, 1981.
53Article 2(1) (a), OAU Charter.
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Eritrea in May, 1993. South Africa joined after its first multi­
racial elections in 1994. All the North African countries with 
the exception of Morocco are members. Morocco left the 
Organization in 1985 in a dispute over the admission of the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Morocco requested the 
expulsion of SADR at the 1992 head of state summit which was 
rejected.
The principal institutions54 of the Organization are the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government which meets at least once a 
year, the Council of Ministers which meets at least twice a year 
to discuss the implementation of the Organization's accords, the 
General Secretariat with an administrative General Secretary to 
direct the affairs of the secretariat and the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration55 which was replaced in 
1993 by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution.56 The OAU had been active in its early years in 
mediation and conciliation attempts in disputes between its 
member states.57 Faced with increasing conflicts on the
54Article 7, OAU Charter.
55see Sohn, L.,DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, for the Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration, 1964, at 69, Rules of procedure of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 1964, 77, Rules 
of Procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OAU, 
1963, 86 and Functions and Regulations of the General Secretariat 
of OAU, 1963, 92.
56 see Part II of this Chapter and the Secretary General's 
Report on "Resolving Conflicts in Africa - Implementation 
Options" OAU Information Services Publication - Series (II) , 
1993 .
57See generally, Zartman, I.W., “The OAU in the African 
State System”, ppl3-44 at 14-19, Wiseman, H., “The 
OAU:Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution”, ppl23-154, Damis, J., 
“The OAU and Western Sahara”, pp273-296 and Pittman, D., “The OAU 
and Chad”, pp297-326 in El-Ayouty, Y. & Zartman, I.W. (eds) THE 
OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS (A SAIS study on Africa), Praeger:New 
York, 1984. See also Fredland, R., A GUIDE TO AFRICAN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Hans Zell Publishers, U.K., 1990, 
at 27-2 8 for a table of African disputes considered by the OAU 
up to 1980.
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continent, the NGO Africa Leadership Forum, the OAU and the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa sponsored a conference in Kampala, 
Uganda in 1991. The final report, the Kampala Document, proposed 
the establishment of a permanent Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Cooperation and called for the 
establishment of continental peacekeeping machinery. Based on 
this theme, plans were made by the OAU for the establishment of 
a Conflict Management Mechanism and the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in June, 
1993 by the adoption of a Declaration in Cairo by the Assembly 
of Heads of States and Government.58 The central organ of the 
mechanism is the Bureau of the Summit,59 a committee consisting 
of member states,60 with the Secretary General working closely 
with and acting under the supervision of the central organ. The 
idea of a wholly OAU financed peace-keeping operation was 
retained as a long-term measure with resort to UN financial and 
logistical assistance where necessary. It was agreed that the OAU 
could mount small observer operations as it did in Rwanda.61 The 
mechanism, as with the OAU, is beset with financial constraints 
which will affect its ability to implement its plans.
There are various specialised commissions62 in the OAU, in a 
structure similar to that of the UN, including the Economic and 
Social Commission, the Educational and Cultural Commission, the 
Defence Commission and the Scientific, Technical and Research
58see Bakwesegha, C.J., op cit. on conflict resolution by 
the OAU. see also Keller's introduction to AFRICA IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER,ppl1-12 on Kampala conference.
59para 14 9 Secretary General's Report.
60 At the 30th Assembly in 1994, the following member states 
were named as members of the Bureau; Benin, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia.
61 see paras. 170-171 of the Secretary General's report.
62Article 20, OAU Charter.
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Commission.63 The annual conference of the OAU takes place each 
year in the member state which is due to take over the 
chairmanship of the Organization for the next year. There have 
been three extraordinary conferences, permitted under Article 9 
on approval by the majority of the member states; the first was 
to discuss the Angolan crisis, the second in 1980 to address the 
continent's economic problems and the third, in 1990 on the 
African debt problem.64
The structure of the OAU is similar to that of the United 
Nations. The Charters of both Organisation make reference to the 
raison d'etre of each; the UN Charter makes explicit reference 
in its preamble to the two world wars which necessitated 
international co-operation to avoid such conflicts in the future 
and the OAU Charter refers in Article II to the eradication of 
colonialism, defence of sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity. While both organisations came into being for differing 
reasons, there are some commonalities. Both refer to 
international co-operation and the OAU Charter makes direct 
reference to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Structurally, the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government is akin to the UN General Assembly. Both meet 
annually, special sessions can be convoked,65 both elect a
63 In addition to the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and 
the Economic and Social Council, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 
established as organs of the African Economic Community a Pan- 
African Parliament, a Court of Justice and Specialised Technical 
Committees under article 7. The established committees are on 
Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, on Monetary and Financial 
Matters, on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, on Industry, 
Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and 
Environment, on Transport, Communications and Tourism, on Health, 
Labour and Social Affairs and on Education, Culture and Human 
Resources. Article 25. For text, see 3 RADIC 1991, 792.
64 An Extraordinary session on human rights in Africa is to 
be held in November, 1998 in Angola which was decided at the 
Yaounde summit in 1996.
65UN Charter, article 20
50
president or chairman each session66 and both may establish 
subsidiary organs to perform functions.67 While there is nothing 
in the OAU comparable to the Security Council,68 the maintenance 
of peace and security on the continent is arguably being dealt 
with under the aegis of the recently established Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which will also 
deal with dispute resolution, dealt with under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter. Both Organisations have a secretariat. Structurally, 
the OAU has followed the pattern of institutional organisation 
of the United Nations.
While the OAU Charter affirms adherence to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Article 2(1) (e) , its main purpose on creation was and remains 
unity between African states in order to safeguard their 
independence and territorial sovereignty and to fight against 
colonialism and 'neo-colonialism in all its forms1.69 It is 
essentially a political organisation intended to form a bulwark 
against outside interference while collaborating to develop 
Africa's autonomy economically, socially and culturally. The 
principles contained in Article III demonstrate the factors which 
informed the drafting committee: non-interference in internal 
affairs, sovereignty, territorial integrity of each state and the 
right to independent existence. Colonialism had so impacted 
adversely on the independence and sovereignty of the states that 
their primary concern was to prevent its incidence at any cost 
in the future. Main concerns at the time were the eradication of
66UN Charter, article 21
67UN Charter, article 22.
68 the idea of establishing an African Security Council 
within the OAU has been discussed for many years but has found 
little favour with the member states who have generally felt that 
establishing such a council would erode the principle of 
sovereign equality of member states. See para 13 9, Secretary- 
General ' s report on Resolving Conflicts, 1993,
69 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, preamble.
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colonialism and apartheid from the continent. Human rights 
concerns were restricted to the minority regimes of South Africa 
and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Broader protection of human rights 
received no mention in the Charter.
"This neglect in 1963 is hardly surprising. The major 
preoccupation of the African leaders was how to 
enhance the security of the fragile state system which 
they had then just inherited from their erstwhile 
colonial masters. Already in this period some 
independent African states were seriously threatened 
by internal as well as external forces. Indeed, many 
of the African leaders that gathered in Addis Ababa in 
May, 1963 were already under threat from internal 
opposition groups. The Congo Crisis and the 
assassination of Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in a coup
d'etat shortly before the founding conference of the
OAU graphically illustrated this dilemma. Furthermore, 
the experience of African leaders during the colonial 
era did not inculcate in them respect for human 
rights. Many of them had served prison terms for 
daring to criticise the colonial policies. Besides, 
they inherited the colonial instruments of repression: 
the police, the intelligence services, the army, and 
the prisons."70
The OAU's neglect of human rights on the continent can be 
ascribed to two related factors; protection of states' 
sovereignty and the application of the principle of 'non­
interference in the internal affairs of States'.71 Violations of
70 Sesay, A. et al, THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS, Westview 
Press, Inc, 1984 at 79.
71 Article III (2), OAU Charter. The principle of 'non­
interference' in a state's domestic jurisdiction is also 
contained in the U.N Charter, article 2(7). The article 2(7) 
defence is nowadays invoked primarily in response to threats of
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human rights were assumed to come under internal affairs and did 
not admit interference by other states. However, the provision 
itself has not been absolutely prohibitive. The OAU involved 
itself in two cases of civil war; in Nigeria and Zaire, and 
member states have expressed their disapproval of coup d'etats 
by refusing to participate in sessions where new regimes have 
been part of the proceedings.72 In recent years, the burgeoning 
number of unresolvable conflicts on the continent, which has been 
the primary cause of displacement, devastation, hunger and the 
creation of refugees within Africa, has led to the creation of 
a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
within the OAU.73
forceful intervention. The role of the UN system, in particular, 
the General Assembly in publicising the situation in South 
Africa, stimulating response to it and the role of the Security 
Council in ordering sanctions ensured that the prevailing view 
is that the establishment of a non-racial and democratic 
constitution that would guarantee equal rights to all was no 
longer a matter of domestic jurisdiction. See further Steiner & 
Alston, op cit. on the role of the UN in South Africa and the 
restriction of the domestic jurisdiction defence.
72 The regime of Togo was prevented from attending the 
inaugural conference of the OAU because of opposition from 
Nigeria, Guinea, Tanganyika, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Niger and 
the Central African Republic. When Nkrumah was overthrown, Congo, 
Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Kenya and Mauritania refused to 
participate at the OAU summit when attempts to deny participation 
to the new regime failed. When Idi Amin overthrew Obote in 
January 1971, both Obote and Amin sent delegations to the summit. 
Both delegations were supported to varying degrees by other 
countries. Neither delegations were seated and the Conference 
broke up. See Akinyemi, A.B., "The Organisation of African Unity 
and the concept of non-interference in internal affairs of 
member-states", BYBIL 1972-73, XLVI, pp393-400 at 399.
See Part III on Regional Institutions, infra, for more detail on 
the Assembly of Heads of Government and States, the principal 
institution of the OAU, and the appropriate forum for discussion 
of such issues.
73 Established in June 1993 by the adoption of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of a Declaration in Cairo. See 
further, Bakwesegha, Chris, J., “The role of the Organization of 
African Unity in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, July 1995, pp207-219,
OAU/UNHCR special issue.
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The OAU Charter makes no explicit reference to human rights save 
a preambular statement reaffirming its adherence to the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 'provide a solid 
foundation for the peaceful and positive co-operation among 
states'. As a state-centric political organisation, individual 
rights were not mentioned.
However, events on the continent made it clear that some sort of 
formal legal document encapsulating the notion of rights, as with 
other regions, was necessary. The unprecedented levels of 
brutality reached by the regimes of Idi Amin of Uganda, Francisco 
Macias Nguema of Equitorial Guinea and Jean Bokassa of the former 
Central African Empire forced the OAU to take the question of 
human rights seriously. At the sixteenth ordinary session held 
in Monrovia, Liberia from 17-20 July 1979, the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government decided to undertake a study on the 
preparation of a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the establishment
of bodies to protect human and peoples' rights.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted on 
17 June 198174 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. The 
historical context75 of the origins of the African Charter lay in
This replaced the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration, one of the institutional mechanisms established 
under the OAU Charter, but which was effectively dormant from its 
establishment. Its jurisdiction was limited to inter-state 
disputes (thus excluding intra-state disputes) and was concerned 
with dispute resolution, not prevention. See further the 
Secretary General's report on "Resolving Conflicts in Africa - 
Implementation Options", OAU Information Services Publication - 
Series (II) 1993 which considers the feasibility of establishing 
a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
which was subsequently established in 1993 as noted.
74 Eighteenth Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 
of the Organisation of African Unity in Nairobi, Kenya. Reprinted 
in 21 ILM 58, 1982.
75 The decision of the OAU meeting to call a meeting of 
experts to prepare an African Charter had part of its roots in
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increasing despotism in Africa, continued apartheid in South 
Africa and the struggle for a new international economic order. 
Colonialism and institutionalised racism, the raison d'etre of
the OAU showed no sign of waning, at the continental level 
atrocities were burgeoning and at the international level, 
African states were trying to assert themselves to realign the 
inequities and inequalities in the economic system. It was not 
possible to maintain a stance of rights due to the state in a 
context where states were rampantly undermining the human rights 
of its people. It became imperative that principles that promoted 
the respect for human rights be readily applicable to Africa.
An additional influential factor was the international 
affirmation of human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
principles integral to the full development of a country. The 
call for a new international economic order, primarily by 
developing nations, was linked to the right to development which 
itself related to the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights.76 The time was essentially propitious 
for a regional document on the protection of human rights.
the United Nations which had mooted the point of establishing 
African machinery at various seminars on human rights and in fact 
had various African situations such as Uganda, under 
investigation. Ramcharan, B.G., “The travaux preparatoires of the 
African Commission on Human Rights”, 13 HRLJ 1992, 307.
76 The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of 
Human Rights UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev. See infra Chapter 
3 for a full discussion.
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1.2 An African Concept of Human Rights?
The drafters77 of the Charter had to reconcile several issues. 
The diversity, different ideology and multi-cultural nature of 
all African countries had to be taken into account. The proposed 
Charter, while conforming to universal principles had to contain 
African values. The Charter78 is distinct in that it contains both 
civil and political rights as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights in one document which differs from other human 
rights regional instruments. It is a far-reaching and ambitious 
document. It includes a familiar catalogue of rights. In addition 
the notion of peoples' rights, the right to self-determination,79 
the concept of rights80 and duties81 and the inclusion of the 
right to development82 and a satisfactory environment83 were all 
a new and laudable approach to an African concept of human 
rights. Although article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights refers to the general duty of the individual to the
77 For information on the drafting history see Ramcharan, 
B.G. op. cit. and Kodjo, E., “The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights”, 11 HRLJ, Nos 3-4, 1990, 271 at 274-275. See 
also, Kannyo, Edward, "The Banjul Charter on Human and People's 
Rights: Genesis and Political Background" in Welch, C. & Meltzer, 
R., (eds), HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT op cit.
78 See Gittleman, R. , "The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis", VJIL v22(4), 1982, pp667-714, 
Umozurike, U.O., "The African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights", 77 AJIL, 1983, 902, Bondzie-Simpson, E., "A critique of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", Howard Law Jnl 
v31(4), 1988, pp643-665 and Okere, Obinna, B., "The Protection 
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and 
American Systems", HRQ v6(2) 1984, ppl41-159.
79 article 20. Article 21 deals with the right of all peoples to
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.
80 Chapter I, ACHPR.
81 Chapter II, ACHPR.
82 article 22, which is expressed in terms of States having the
duty to ensure the exercise of the right to development.
83 article 24.
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community within which the full development of his personality 
is possible, the concept of duties in the ACHPR is more specific 
and requires that the individual undertake certain 
responsibilities.84 While common article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refer to the 
right to self-determination, article 20 of the ACHPR puts self- 
determination in the context of freedom from domination and 
refers to the right to self-determination as inalienable.
The document, however, lacks precision in several respects. There 
is no definition of 'peoples', there is inadequate clarity with 
regards to the right to self-determination, particularly in the 
context of peoples' rights and there is no definition or 
explanation as to what constitutes culture.85 It is questionable 
whether the idea of duties of the individual to family, community 
and indeed the state is enforceable, or even justiciable, besides 
which there exists inherent potential for conflict of duties in 
the named areas. There are no derogation clauses and consequently 
no non-derogable rights. The clawback clauses, where they exist, 
are drafted widely and restrict the protected rights with no 
procedural guarantees. For example, article 6 provides that no 
individual may be deprived of his or her liberty except for 
reasons and conditions previously laid down by law and article 
8, the provision for freedom of conscience and free practice of 
religion, operates subject to law and order. However, as 
discussed below, the use and operation of retrospective 
legislation and ouster clauses in particular countries can result 
in uncertainty as to what constitutes law at any given time. Yet, 
in article 11, the right of free assembly, and article 12, the 
right of freedom of movement, provision exists for the enjoyment 
of these rights except under certain stated circumstances such 
as the interest of national security, public health, law and
84 See articles 27-29, ACHPR.
85 article 17(2) and especially article 29(7) where the Charter 
imposes a duty on the individual to preserve positive African 
cultural values.
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order and freedom of others.
The institutional mechanism for the implementation and 
enforcement of the Charter, the African Commission on Human 
Rights, is hampered by restrictions on what it can do and the 
rule on confidentiality although the Commission has, since 1994, 
begun to make disclosures of its work.86 There was no provision 
for a court to enforce the rights although this is now in the 
process of being established.
The Preamble of the African Charter demonstrates the concerns of 
the drafters. There is a reaffirmation of the pledge made in 
Article 2 of the Charter of the OAU to "eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their 
cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples 
of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due 
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights." While taking into consideration the 
traditions of Africa, there is recognition on the one hand that 
"fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human 
beings, which justifies their national and international 
protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of 
peoples rights should necessarily guarantee human rights." There 
is a statement that "the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also 
implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone." There 
is a categoric statement "that the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights" and a further reaffirmation of the 
adherence of the state members of the OAU to "the principles of 
human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the 
declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the
86In its seventh activity report, submitted to the OAU in 
1994, the Commission made disclosures on its work by indicating 
the status of specific cases before and stating its views on 
admissibility. See Ankumah, E.A, "Towards an Effective 
Implementation of the African Charter" Interights Bulletin, 1994, 
Volume 8, No 3, a special edition on the Protection of Human 
Rights in Africa.
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Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned 
Countries and the United Nations."
There is an ambivalence in the preambular paragraphs that aptly 
identifies the quandary of African governments at the time. The 
eradication of colonialism, apartheid and discrimination was 
highly central to ensuring the human rights of the African 
people. The difficulties that states had in asserting their 
sovereignty is evidenced in the repeated references to peoples' 
rights. While there is recognition of human rights as being 
natural to human beings, it appears to be subsumed to the 
"reality and respect of peoples' rights [which] should 
necessarily guarantee human rights." In addition, this natural 
right also implied the performance of duties by individuals. The 
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is given 
priority over civil and political rights from the onset. The 
Preamble states that "it is henceforth essential to pay 
particular attention to the right to development and that civil 
and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social 
and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality 
and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights 
is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights". 
Although there is reaffirmation of the principles of human rights 
contained in international documents and promulgated by 
international organisations such as the United Nations, the 
caveat of African values and traditions is attached. The Preamble 
states that the promotion and protection of human and peoples' 
rights must take into account the "importance traditionally 
attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa". There are 
several contradictory statements within the Preamble itself which 
does not bode well for the text. Are the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the African Charter dependent on the 
performance of duties? It is also questionable to make civil and 
political rights conditional on the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights.
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Rights
Chapter I of the Charter enumerates rights and duties. Article 
2, the non-discrimination provision states:
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in 
the present Charter without distinction of any kind 
such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or any other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status.
Article 3 states:
1.Every individual shall be equal before the law.
2.Every individual shall be entitled to equal 
protection of the law.
Under the non-discrimination article, article 3 should apply 
without distinction. However, the existence of parallel customary 
legal systems87 in Africa operate to discriminate against women 
particularly in the area of family law88 and in addition conflict 
with the provisions of article 18 (3) of the Charter which 
provides that "the State shall ensure the elimination of every 
discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of 
the rights of the women and child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions." Prima facie, the guarantee of 
equal rights under article 3 is breached by operation of national 
law in most countries. For example, Constitutional provisions 
exist for formal legal equality in Nigeria89 but in the area of 
personal laws, the main site for inequality in terms of the
87 See Neff, Stephen, C.,"Human Rights in Africa: Thoughts 
on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in the light 
of case law from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland", 33 ICLQ 1984, 
331. While the main thrust of the article is concerned with the 
southern African countries and the case law, there is a short 
discussion of the issue of non-discrimination.
88 see further Chapter 5.
89 section 39, Chapter IV on fundamental rights.
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promotion and protection of women's rights, customary law is 
usually given precedence over statutory provisions.90 The Charter 
has failed to consider and make provision for an African problem 
they could have envisaged.
"The difficulty with the Banjul Charter, however, is 
that it does not contain an express saving for 
discriminatory laws which are justiciable on grounds 
of reasonableness
The existence of what amount to parallel legal 
universes within African countries is certainly not 
easy to square with the notion of equality before the 
law. Yet such squaring should be done, in the 
overriding interest of ensuring that the Banjul 
Charter norms are able to function meaningfully in the 
current African social framework."91
Article 6,92 article 7,93 article 8,94 article 9,95 article 10,96
90 For instance, section 69 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 rev. ed; Cap 220 excludes the 
application of its ancillary relief provisions to spouses married 
under customary law. See further Chapter 5 on obstacles to the 
enjoyment of the human rights of women especially the conflicts 
that exist between formal legal equality and existing customary 
law.
91 Neff, S.C, op cit at 336.
92the right to liberty and security of the person
93 the right to have a cause heard
94 freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice 
of religion
95 freedom of information
96 freedom of association
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article ll,97 and article 12,98 contain essentially civil and 
political rights. These rights are circumscribed by reference to 
operation within the law. There are no procedural guarantees that 
go with these rights, particularly under article 7 which 
guarantees the right to have a cause heard. The 'margin of 
appreciation',99 which allows national security or public safety 
limitations to the enjoyment of rights has uneven application in 
the Charter.100 Initially, it would appear that these rights offer 
wide guarantees of protection because they are only limited by 
operation of the law and because of the lack of derogation 
clauses. In actual fact, they are potentially restrictive because 
they are subject to differing national laws, whatever they may 
be and however potentially they conflict with the guarantees 
under the Charter. The clawback clauses effectively restrict the 
formal guarantees.101 They restrict the formal guarantees because 
unlike, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights102 
which provides in its corresponding clawback clauses that the 
rights guaranteed must be protected103 in conformity with the 
rights of others, or where there is a restriction it must 
prescribed by law and necessary for the protection of other,
97 the right to freely assemble with others
98 freedom of movement
99 see Higgins, R."Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, 
BYBIL 48, 1978, 281.
100 As noted above, articles 11 and 12 have some express 
limitations to the enjoyment of the rights they provide while the 
others do not. These others are limited only by operation of the 
law.
101 See Higgins, R. , op cit. See also Gittleman, R. , "The 
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis", 
in Welch and Meltzer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, op cit. note 
19, at pl54ff for an analysis of the lack of provision for 
derogations in the ACHPR.
102 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and relevant protocols (European Convention) 
signed in Rome 4th November, 1950 and entered into force on 3rd 
September, 1953, 213 UNTS 221.
103 For example, see articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2) ECHR.
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public morals or national security reasons and necessary in a 
democratic society, the clawback clauses in the African Charter 
need only be prescribed by law.
This includes, in practice, retrospective legislation, whether 
by decree or otherwise and legislative enactments which oust or 
exclude the courts' jurisdiction or nullifies the courts' 
jurisdiction.104 The use of ouster clauses, for instance in 
Nigeria, are arguably prescribed by law but have the effect of 
excluding the provisions of the Charter. Fawehinmi notes that 
between independence in 1960 and 1991, a total of 164 laws were 
promulgated by Federal Governments containing ousters of courts' 
jurisdiction; the total number of ouster sections in those laws 
being 216. The African Charter was ratified by Nigeria in 1983 
by Act No.2 of 1983 as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983 with a commencement 
date of 17th March, 1983. It is a part of national law. Article 
7 of the Charter provides that:
"1.Every individual shall have the right to have his 
cause heard. This comprises:
(a)the right to an appeal to competent national organs 
against acts of violating his fundamental rights as 
recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, 
regulations and customs in force;
(b)the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty by a competent court or tribunal;
(c)the right to defence, including the right to be 
defended by counsel of his choice;
(d)the right to be tried within a reasonable time by 
an impartial court or tribunal.
2.No one may be condemned for an act or omission which 
did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the 
time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for
104See Fawehinmi, G., "Denial of Justice through ouster of 
Courts jurisdiction in Nigeria." Journal of Human Rights Law & 
Practice, Vol.1 No.2, 7, 1991.
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an offence for which no provision was made at the time 
it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be 
imposed only on the offender."
Ouster clauses or enactments may be general, may be retrospective 
to protect unconstitutional laws, may be used to prevent the 
general process of court or may be used to intervene, stop or 
nullify court orders.105 Such use of ouster clauses and provisions 
also directly challenge the role of the judiciary and in the 
absence of activism and dynamism by a judiciary dedicated to the 
protection of their independence, violations of rights will 
continue unabated despite regional and international treaty 
obligations.106 Ouster of a court's jurisdiction violates the 
right of an individual to have his cause heard and retrospective 
legislative enactments also violate s7(2).107 Nonetheless, no 
matter how heinous or unacceptable the law or the exceptional 
circumstances in which the enactments have been promulgated for 
whatever aims, the limitation or violation of any individual's 
rights will, prima facie be valid under the Charter if it is
prescribed by law. It is possible, however, to argue that the
105 Fawehinmi, at pp5-9.
106See Onyekpere, E ., "Democracy, Human Rights, Dictatorship 
and the Nigerian Judiciary", JHRLP, Vol 3, Nos. 1,2,3, December, 
1993 (Composite Edition), 49.
107See Annual Report, 1994; A CLO report on the state of 
human rights in Nigeria, Civil Liberties Organisation, 1995, 
especially pages 156-164 noting the various decrees promulgated 
by the incumbent military government during the preceeding year. 
One of the decrees, Concord Newspapers and African Concord Weekly 
Magazine (Proscription and Prohibition from Circulation) Decree 
No.6, aimed at curbing freedom of expression and press freedom 
also prohibited the institution of proceedings or suit by any 
person against any act or thing done or purported to be done in 
respect of compliance with the decree and any suit or proceedings 
instituted shall be of no effect whatsoever. Another dissolved 
the national executive of a union, the Nigeria Labour Congress 
(Dissolution of National Executive Council) Decree No.9, 
violating articles 10 and 11 of the Charter on freedom of 
association and yet another, State Security (Detention of 
Persons) (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree No.14, stated that no writ of 
habeas corpus shall the issued by the order of any court for the 
production of any person, at 161-162. Other examples abound.
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reference to prescription by law includes international law 
presumably including jus cogens.108
Duties
Articles 27 to 29 deal with the concept of the duty of the 
individual towards his family and society. It is doubtful whether 
the notion of duties owed to a family, community, state or 
international community is enforceable or even justiciable. 
Article 27 states that:
"1.Every individual shall have duties towards his 
family and society, the State and other legally 
recognized communities and the international community
2.The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, 
collective security, morality and common interest."
The exact nature of these duties is not explicitly expressed. 
What it comprises of is not enumerated. The rationale for the 
whole notion of duties may be explained by article 2 9 where the 
individual's duty is stated to include maintenance of the family, 
including parents (article 29(1)), payment of taxes, (article 
29(6)), service to the national community, (article 29 (2)) and 
preservation and strengthening of positive African values, 
(article 29 (7) ) . These duties are intended to foster a spirit
of unity and perhaps to reinforce a notion of African 
communitarianism and values. But are they legal and justiciable?
The notion of duties as a correlative to rights is explained by 
Cobbah thus:
108 This argument has recently been presented before the 
Commission on the legality or otherwise of the execution of the 
Ogoni men in 1995 by the Nigerian government. The decision is 
forthcoming.
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"Within the organization of African social life one 
can discern various organizing principles. As a
people, Africans emphasize groupness, sameness, and 
commonality. Rather than survival of the fittest and 
control over nature, the African worldview is tempered 
with the general guiding principle of the survival of 
the entire community and a sense of cooperation,
interdependence, and collective responsibility.
The extended family unit, like family units in 
nearly all societies, assigns each family member a 
social role that permits the family to operate as a 
reproductive, economic, and socilization unit. These 
roles of kinship, however, are defined differently 
than in Western families and the behavior (sic) of kin 
toward one another is different than that which 
pertains in the West. In many African societies, for 
example, there is no distinction between a father and 
an uncle, or a brother and a cousin. Among the Akans 
of Ghana the English word "aunt" has no equivalent. 
For the Akan all aunts are mothers - i.e., older
mothers and younger mothers. Likewise there is no
equivalence for the English word "cousin" in the Akan 
language. A cousin is simply a brother or a sister. 
The differences that one finds in responsibilities 
toward different kin people usually revolve around 
whether the particular society is matrilineal or 
patrilineal.
These kinship terminologies, that is, the way 
relatives are named, are related to the ideals and 
expected behavioral patterns and norms that govern 
family members. The kinship terminology defines and 
institutionalizes the family member's social role.
"These roles are essentially rights which each kinship
member customarily possesses, and duties which each
kinship member has toward his kin." Viewed another 
way, the right of one kinship member is the duty of 
the other and the duty of the other kinship member is
66
the right of another."109
Clearly, for proponents of African values or what Mutua has 
termed "the African cultural fingerprint",110 the concept of 
duties is an inherent part of African communitarian society and 
is quite properly expressed in correlation to the language of 
rights in the African Charter. He identifies and elaborates on 
human rights ideals which existed in precolonial societies in his 
attempt to reconfigure a rights regime that could achieve 
legitimacy in Africa and become the basis for social and 
political reconstruction. Inherent in his thesis is the concept 
of duties. The concept of duties is an important contribution to 
culturally specific values because it informs the human rights 
discourse with an African contribution. What are these African 
values? They seem to incorporate primarily social and kinship 
relations and are expressed by Mutua as:
"The principles and ideals common to all these 
conceptions are, according to the author's own 
observations of various African societies, respect 
for, and protection of, the individual and 
individuality within the family and the greater socio­
political unit; deference to age because a long life 
is generally wise and knowledgeable; commitment and 
responsibility to other individuals, family, and 
community; solidarity with fellow human beings, 
especially in times of need; tolerance for difference 
in political views and personal ability; reciprocity 
in labor issues and for generosity; and consultation 
in matters of governance."111
109 Cobbah, J.A.M, “African Values and the Human Rights 
Debate: An African Perspective”. HRQ volume 9, 1987, 309 at 32 0- 
321, footnotes omitted, italics are author's own.
110 Mutua, Makau wa, " African Cultural Fingerprint" op cit., 
note 24.
111 ibid at 352, footnote and italics omitted.
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"In practical terms, this philosophy of the group- 
centered individual evolves through a series of 
carefully taught rights and responsibilities. At the 
root were structures of social and political 
organization, informed by gender and age, which served 
to enhance solidarity and ensure the existence of the 
community into perpetuity
Relationships, rights, and obligations flowed from 
these organizational structures, giving the community 
cohesion and viability. Certain obligations, such as 
the duty to defend the community and its territory, 
attached by virtue of birth and group membership.1,112
I quote at length from Cobbah and Mutua in order to show exactly 
what are denoted African values. African values consist of an 
intricate network of rules and regulations that govern social and 
kinship relationships. Culturally based as these values are, it 
is unsurprising that the manifestations of such mores should be 
primarily social. In terms of an easily identifiable notion of 
African values with respect to regional protection of human 
rights, I remain unconvinced that this is evidenced either in the 
regional human rights documents or in their institutional 
mechanisms.
The documents make reference to "African Values" but they are not 
defined. Social values are important, they influence societal 
organisation and are also linked to moral values which in turn 
influence legal policy and the law. Yet the idea of an 
intrinsically African notion of cultural values contradicts the 
fact that culture is not monolithic, nor is it possible to 
attribute a culture to a continent. The only common African 
experience is colonialism and the effect it has had on the 
economic and social development of the majority of African 
countries.
112 Mutua, ibid at 361.
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While there may be similarities in culture amongst countries in 
Africa, it remains the case that, save in express reference to 
"culture" the regional human rights documents do not evidence an 
intrinsic notion of African cultural values. Further, regional 
institutional mechanisms for rights protection do not demonstrate 
a specific African model of rights promotion and protection; they 
are based on international and other regional models.113 The 
specificities of Africa relates directly to its geo-political, 
colonial history especially with regard to economic 
underdevelopment which has affected the capability of many 
countries in terms of social development. These specificities 
need to inform the implementation of human rights; in the 
creation of the social conditions on which the promotion and 
protection of human rights is predicated.
2. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child114
The proclamation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child is evidence of the commitment of the OAU to the 
regional development of human rights norms and protection. The 
precursor to the Charter was the Declaration on the Rights and 
Welfare of the African Child, 1979115 adopted by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its Sixteenth 
Ordinary Session in Monrovia, Liberia which recognised the need 
to protect the welfare of the African Child. The Charter names
113 see infra Part B Enforcement Mechanisms.
114 1990, reprinted in 3 RADIC 1991, 173. For commentary on the 
Charter, see Thompson, B., "Africa's Charter on Childrens' 
Rights: A Normative Break with Cultural Traditionalism", VOL 41 
ICLQ 1992, 432.
115 AHG/ST.4 Rev.l. This Declaration was adopted during the 
period leading up to the adoption of the ACHPR in 1981 and was
clearly part of the development of regional human rights
protection. There is no clear reason why so much time elapsed
before the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child itself
was adopted.
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the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,116 the OAU 
Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child and 
principles of the rights and welfare of the child contained in 
various OAU promulgations as sources of inspiration in its 
Preamble.
There are also references to African values in this Charter. The 
preamble mentions "...the virtues of their cultural 
heritage, ... the values of African civilisation which should 
inspire and characterise their reflection on the concept of the 
rights and welfare of the child..." The notion of duties is also 
mentioned. While article 1 states that "any custom, tradition or 
religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties 
and obligations" in the Charter should be discouraged other 
articles refer to custom and tradition as part of the African 
child's heritage. For instance, article 11 on education states 
that the education of the child shall be directed, inter alia, 
to the "preservation and strengthening of positive African 
morals, traditional values and cultures".117 Reading the Charter 
in conjunction with the ACHPR, presumably the responsibility for 
cultural education of children falls within the remit of the 
family since the preservation of cultural values comes under 
Chapter II on duties in the ACHPR and is expressed in terms of 
relations with other members of society. Cultural leisure 
activities is referred to in article 12. There is specific 
protection in article 21 from harmful social and cultural 
practices where prejudicial to health or life of the child and 
article 12(2) prohibits child bethrothal. A committee is 
established under article 32 to promote and protect the rights 
of the child with a reporting mechanism under article 43.
While the protection of the rights and welfare of the child 
appears to have emerged as part of the general discussion and 
development of human rights norms in the period leading up to the
116 UN Doc A/44/25, 1989.
117 article 11(2) (c) .
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adoption of the primary regional document on rights protection, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, it appears also 
to have been influenced by developments internationally which led 
to the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
The Children's Charter endeavours to incorporate a culturally 
relevant form of rights protection while retaining similar 
institutional elements to the UN Children's Convention such as 
a Committee118 and a reporting procedure.119
3. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women
In June, 1995, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
endorsed the decision of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights to elaborate a draft protocol on the Rights of 
Women.120
In addition to the usual international treaties on human rights 
such as the International Bill of Rights and the African Charter 
itself, the preamble of the draft protocol refers to the 
recognition of women's essential role in development affirmed in 
the UN Plans of Action such as on Human Rights in 1993,121 and 
Beijing122 in 1995. The preamble notes also that rights are 
considered by many in Africa to be the preserve of men despite 
the fundamental role of women in peace and development in Africa.
Article 1 defines discrimination as 'any distinction, exclusion 
or restriction based on sex whose effects compromise or destroy
118 article 43 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
119 article 44 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
120 a copy of the draft protocol is on file with the candidate. 
See appendix.
121 A/CONF.157/23.
122 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action A/CONF./177/20, 
1995.
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the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women - regardless 
of their matrimonial status - on an equal basis with men, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all aspects'. Article
2 provides for women to 'contribute to the preservation of those 
African cultural values that are positive and are based on the 
principles of equality, dignity, justice and democracy' . Articles
3 and 4 require State Parties to the protocol to take all 
necessary measure to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against women, a similar provision to that in CEDAW, article 2. 
Article 5 prohibits the sentencing of a pregnant women to death, 
all forms of trafficking and commercial exploitation of 
prostitutes, medical or scientific experiments on women, all 
traditional or cultural practices physically harmful to women and 
girl children and requires State Parties to protect women against 
rape and sexual assault. Articles 6 and 7 deal with marriage and 
divorce. Under article 6, marriage is to be with the consent of 
both parties including polygamous marriages although the 
elimination of polygamy should be worked towards. The right of 
a women to keep her maiden name, retain or change her nationality 
and to confer it on her husband or children is contained in 
article 6. Article 7 provides for the equal right of women and 
men to seek divorce or annulment of a marriage. Article 7(2) 
prohibits the inhuman, humiliating or degrading treatment of 
widows. Article 7(4) provides for the widow to be the legal 
guardian of the children of the family and article 7(5) provides 
that a widow shall have the right to inherit her husband's 
property.
Access to legal services and education of women on their rights 
is provided for under article 8. Articles 9 and 10 provide for 
equal participation in politics and the promotion of peace and 
conflict management respectively. Article 11's definition of 
violence seems to incorporate the definition in the Special 
Rapporteur's report on Violence against Women in its reference 
to physical, sexual or psychological harm. Article 12 requires 
State Parties to eliminate discrimination in education, article 
13 provides for equal opportunities for work, article 14 deals
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with the provision of adequate healthcare for women, including 
pre and post-natal healthcare. Article 15 provides for the right 
to adequate supplies of food, article 16 for housing. Article 17 
states that women 'shall have the right to live in a positive 
cultural environment and to participate at all levels in the 
determination of cultural policies and article 17(2) requires 
that State Parties should take measures to protect women from the 
harmful effects of all forms of fundamentalism. Article 18 
provides for women to have the right to live in a healthy 
environment while article 19, with reference to the ACHPR 
requires that State Parties take appropriate measures to ensure 
women fully participate in the development process.
The draft protocol, while an important development for the 
protection and indeed the justiciability of women's rights on the 
African continent, draws from existing international human rights 
instruments, particularly, those dealing with the development and 
protection of women's rights such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) .123 Its references to culture relate only to the positive 
aspects of culture which do not harm women or girl-children. It 
seeks to provide protection from negative cultural influences, 
including attitudes that affect the protection of women's human 
rights. In drawing from existing developments on human rights it 
illustrates the position that African regional documents follow 
established patterns of rights protection. It recognises also 
that a lot of what constitutes 'African Values' are cultural 
values which may be detrimental to the achievement of rights for 
women.
123 UN Doc A/34/46, 1249 UNTS 14.
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B. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
l.The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
The African Commission is the regulatory body of the ACHPR. It 
consists of eleven members serving in their personal capacity124 
and elected, from a list nominated by Member States of the 
Charter, by a secret ballot of the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Government.125 Members are elected for a six year period and 
are eligible for re-election.126 The Commission's mandate is to 
promote and ensure the protection of human and peoples1s rights 
under the conditions of the Charter and interpret the provisions 
of the Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution 
of or recognised by the OAU and perform any task entrusted to it 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.127
The Commission is authorised to lay down its rules of procedure128 
and in 1995 revised rules of procedure were adopted.129 The 
previous rules were not considered, by many, to be as effective 
as they could have been.130 The Commission generally holds two 
sessions a year for about two weeks. Extraordinary sessions may 
be held and only two have been held so far (1987 and 1995, Saro- 
Wiwa's case). The Commission may receive communications from
124 Article 31, ACHPR.
125Article 33, ACHPR.
126Article 36, ACHPR.
127Article 45, ACHPR.
128Article 42(2), ACHPR.
129Revised Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 6/10/95,8 RADIC, 1996, 978. 
The previous Rules of Procedure had been adopted at the 
Commission's second session in 1988.
130Odinkalu, C. "Proposals for Review of the Rules of 
Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights", HRQ, VOL 15, 1993, 533.
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states131 and it may also receive 'other' communications.132 There 
is no requirement that the communications be from an alleged 
victim or from a non-governmental organisation. The requirements 
are that the communication is not anonymous, is compatible with 
the OAU Charter and the African Charter, is not written in an 
insulting or disparaging language, not based solely on 
information disseminated in the media, is submitted within a 
reasonable time after exhausting local remedies and that the 
cases must not have been been settled by those states involved. 
The Commission reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of measures taken within the provisions of the Charter 
who decide if it shall be published.133 Applicable principles to 
be applied by the Commission include the UDHR, other UN 
documents, OAU Charter and provisions of other African documents 
in the area of human and peoples' rights. States Parties are 
required to submit a report on actions taken to implement the 
provisions of the Charter every two years.
There is no equitable gender distribution in the eleven member 
Commission. Until 1993 at the 14th Session when a nominee from 
Cape Verde was elected, there was no woman on the Commission. In 
1995, another woman joined the Commission, a national of Congo.
The impartiality of members of the Commission has at times been 
open to question. For instance, it has happened that certain 
members have been serving members of the incumbent government in 
their states.134 Although members are serving in their personal
131Articles 47 to 54, ACHPR.
132 see Odinkalu, C. & Christensen, C., "The African Commission 
on Human Rights: The Development of its Non-state Communication 
Procedures", 20 HRQ, 1998, 235-280.
133Article 59, ACHPR.
134The Congo Minister of Interior served on the Commission 
between 1987 and 1993 as did the Attorney General of Botswana 
during the same period. See Ankumah, E.A., THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS : PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, Kluwer 
international Publishing, 1996, at 18.
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capacities, the potential for conflict of interest is more likely 
if a serving member is a member of government, despite the fact 
that Commission members are not allowed to take part in the 
deliberations concerning their own member state. The tendency for 
members to take on other posts and responsibilities, even though 
admittedly appointment to the Commission is a part-time 
appointment, has also resulted in situations where members have 
not been able to fulfil their duties by attending sessions.135 
The fact that reporting under article 58 is to the OAU Assembly 
of Heads of Government and States is very tied to the political 
process.
The Secretariat which exists to support the work of the 
Commission is grossly understaffed and under funded. Not only 
does this add to the inefficiency of the work of the Commission, 
it has left the Commission open to the vagaries of conditional 
funding. Some NGOs have supplied staff at no cost to the 
Commission but they have tended to be Western staff. Not only has 
this marginalised African involvement in the administration and 
development of the work of the Commission, it is also highly 
inappropriate to have sensitive information dealt with by the 
nationals of non-member states of the Charter. These volunteers 
and interns draft decisions, sit in on the Commission's 
deliberation and have a day-to-day involvement in what is 
supposed to be an African regional mechanism.
Admissibility. Monitoring of States Reports and the Complaints 
Procedure
The practice136 of the Commission in dealing with communications 
is to first ascertain whether a communication is receivable or 
not.137 This appears to be a means of disposing of the cases that
135 Ibid, at 47.
136 Ibid. This is one of the few published accounts of the 
practice of the Commission. The reporting process was hampered 
at first by confidentiality.
137 Ibid, p56f f .
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do not fit in with the Charter provisions and it is confusing 
since these communications would presumably be also inadmissible. 
The notion of receivability makes it unclear whether a 
communication is prima facie inadmissible or has failed on its
merits. Further, the Commission does not give reasons why a 
communication is irreceivable. Where a communication is received 
alleging a violation against a state that is not a member to the 
Charter, the communication is kept on file and if the state 
becomes a member, the communicant is informed and the 
communication may be re-submitted if desired.
The factors which influence the adequacy and quality of submitted 
state reports include the lack or insufficient mobilisation of 
national resources. The Commission issued guidelines to aid 
report preparation.138 The purpose of the guidelines is to ensure 
that reports are made in a uniform manner and to reduce the need 
for the Commission to request additional information and to 
obtain a clearer picture of the situation in each state regarding 
implementation. The guideline includes a section, Section VII on 
women and requires each state report to include details of 
measures taken to eliminate the 'anachronism' of gender based 
discrimination. It is recommended that reports, instead of 
enumerating lists of legal instruments, should indicate how these 
are reflected in actual, economic, political and social realities 
and general conditions existing in their countries with data and 
statistics categorised according to sex. Whether this is done is 
unknown. The reports vary in quality,139 a problem faced by other 
UN treaty monitoring bodies. An increasing use of alternate 
country reports by NGOs, to individual Commissioners, may be a 
way to obtain additional information that may be used in 
questioning country representatives. The Charter does not require
138African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Fourth 
Ordinary Session, Cairo, Egypt, 17-26 October 1986, 
AFR/COM/HPR.5 (iv), Guidelines for National Periodic Reports. See 
also 5, RADIC, 885, 1993.
139Ankumah, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' 
RIGHTS .-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, op cit, note 134, pp90-93.
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the presence of state representatives during the consideration 
of their reports but Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure allows a 
state to send a representative before the Commission to discuss 
it. The practice of the Commission, however, has been not to 
discuss a state report if there is no representative present.140 
The Commission appears to question the representatives quite 
rigorously141 and has begun to call upon specific states who are 
tardy in submitting reports, to do so in its communique.142
The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission were revised and 
came into effect in 19 9 5143 and were fully applicable at the 19th 
session in 19 9 6 .144 The revised rules attempt to increase the 
power of the Commission and reduce the political influence of the 
OAU by reducing the role of the Secretary-General and 
substituting the Secretary of the Commission instead. For 
instance, the drawing up of the agenda is now the responsibility 
of the Secretary as are some other administrative functions such 
as keeping a register of communications.145 The Secretary General 
of the OAU still, however, maintains a close link with the 
Commission. Communications from states parties to the Charter 
under Article 47 are still to be submitted to the Secretary 
General, the Chairman of the Communication and the state party 
concerned.146 Complaints submitted under Articles 48 and 49 of the 
Charter may be submitted to the Commission through notification 
to the Chairman of the Commission, the Secretary General and the 
state party concerned. Communications received under Article 55 
(non-state communications) are not expressed to be notified
140ibid at 97. See also footnote 290.
141ibid, 96-107.
142i.e. 16th Ordinary Session, 1994, Item 49, Final 
Communique.
143for text see RADIC, Vol 8, pt 4, December, 1996 at 978.
14426 March-4 April, 1996.
145Rule 89.
146Rule 88.
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through the Secretary General or the Chairman of the 
Commission,147 therefore presumably, the Secretary may receive 
these communications directly. Other aspects of the involvement 
of the OAU Secretary General1s involvement with the work of the 
Commission include consultation on dates for the seesions of the 
Commission which may be changed in exceptional circumstances by 
the Secretary General.148
One aspect of the work of the Commission which had given cause 
for concern was the requirement for confidentiality under Article 
59 of the Charter which states that "all measures taken within 
the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential 
until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government shall decide otherwise." The revised Rules of 
Procedure have made some modifications to this requirement. Rule 
32 states that all sittings of the Commission and of its 
subsidiary bodies are to be held in public unless the Charter 
provisions provide otherwise. Further, under Rule 33, the 
Commission may issue a communique at the end of each private or 
public sitting. Reports of the Commission to the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Governments on communications relating to 
states parties remain confidential149 but shall be published by 
the Chairman of the Commission unless the Assembly directs 
otherwise.
Amendments to the Charter itself was also discussed at the 19th 
session.150 Areas for change considered included Article 58 on 
responses to emergency situations which reveal serious and 
massive violations of human and peoples' rights, an additional
147Rule 102.
148Rule 2.
149Rule 77.
150see further, Murray, R. , "Report on the 1996 Sessions of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights - 19th and 
20th Ordinary Sessions:26 March-4 April, and 21-31 October, 1996" 
HRLJ vol 18, 1-4, 1997, 16.
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protocol on women's rights,151 article 46 on the ability of the 
Commission to resort to any mode of investigation, clawback 
clauses and the insertion of a clause on non-derogable rights. 
Arguments against amendment included the need for stability, the 
potential for the Commission to exploit its present powers 
creatively and the fact that articles 60 and 61 allow inspiration 
to be drawn from international law on human rights. A working 
group was established under Commissioner Ndiaye to work on the 
issue. The drafting of an additional protocol on women's rights 
was brought up at the 2 0th session but there was no further 
debate.152 The establishment of a Court was also debated at both 
sessions. Following an OAU resolution,153 a group of inter­
government experts met in Cape Town in September, 1995 and a 
report and Draft Protocol for a Court were prepared. The Protocol 
to the ACHPR on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights was accepted by OAU member states in 1997.154
Decisions of the Commission
A number of communications have been considered by the Commission 
so far. It is only recently that some of the decisions have been 
published.155 The common factor in all the cases is the cursory 
reasoning, even when violations have been upheld, although this 
has improved in the more recent decisions.
151 see supra for comment on the draft protocol.
152Murray, R, ibid at 19.
153 AHG/230 (XXX) , id at 19.
154 For text see 9 RADIC 1997, 432.
155For instance, the cases discussed here are the only 
communications received by the Commission to be published in a 
widely available international journal. Access had previously 
been restricted to either Banjul, the Commission headquarters or 
Addis Ababa, the OAU headquarters and given the peripatetic 
nature of communications in Africa, it has been extremely 
difficult to gain access to Commission decisions. For details of 
some of the reported cases see HRLJ, VOL 18, No 1-4, 1997.
Decisions of the Commission since 1995 have been reported in the 
International Human Rights Law Reports published by Nottingham 
University. Decisions are also reported in Interights Bulletin.
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For example, in Communication 60/91, Constitutional Rights 
Projects v Nigeria (in respect of Wahab Akamu, G. Adeaga and 
others), the issue was the imposition of the death penalty under 
the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Decree which created 
a special tribunal composed of one serving or retired judge, one 
member of the armed forces and one member of the police force. 
The decree provides for no judicial appeal of sentences but they 
are subject to confirmation or disallowance by the state 
Governor. The communication argued that the prohibition on 
judicial review was contrary to article 7(1)(a) of the Charter 
and further the setting up of special tribunals violates the 
right to be tried by an impartial tribunal under article 7(1) (d) . 
The case was considered admissible on the ground that the 
remedies available, confirmation or dismissal by a state 
Governor, was of a non-judicial nature and it would be improper 
that the complainants seek to exhaust it since it is neither 
adequate nor effective. On the merits of the case, the Commission 
found that the prohibition of appeal clearly violated article 
7(1)(a) and the composition of the tribunal did not create the 
appearance of impartiality and thus violated article7(l)(d). It 
recommended that the complainants be freed by the government.
In Communications 64/92, Krischna Achutan (on behalf of Aleke 
Banda) joined with 68/92 and 72/92, Amnesty International on 
behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa v Malawi, the issues were the 
detention of Mr Banda, the death penalty, later commuted to life 
imprisonment of Orton and Vera Chirwa and mass arrests in Malawi 
in 1992 and poor prison conditions. From the report of the 
opinions of the Commission, it would appear that the 
admissibility of the communications was not considered. It 
considered that shootings by police officers violated article 4 
of the Charter on the right to life. There is no detail of the 
circumstances of the shootings, whether it was reasonable (nor 
was reasonableness defined) for the police to have shot at people 
perhaps to disperse them, whether this use of force was 
prescribed by law, whether it was necessary for any reasons, 
national security maybe. The decision of the Commission is not
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being challenged, but the reasoning for reaching the decision 
that the act of the police in this particular circumstance 
violated article 4 would have been useful, if only for 
precedential value and for the creation of Charter jurisprudence.
Similarly, in finding that there was a violation of article 5, 
which prohibits torture, the Commission was of the opinion that 
overcrowding, beating and torture (without defining what 
constitutes torture), excessive solitary confinement of the 
Chirwas, shackling, poor food and denial of access to medical 
care all amounted to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. There was no reference to existing international 
jurisprudence on torture, nor was it defined, nor was there 
consideration of prison conditions, either in general or in 
Africa, or whether the situation of the Chirwas was common or 
exceptional. On the violation of the right to personal liberty 
and security of the person under article 6 the Commission found 
a violation. It appears from the report that the arrests, which 
they considered arbitrary without describing what constitutes 
arbitrary detention, violated the right to liberty and security 
of the person. Clearly not all arrest amount to arbitrary arrests 
nor do they amount to violation of the right to liberty. It would 
have been useful for the Commission to delineate the 
circumstances in which such arrests amount to a violation in 
contravention of the terms of the Charter.
In Communication 129/94, Civil Liberties Organization v Nigeria, 
the attempt of the Nigerian government to oust the courts' 
jurisdiction in respect of any Decree promulgated after December 
1983, suspending the Constitution by the same 1993 Decree and 
nullifying the domestic effect of the African Charter came before 
the Commission. The Commission was of the opinion that the 
Decrees, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 
No. 107 of 1993 which suspends the Constitution and oust the 
jurisdiction of the court after December 1993 in respect of any 
decree promulgation and the Political Parties (Dissolution) 
Decree No.114 of 1993 which not only dissolved political parties
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but specifically nullifies the domestic effect of the African 
Charter, breached article 7, the right to be heard, article 26 
on the independence of the courts and the establishment of
national institutions to promote and protect the rights 
enumerated in the Charter and finally, finds the attempt of the 
Nigerian government to nullify the domestic effect of the Charter 
a serious irregularity.
This last communication is an interesting development since the 
Commission was forced to consider laws nullifying its
jurisdiction. While it decided that the attempt was an
irregularity it did not declare it null and void. It also raises 
the question of an effective remedy. The Charter makes no 
provisions for an effective remedy for a victim of a violation 
and there are limitations on what the Commission can achieve. It 
cannot enforce its opinions, (a general problem of international 
law) and only makes reports to the Assembly of Heads of 
Governments and States on its activities. The issue of
enforcement makes proposals for an African Court attractive but 
given the current difficulties faced by the Commission in terms 
of time constraints, financial limitations and administrative 
inefficiency, it is unlikely that a Court would enhance the 
protection of human rights in Africa without a considerable 
strengthening of the existing mechanism for promotion and 
protection.156
There is only one reported case on economic, social and cultural 
rights, Ebrima M.S. Cessay v Gambia151 which was declared
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of local remedies.
One of the foremost pressing issues with regard to the work of 
the Commission is the inaccessibility of its decisions. They are
156see Amoah, P. "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights - An Effective Weapon for Human Rights?", 4 RADIC, 1992 
226.
157Communication No. 86/93. Reported in Ankumah, op cit. at 
146. No further details are provided on the case.
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largely unreported and those that are reported are summaries of 
the decision. There is no access to the reasoning behind the 
decisions and it has been difficult to determine whether there 
is developing an African human rights jurisprudence or instead, 
a more prosaic, practical procedure of disposal of cases. This 
paucity of information makes it difficult to gauge the importance 
of the willingness of the Commission to reach settlement of 
cases. The Commission meets only twice a year, the 
responsibilities of other posts undertaken by Commissioners means 
that some have on occassion not been able to fulfil their 
obligations and potential conflict of interest arrises when the 
post is undertaken with a government post. The Secretariat is 
inefficent, understaffed and underfunded. There is no provision 
for enforcement of decisions, a report of which is sent to the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments.158 The Commission 
obviously needs strengthening; it needs financial and human 
resources. The cases need to be published so that the reasoning 
is apparent to develop an African human rights jurisprudence.
2. An African Court of Human Rights
At the 1994 Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Tunis, 
Tunisia, a resolution was adopted159 requesting the Secretary- 
General to convene a Government experts' meeting to consider, 
with the African Commission, means of enhancing the work of the 
Commission particularly with the establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A draft Protocol was adopted 
by a group of government experts in Cape Town in September, 
19 9 5 .160 At the second legal experts' meeting in Nouakchott,
158see Rule 101, Revised rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission.
159 Resolution AHG/Res.23 0 (XXX), June, 1994.
160 See Naldi, G. and Magliveras, K., "The Proposed African Court 
of Human and Peoples' Rights:Evaluation and Comparision", 8 RADIC 
1996, 944 at 945.
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Mauritania in 1997, a Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights was accepted by the member states of 
the OAU.161 The Court is to complement the mandate of the
Commission,162 have jurisdiction over the interpretation and 
application of the Charter, the Protocol and any applicable 
African Human Rights instrument163 and give advisory opinions at 
the request of member states of the OAU, its organs or any
African organisation recognised by the OAU relating to the
Charter or other applicable human rights instruments with each 
judge entitled to give a separate or dissenting opinion.164 Member 
States and the Commission are entitled to submit cases to the 
Court165 in addition to NGOs with observer status at the
Commission whom the Court have entitled to make submissions.166 
The Court is to apply the provisions of the Charter and other 
human rights instruments,167 specifically not limited to African 
regional instruments. The Court is to be composed of eleven 
judges with no two judges to be the nationals of the same 
state.168 In the nomination of judges, the Protocol requires that 
due consideration be given to adequate gender representation in 
the nomination process169 as in the election process.170 Judges are 
to be elected for a six year period and may be re-elected once.171
161 for text: see 9 RADIC 1997, 432.
162 article 2 .
163 article 3 (1) .
164 article 4 .
165 artilce 5.
166 article 6.
167 article 7.
168 article 11.
169 article 12 (2) .
170 article 14 (3) .
171 article 15(1) .
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The Court is to elect its President and Vice-President.172 
Provision is made for the independence of the judges under
article 17. At present, the seat of the Court has not been 
decided; it is to be determined by the Assembly and may be 
changed by the Assembly after consideration with the Court. The 
Protocol comes into force one month after fifteen ratifications 
or accessions.
It remains to be seen, once the court is established, whether it 
will be a strong structure or whether it will be a facade. It
took the European Court of Human Rights at least 40 years to
stamp its authority so perhaps expectations of the African court 
should be tempered with caution. It is also worth querying at 
this juncture if there is not an inherent contradiction in
establishing an African Court of Human Rights to promote African 
values while recognising international human rights norms 
predicated on their universality.
172 article 20.
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PART III AN AFRICAN APPROACH TO REGIONAL PROTECTION
1. Regional Institutions
(1) The Organization of African Unity (OAU)173
In spite of a cautious beginning for a number of reasons which 
have already been dealt with, there has of recent, been a shift 
in the approach of the OAU on how best to achieve unity and 
solidarity in Africa, not least because of the end of the Cold 
War, an increase in internal conficts within states, economic 
hardship, the debt problem, increasing agitation by civil society 
for democratisation as well as by the international community. 
The creation of the conflict resolution mechanism appears to be 
a modification of previous non-interventionist positions even 
though it is required to give regard to article 3(2) of the OAU 
Charter. The focus on external factors as the cause of Africa's 
ills appears to have been modified.
The problem facing the OAU at present is what role it will and 
it is able to play in redefining Africa's role in the 
international order and to begin to come up with solutions to 
Africa's problems. This involves a determination of when to 
intervene in internal conflicts especially given the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of states in Article 
3(2) of the Charter. It also involves issues of determining when 
an internal problem poses a regional security risk and 
intervention becomes necessary. The approach of the United 
Nations in challenging concepts of sovereignty and domestic 
jurisdiction with human rights law, under Article 2 (7) of its 
Charter may be illustrative. Non-interference in that context has 
come to mean not tolerating massive violations of human rights. 
The development of human rights law over the last 50 years has 
considerably reduced the scope for the claim of freedom from 
interference in domestic jurisdiction in that respect. 
Developments in South Africa and international approbation of the
173see Part II, supra, on the creation of the OAU and events 
leading to the adoption of the ACHPR.
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apartheid government attest to this fact.174 The Kampala 
Document's definition of security as not only the state's 
security but the individual's security to live in peace, enjoy 
fundamental human rights, participate in the affairs of the 
country and have basic needs met could conceivably be used, in 
addition to the OAU's Charter obligations to promote unity and 
adherence to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to justify intervention in conflict situations in 
Africa. Displacement of population, refugee influx into 
neighbouring countries, internecine conflicts such as in Rwanda 
and Burundi, not only have obvious unfortunate results, it is 
possible that the initial conflicts which developed into violent 
situations and the concomitant problems for the state concerned 
and its neighbours, might have been avoided by a more direct and 
tougher stance taken by the OAU. But as stated earlier, early 
preoccupations of the OAU and goverments were with territorial 
integrity and sovereignty although there were some attempts at 
conflict and dispute resolution by the Assembly of Heads of 
States and Governments.
(2) Assembly of Heads of State and Government175
The second Assembly of Heads of State and Government was held in 
Cairo in 1964. In addition to making Addis Ababa the seat of the 
organization's permanent headquarters, it also saw an undertaking 
by members states to respect their frontiers as they existed at 
independence.
Between 1971 and 1972 the OAU was instrumental in achieving 
reconciliation in a number of disputes between member states, 
including those between Senegal and Guinea on Senegal's alleged 
failure to suppress guerrilla activities against the Guinean 
government, between Guinea and Ghana over the burial of Kwame
174see Steiner & Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT:LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, 
ppl48-65 and pp363-370.
175The following information is obtained from Keesing's 
Reference Publications, op cit., note 52, p352ff.
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Nkrumah and between rival Angolan factions. The 11th Assembly was 
held also in Ethiopia. The disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia 
and between Uganda and Tanzania were the subject of OAU 
mediation. A 'good offices committee' was formed to seek ways of 
reconciling the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
The Uganda/Tanzania conflict arose from the invasion of Uganda 
from Tanzania by armed followers of former President Obote in the 
September, 1972. An agreement was reached and was signed by the 
two Presidents on May 28. Under the terms of the agreement, the 
Ugandan government agreed to pay to Tanzania compensation for the 
deaths of the 24 Tanzanian nationals in Uganda; both parties 
agreed to adhere to the Mogadishu Agreement (signed on October 
5, 1972 and which provided for the withdrawal of troops from the 
Ugandan-Tanzanian border and for a cessation of all military 
activities by the two sides against each other), and to prevent 
their territories from being used as bases of subversion, the 
Tanzanian government assumed responsibility that President Obote 
would not interfere in Uganda's affairs and the Ugandan 
government would not demand Obote's expulsion from Tanzania.
At the 12th Assembly in Mogadishu in 1974, no progress was made 
towards a solution to the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia 
despite a private meeting between the two heads of state on June 
13. In 1975 at the 13th Assembly held in Kampala, Idi Amin was 
elected as President of the OAU in spite of strong protests and 
opposition to Amin's policies by the Presidents of Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Resolutions supporting the 
freedom fighters of the ANC in Rhodesia, armed struggle as the 
only way left, measures taken to isolate South Africa including 
sanctions and a special OAU committee to be appointed from among 
African members of the UN Council for Namibia were adopted at an 
extraordinary meeting of OAU Council Ministers on April 11, 1975 
(Dar-es-Salaam Declaration). Strong resolutions were also 
approved against South Africa at the 14th Assembly in 1976 in 
Port Louis, Mauritius.
The 1977 Assembly in Libreville, Gabon was marked by strong
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attacks by African leaders on Soviet interference in African 
affairs. There were numerous disputes among Africa states during 
1976-1977; between Egypt and Libya, Libya and Sudan, Ethiopia and 
its neighbours, between Mauritania and Morocco and Algeria and 
the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara, in connection with 
which Morocco had decided on 25 February, 1977 to temporarily 
suspend its participation in the OAU. On the conflict between 
Ethiopia and Somalia, the committee set up in 1973 reaffirmed on 
9 August, the inviolability of frontiers inherited from the 
colonial era and condemned all subversive activities on the part 
of neighbouring states or other states. The Assembly also 
approved a draft resolution submitted by Senegal which appealed 
to all African states to abstain from having recourse to foreign 
intervention in internal African problems, invited OAU members 
states to prohibit the use of their territory as a base for 
aggression against another African state, requested powers 
outside Africa not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
African states and recommended that member states reach peaceful 
settlement of their disputes through mediation and negotiation.
The 1978 16th Assembly in Khartoum was taken up with the problem 
of foreign troops and bases in Africa. The adopted resolution 
while condemning military alliances with non-African powers, 
reaffirmed the right of each country to choose its own 
ideological system and strongly condemned the use of mercenaries 
by some countries, unspecified, to destabilise African countries. 
The 17th Assembly in Monrovia, Liberia in 1979 was also marked 
by disputes among member states. Tanzania's role in the overthrow 
of Amin in 1978 was strongly criticised, notably by Nigeria and 
Sudan, a resolution calling for cease fire and a UN supervised 
referendum in Western Sahara caused the Moroccan delegation to 
leave the session and during a speech by the Egyptian President 
in defence of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, several other Arab 
delegations also walked out. In his opening speech President 
Tolbert of Liberia suggested that the OAU Charter be revised to 
make the protection of human rights explicit in consideration of 
the conflicts in Africa which had resulted in over four million
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refugees.
In 1980, a special conference of the OAU held in Lagos between 
April 28-30, adopted the Lagos Plan of Action for the 
implementation of a strategy for the economic development of 
Africa setting out guidelines on strengthening subregional 
groupings in central, eastern northern and southern Africa 
between 1980-90 and for closer integration between such groupings 
between 1990-2000. This African Economic Community (AEC), was 
originally scheduled to be in place by 2000 but at the 27th 
Assembly in Abuja in 1991, this target was postponed to 2 025. The 
AEC treaty which was signed at this summit, outlined six stages, 
including the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
and the establishment of a continent-wide customs union by 2004. 
A commitment was also made to the establishment of an African 
Common Market with a central bank and single market by 2031.
The Lagos Plan of Action devotes a chapter to the needs of
women.176 It states that ..."The steps to be taken to solve the 
problems of African women should not be marginal and separate 
from the question of over-all development"177 and advocates 
improvements in the status of women in the areas of health and 
healthcare, education, employment and better legislative and 
administrative improvements, especially in the area of family 
law. It advocates the increased participation of women in law­
making and institutional structures. The implementation of these 
matters, even though the achievement of the Plan itself has been 
postponed, remains at the vagaries of the tensions between custom 
and formal legal rights. The right to education, for instance, 
is a legal right but the reduced number of girl children
attending secondary schools in comparison to boys can be 
attributed to societal expectations of the role of women in
society. Parpart gives a figure of 60% of eligible girls
176see Parpart, J. L., "Women's Rights and the Lagos Plan of
Action", 8 HRQ, 1986, 180.
177quoted ibid at 181.
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attending primary schools in Ghana while only 27% go on to 
secondary schools compared with a figure of 77% of boys in 
primary schools and 44% in secondary schools.178
In a recently published work on the status of women, statistics 
on school attendance in Nigeria shows that 51% of primary school 
age girls are not in school,179 girls form 44%180 of the student 
body at primary level, 55%181 at secondary and 24%182 at tertiary 
level. Figures for Ghana show that 45% of girls attend primary 
school, 183 39% attend secondary school184 and only 17% go on to 
higher education.185 Clearly, existing practice affects 
implementation. Without a change to the foundational basis of 
social organisation, the achievement of real equality in terms 
of access to opportunity which will result in equitable 
participation in decision-making, the success of any 
developmental plans can only be partial.
The 1981 18th Assembly, held in Nairobi was notable for the 
adoption of the African Charter of Human and People's Rights. The 
19th Assembly, scheduled for August 5-8, 1982 could not be held 
because the two-thirds quorum could not be achieved as a result 
of a boycott by Morocco and those states which supported its 
opposition to the SADR's admission to the OAU.186 The SADR
178ibid 186.
179 Neft, N. & Levine, A.D., WHERE WOMEN STAND: AN INTERNATIONAL 
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN 140 COUNTRIES 1997-1998, Random 
House, 1997, at 38.
180 ibid at 39.
181 ibid at 40.
182 ibid at 43 . .
183 ibid at 39.
184 ibid at 40.
185 ibid at 43.
186 See further Keesings Reference Publications, op cit., 
note 52 at 422.
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declared on 8th June, 1983 that it had decided not to participate 
voluntarily and temporarily in the 19th Assembly. The Assembly 
opened in Addis Ababa on the same day. It was dominated by the 
Western Sahara question and adopted by consensus on November 21, 
a draft resolution calling on Morocco and the Polisario Front to 
undertake direct negotiations to bring about a cease fire and to 
create the conditions necessary for a fair referendum in the 
territory in December, 19 8 3.187 No agreement was however reached 
on such negotiations.
The 20th Assembly held in Addis Ababa in 1984 was notable for the 
withdrawal of Morocco from OAU membership following the 
representation of the SADR at the session. The OAU's commitment 
to the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action was affirmed. The 21st Assembly 
in 1985 in Addis Ababa adopted a declaration on 25th July which 
contained a survey of the economic situation and a five-year 
draft programme of measures to achieve recovery in the short, 
medium and long term. The programme also called for the 
accelerated implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action. In 1986, 
the 22nd Assembly dealt with, inter alia, sanctions against South
Africa, voluntary sanctions against the United Kingdom for its 
opposition to sanctions against South Africa, expressed support 
for the convening of an international conference on Africa's 
external debt, established a council charged with reconciling 
disputes between OAU member states and approved an OAU anthem.188
At the 25th Assembly in 1989, the newly elected Secretary- 
General, Salim Ahmed Salim highlighted three areas to which he 
would give special consideration during his tenure; Africa's 
economic problems, the environment and human rights. Africa's 
debt problem was discussed and the member states renewed their 
call for an international conference to discuss the problem on
187 Keesings Reference Publications, ibid at 423.
188Keesings Reference Publicationsat 423.
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a global basis rather than case by case approach.189 At the 2 6th 
Assembly, Namibia participated as the Organization's 51st member. 
Nelson Mandela was also present for the first time. Growing 
demands for democracy on the continent was under discussion.
At the 1991 summit, held in Abuja, Nigeria, the Treaty of Abuja 
or the African Economic Community Treaty was signed. The treaty, 
signed on 3rd June, provided for the establishment of a 
continental framework for the development of resources, economic 
and trade co-operation between member states and a common trade 
policy towards non-member states.190 At the 28th summit in 1992, 
it was agreed that the OAU Secretariat should prepare a 
feasibility study, for presentation to the 1993 Assembly, on the 
prevention and management of conflicts.191 Eritrea was represented 
at the 2 9th Assembly in 1993, its admission having been 
unanimously accepted at the Council of Ministers meeting. A 
resolution was passed establishing a mechanism for conflict 
resolution and management as was a resolution on the means of 
implementing the AEC treaty, inter alia. At the 3 0th Assembly in
Tunis in 1994, South Africa took its seat for the first time. The 
Assembly also passed a resolution requesting a governmental legal 
experts to consider the establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights.192
189 see further, N.J. Rengger with John Campbell, TREATIES 
AND ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD, Catermill International Limited, 
U.K., 1995 at 428.
190 for text of treaty see 3 RADIC, 1991, 792.
191for further information on the summary of the 1992 summit, 
see Rengger, op cit., TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD, 430.
192 Resolution AHG/Res. 230 (XXX) . See Part II of the Chapter 
supra.
Reports of the developments at the Assembly of Heads of 
Governments and States is limited to available published 
accounts.
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(3) African Development Bank (AfDB)193
The decision to set up an African Development Bank was reached 
in 1963 when the Council of Ministers signed an agreement which 
came into force on 10 September, 1964. The Bank was formally 
constituted on 25 September, 1964, its capital being subscribed 
exclusively by African states. It began operations in 1966. The 
Bank has four associated institutions; the African Development 
Fund (ADF) set up in 1972, the Nigeria Trust Fund, set up by 
agreement with Nigeria and ADF in 1976, Societe Internationale 
Financiere pour les Investissements et le Developpement en 
Afrique (SIFIDA) , set up in Geneva in November, 1970 with the 
object of promoting the establishment and growth of productive 
enterprises in Africa and Africa Reinsurance Coporation 
(AFRICARE), established in 1976 and which came into force from 
January 1977, with the object of fostering the development of the 
insurance and reinsurance industry in Africa.
The African Development Bank was instrumental in the 
establishment of the African Export Bank (Afreximbank), in Cairo 
in 1994 to facilitate, promote and expand trade within and 
outside the continent through the provision of pre and post- 
shipment finance credit to eligible African exporters, short and 
medium term credit to African exporters and importers, credit to 
finance imports needed for export development and the promotion 
and provision of insurance and guarantee services covering 
commercial and non-commercial risks associated with African 
exports. Its membership comprises independent African states, 
regional and sub-regional financial institutions and economic 
organisations; African public and private banks and financial 
institutions and African public and private investors and non- 
African international financial institutions and economic 
organisations and banks, financial institutions and public and 
private investors. The financial performance of the Bank has been
193 see Sohn, DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, 
ibid at 165 for the Agreement establishing the ADB and at 205 for 
General Regulations of the ADB. See also Keesing's Reference 
Publications, ibid at 357 for a short summary.
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affected by the general economic problems in the region. It lost 
its triple A credit rating194 in August 1995 when Standard and 
Poor, the international credit agency, deemed downgrading 
necessary because of the excessive political influences which 
govern the Bank' s management.195
The African Development Bank, like the Asian Development Bank and 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, seems to 
have developed following the model of the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). Although it has been 
difficult to obtain information on the work of the African 
Development Bank, its establishment seems to follow a trend of 
regional development banks which in turn appears to have been 
influenced by the establishment of the World Bank. In spite of 
the absence of information with which to make comparisons, it 
seems clear that international developments clearly influence 
regional institutional developments which in turn supports the 
argument that African regional institutional mechanisms replicate 
the international model.
(4) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)196 
Although strictly a regional African organisation, ECOWAS, is 
included in this section of institutions because of the role its 
peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) is playing in Liberia and because of 
the renewed commitment to conflict resolution in Africa, given 
its necessity to security in the region. ECOWAS has its 
headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria and has 17 members.197 It was
194 The downgrading of the credit rating invariably results in 
a loss of confidence by investors which has effects on the 
markets of the concerned institution.
195 some of the information on the African Development Bank 
was obtained from a Crown Agents report written by Ruka Sanusi, 
n. d.
196For Articles of Association to establish ECOWAS see Sohn, 
L. Documents of African Regional Organizations, ibid at 1005.
197Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta and Sao Tome.
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established in 1976 under the Treaty of Lagos by all member 
states except Cape Verde which did not join until 1977. The 
treaty's principal objective, to be achieved in stages, was the 
harmonisation of the economic and industrial policies of member 
states and the elimination of the disparities between the 
development of member states.198 The role of ECOMOG in monitoring 
the cease fire represented a radical departure from the principal 
objectives of ECOWAS but it gave the organization a high profile 
in West African affairs and it was decided that a permanent 
regional conflict resolution role should be adopted by ECOWAS. 
On 24 July, 1993, a new treaty was signed by all members 
replacing the 1975 treaty and added the role of regional 
peacekeeping to the list of ECOWAS objectives. The revised treaty 
also provided for the establishment of a regional parliament, an 
Economic and Social Council and and ECOWAS Court of Justice.
(5) The Lome Convention
The Lome Convention is a trade and aid agreement signed by the 
EC and 69 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states which 
guarantees duty-free entry to the EU for some commodities 
produced by the ACP states. All sub-Saharan African countries are 
members with the exception of South Africa. The fourth Lome 
Convention (Lome IV) was signed in December, 1989, replacing the 
1975, 1979 and 1984 convention. Namibia became a new member under 
Lome IV with Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
2. A New Approach to Regional Problems?
Societal changes have been reflected in upheavals on the African 
continent. The end of the Cold War and events in Eastern Europe 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989-90 represents the 
possibility of a new approach and role for sub-Saharan Africa,
198 These objectives are similar to that of the European Economic 
Community as it was, and now the European Union. There is no 
clear indication that ECOWAS was modelled on this form of 
regional development but the similarity in objectives is 
persuasive of some element of influence.
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should the continent be desirous of it and able to work towards
it. During the Cold War, many African countries were strategic
pawns for the two superpowers, USSR and the USA in their
ideological battle for supremacy. In their efforts to establish 
a strategic regional base, incompetent and autocratic regimes 
were supported, with aid and arms, and many African countries 
became heavily militarised.
The Cold War also dampened regional tensions to a certain extent. 
With the end of the ideological battle, there began a
marginalisation of Africa economically and politically, or at 
least, a perception of marginalisation. Attention, aid and 
economic restructuring efforts have been directed towards Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, (CIS) and the 
end of the Cold War has also meant the drying up of assistance 
from former Eastern Bloc countries. For example, in April, 1991 
Western Europe announced a package of assistance for Russia of 
$24 billion and $80 billion for CIS compared to a total of $3.4 
billion for the whole of Africa at the end of the 1980s.1" 
Africa's share of official development assistance (ODA) fell from 
37.1 per cent, in 1990 to 36.3 per cent, while in comparison ODA 
share of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union rose from 1.4 per 
cent, to over 7 per cent. This is with African debt inceasing; 
the total debt in 1980 was $84 billion, in 1992 it was $194,264 
billion and in 1993 it was estimated at $199,046 billion despite 
efforts at servicing the debts. 200 Following the 1993 Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs, GATT, Africa 
is likely to face an increase in imported foods, loss of 
preferential advantage, stiff competition in banking and services
199Gambari, I. A, "The role of Regional and Global 
Organization in addressing African Security Issues" in AFRICA IN 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER:RETHINKING STATE SOVEREIGNTY, Keller, 
E.J & Rothchild, D. (eds), Lynne Riener Publishers, 1996, 
hereafter Keller & Rothchild, AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER, at 30.
200These figures are taken from Obasanjo, O, "A Balance Sheet 
of the African Region and the Cold War", at 21, Keller & 
Rothchild, AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER.
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and loss of bioproperty rights. A 1993 publication of the 
OECD/World Bank projects that net losses for Africa will be about 
$2.6 billion by 2000 with the leading industrialised countries 
projected to gain about 64% of total annual income gains from 
GATT amounting to $135 billion.201
Politically, the 'new international order' has resulted in a wave 
of enforced democratisation across the continent, tied to 
official assistance and trade conditions. This has facilitated 
Namibia's independence in 1990, the end of apartheid in South 
Africa in 1994 and elections in Malawi and Benin. At the same 
time efforts to institute democratic systems have failed in other 
countries such as Nigeria where the 1993 elections were annulled. 
The Cold War prevented, in a way, regional and perhaps internal 
conflict. With its demise and the redirection of aid and 
assistance to Eastern Europe, adverse socio-economic condition 
have been exacerbated, structural adjustment programmes have 
imposed stringent economic conditions and the mixture of economic 
hardship, coupled with the new wave of democratisation, have 
resulted in internal unrest across the continent. These have 
manifested themselves in violence as in Rwanda, Burundi and 
Liberia and have resulted in regional security problems with the 
displacement of peoples and influx of refugees to neighbouring 
countries and ensuing tension, Congo-Zaire is a case in point 
although other factors were at play in that internal conflict (as 
is true elsewhere). Where there has been no internal conflict as 
such, there has been an increase in ethnic groups within states 
seeking self-determination. In Nigeria, this has taken the form 
of the formation of increasing smaller states along ethnic lines 
in a federal structure. From three broad regions in 1960, there 
now exist 36 states. Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1990 after 
years of civil conflict. It has been suggested that the power 
vacuum created after the end of the Cold War resulted in the
201 Ibid, at 21.
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breakdown of order in Somalia.202
This breakdown of order in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda has resulted 
in a re-evaluation of the role of the OAU in conflict resolution. 
There have also been regional efforts to resolve conflicts such 
as the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, led by Nigerian troops. The 
OAU, however, as the primary continental organisation has had to 
redefine its involvement and efforts to ensure regional security. 
Territorial security or the physical security of the state is not 
synonymous with internal security and efforts are being made to 
define the problems which give rise to continuous conflict 
situations and to devise a solution to contain and resolve them.
"The concept of security goes beyond military 
consideration. It embraces all aspects of the society 
including economic, political and social dimensions of 
individual, family, community, local and national 
life. The security of a nation must be construed in 
terms of the security of the individual citizen to 
live in peace with access to basic necessities of life 
while fully participating in the affairs of his/her 
society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human 
rights. "203
This definition of security encompasses accountability of 
governments, implies transparency of government and integral to 
this definition is the representation of people and their 
participation in the affairs of their country. With the scramble 
for Africa effectively over, politically and economically, at 
this juncture of great change in approach to the solution of
202see Simons, A., "SomaliarA Regional Security Dilemma" and 
in general Part 2 of Keller & Rothchild AFRICA IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER on regional security.
203African Leadership Forum, The Kampala Document: Towards a 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation 
(New York:African Leadership Forum) , 1992 at 9, quoted in
Gambari, I., op cit. note 199.
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African problems by African leaders, and indeed African people, 
it is important that existing inequities within institutional 
structures are also redefined and that includes gender 
inequities.
CONCLUSIONS - AFRICAN VALUES OR A REPLICATION OF EXISTING MODELS?
The structure and content of the OAU Charter is substantively 
similar to that of other treaties regulating the relationship 
between states such as the UN Charter. Established legal 
principles such as no interference in domestic jurisdictions to 
ensure the inviolability of state sovereignty is evident in the 
OAU Charter. 204 While the fundamental purpose of the Charter is to 
assert sovereign autonomy from colonial or imperial influence, 
it still remains a political document and the OAU itself is 
essentially a political organ reflecting the concerns of states 
using received legal discourse and the language of rights due to 
a state. It will be shown in Chapter 4 that the organisational 
and normative structures of international law excludes the 
participation of women. In replicating the organisational 
structures of the international legal system, the political 
organisation of the OAU, from which the African Charter evolved, 
has replicated at its inception, the non-participatory flaws of 
the international legal system.
Similarly, the African Charter follows existing structures of 
human rights protection contained in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covernant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and regional documents such as the European205 
and American206 Conventions on Human Rights. For example, a
204 compare with article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
205 signed in Rome, 4th November, 1950 and entered into force on 
3rd September, 1953.
206 signed 22nd November, 1969, entered into force 18th July, 
1978, reprinted in 9 ILM 673, 1970.
101
comparative study of the three regional instruments and 
mechanisms for the protection of rights; the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, the American Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, shows that 
there is a similarity in the provision for rights protection. All 
three instruments provides rights protection for non­
discrimination, 207 the right to life, 208 cruel, inhuman, degrading 
treatment/torture, 209 from slavery,210 liberty and security,211 fair 
trial,212 freedom of conscience and religion,213 freedom of 
expression/receive information214 and freedom of 
association/assembly with others.215 Both the African Charter and 
the American Convention, however, make explicit provision for a 
right to participate in government (article 13 and 23 
respectively), the right to freedom of movement and residence 
(articles 12 and 21 respectively), the right to property 
(articles 14 and 21 respectively and the right to development( 
articles 22(2) and 26 respectively). The American Convention 
makes provision to a right to a name under article 18, the right 
to a nationality under article 20 and the rights of the child 
under article 19. The African Charter has some unique provisions; 
it makes provision for the right to work and equal pay under 
article 15, physical and mental health under article 16, the 
right to education under article 17, self-determination under
207 ACHPR article 2, AmCHR article 24, ECHR article 14.
2 08 ACHPR art 4, AmCHR art 3, ECHR art 2.
2 09 ACHPR art 5, AmCHR art 5, ECHR art 3.
210 ACHPR art 5 (torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment
and slavery are dealt with under the same article), AmCHR art 6 
and ECHR art 4.
211 ACHPR art 6. AmCHR art 7, ECHR art 5.
212 ACHPR art 7, AmCHR art8, ECHR art 6.
213 ACHPR art 8, AmCHR art 12, ECHR art 9.
214 ACHPR art9, AmCHR art 13, ECHR art 10.
215 ACHPR art 10 & 11, AmCHR art 16 & 15, ECHR art 11.
102
article 20, natural resources and wealth under article 21, the 
right to development under article 22, peace and security under 
article 23 and environment under article 24.
The institutional mechanisms for the protection of rights under 
the three regional systems are similar. All three have a 
commission whose members, of high moral character, are elected 
to serve in their personal capacity.216 Communications may be 
received from victims or an interested party after exhaustion of 
local remedies within a time limit and must not be ill founded 
or vexatious.217 The European and American systems have already 
established courts and the establishment of an African Court for 
the protection of human rights has been agreed with a protocol 
to the Charter adopted in 1997, the Nouakchott Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.218
While the African Charter and the Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, contain additional elements of African 
values, including rights and duties, the form of human rights 
protection follow an established legal pattern. The preamble of 
the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child affirms its 
adherence to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well 
as OAU instruments such as its Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child of 1979. The preamble of the ACHPR refers to the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, these 
promulgations suffer from the same foundational problems that 
feminist approaches to human rights protection has demonstrated. 
Consequently, in terms of the protection of women's human rights, 
notwithstanding a specifically African flavour, the African 
regional system is inherently challenged by feminist approaches 
to human rights protection.
216 see art 19(1) ECHR, art 33(a), 34 and 35AmCHR and arts 30, 
31 ACPHR.
217 see arts 25, 25 and 27 ECHR, arts 44, 45, 46 and 47 Am CHR 
and arts 47 to 59 ACHPR.
218 see 9 RADIC, 432, 1997.
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I have attempted to ascertain whether there is an intrinsically 
African approach in the overview of selected institutional 
mechanisms above. However, what comes across is an alliance of 
political entities with a common history of colonialism, the 
effects of which still reverberate in Africa's economy, finance, 
trade and political structures to the detriment of its people and 
particularly its women. The provisions of the OAU Charter are 
state centric, for instance in its references to territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. Where there is reference to the 
peoples of Africa in the preamble, there is reference to the 
inalienable right of all people to control their destiny. 
Freedom, equality, justice and dignity are stated essential 
objectives and peace and security are to be maintained and 
established. The definition of security in the Kampala Document 
arguably gives the preamble a modern day political importance. 
Despite references to non-interference, the OAU Charter adheres 
to UDHR and UN principles. These same legal principles are those 
same principles which have not elsewhere ensured protection for 
women. The only peculiarly African experience is colonialism. The 
African regional system is comparable to and based on the same 
structures as other regional systems. It accepts the foundational 
basis of these structures and not only has it maintained existing 
imported systems of law imposed during colonalisation, it has 
replicated these same models in its regional organisations after 
independence, while maintaining its position of difference. 
Difference lies only in culture and that is not a peculiarly 
African experience, it is diverse not only across the continent 
but across the world. African regional mechanisms are based on 
the international model. These laws and these institutional 
structures are androcentric and therefore, for Africa's women 
feminist challenges to these laws apply.
The various African regional institutions219 represent to me,
219There are of course many more regional groupings and 
alliances within Africa serving a number of purposes. For details 
of them see Sohn, L. op cit. note 193 and also Keesings Reference 
Publications op cit. note 52.
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rather than an African way of doing things, a desire for Africans 
to be a part of the process of their own development. This is 
reflected in the repeated resolutions at various Assemblies of 
Heads of State and Government condemning interference in the 
internal affairs. While there have been, and there continue to, 
be a disproportionate number of conflicts on the continent, their 
causes lie in issues relating to territorial disputes, 
insurgency, counter-insurgency and despotic governments 
previously maintained in positions of power by the Cold War. The 
causes of a predominant number of disputes may be directly 
attributed to the legacy of the colonial era excercabated by bad 
government, lack of accountability, lack of transparency, lack 
of representation of the populace. The only thing peculiarly 
African about the problems faced by Africa is its geo-political 
history which has resulted in this situation.
Approaches taken thus far, as far as institutional mechanisms in 
terms of structure and rules of association are concerned, are 
very similar to other regional alliances based on economic, 
financial and political objectives. To that extent, the African 
regional system models itself on existing structures founded on 
legal principles. These principles have been challenged by 
feminist legal theory and implicitly the legal bases which 
underlies the structures of these institutions are also 
inherently challenged.
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CHAPTER 3
SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT; THE EXCLUSION
OF WOMEN
This Chapter looks at self-determination and the right to 
development as a means of demonstrating how, in spite of 
guaranteed rights under these established legal principles, the 
operation of the law in an African context has limitations. These 
two core doctrines are promoted by post-colonial states for the 
benefit of such states and an evaluation of the operation of 
these doctrines is useful in ascertaining the benefits for the 
states and their citizens. This Chapter will show that for the 
purposes of implementation of human rights in an African context, 
especially in terms of women's rights, there are core problems 
in using legal discourse because of the marginalisation of women 
from policy making and the decision making process. Nevertheless, 
these same principles are intrinsically capable of being used to 
assure women's wider political participation especially when 
coupled with a feminist legal theory which is informed of the 
specificities of women in an African context. Therefore, if the 
possibilities of the legal discourse are at present flawed in its 
application to certain African situations, there exists the 
potential to use the discourse itself and its representative and 
inclusionary elements to ameliorate the implementation of women's 
human rights. Part I discusses self-determination and Part II 
discusses the Right to Development.
PART I SELF-DETERMINATION
The right to self-determination is central to the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights1 (ACHPR) . The preamble of the OAU 
Charter refers to a determin[ation] "to safeguard and consolidate
Adopted 17th June, 1981, entered into force 21st October, 
1986, reprinted in 21 ILM 58, 1982.
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the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of our States..." while article 20 of the 
ACHPR states that not only shall all peoples shall have a right 
to existence, it goes on state that "[All peoples] ... shall have 
the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination." 
Article 21 (1) states that "All peoples shall freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised 
in the exclusive interest of the people" . The right to self- 
determination is also recognised in the United Nations Charter,2 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights4 (ICESCR),5 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Territories and Peoples,6 the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations,7 the General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources,8 the Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order,9 the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States,10 and the Declaration on 
the Right to Development.11 All these international documents deal 
with connected doctrines of human rights, economic rights,
2 articles 1 & 73.
3999 UNTS 171, 1966.
4993 UNTS 3, 1966.
5 Common article 1.
6 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December, 1960, 
UN Doc A/4684 (1960), GAOR 15th Session, Supp 16, p.66.
7 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970.
8 A/Res/3171, 5 February 1974, reprinted in 13 ILM 1974,
238.
9 A/RES/3201 (S-VI), 9 May, 1974, reprinted in 13 ILM 1974,
715.
10 A/RES/3281 (XXIX) 15 January 1975, reprinted in 14 ILM 
1975, 251.
11 General Assembly Resolution 41/128, 4 December 1986.
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sovereignty over natural resources and generally, international 
peace and security of which it might be said, the right to self- 
determination is encompassed.
Self-determination is a peoples' right. While there is no legal 
certainty over the definition of 'people', it has been stated 
that:
" . . . [T] he principle appears to have a core of
reasonable certainty. This core consists in the right
of a community which has a distinct character to have 
this character reflected in the institutions of 
government under which it lives."12
The term 'rights of peoples' is used in three interchangeable 
ways; as a reference to governments as the authoritative 
representatives of people in international documents such as the 
United Nations Charter, as the description of action by civil 
society within domestic jurisdictions to challenge the actions 
of government policy in relation to military/human rights
decisions inter alia, and to refer to indigenous peoples who are
marginalised from dominant society.13
Four characteristics of self-determination have been noted.14 It 
is a right against the state which controls that people, it is 
a right against other governments, it is vested in the people 
concerned and it is vested in the people as a group and as a 
collective right. Peoples' rights is distinct from the rights of 
a state or a government. The people in whom a particular right
12 Brownlie, I., "The Rights of Peoples in Modern 
International Law" in Crawford, J. (ed) THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1988 at 5, hereafter Crawford, RIGHTS OF 
PEOPLES.
13 Falk, R., "The Rights of People (In Particular Indigenous 
People)", in Crawford, J., RIGHTS OF PEOPLE, at 24-36.
14 Crawford, J, "The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions" in 
Crawford (ed), THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES, pp.164-165.
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is vested are not necessarily represented by states or 
governments of states. Conversely, the vesting of peoples' rights 
in governments disqualifies the right from being regarded as 
peoples' rights.15 The constituent of the term 'peoples' has been 
described as 'context - dependent'.16 Nonetheless, Crawford has 
identified the content of 'peoples' rights' as the principle of 
self-determination, the right of peoples to free political 
choice, the right to existence consisting of the right not to be 
subjected to genocide and not to be deprived of the means of 
subsistence17 and the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.18 On the latter point, it is debatable whether the 
right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is subject 
to domestic jurisdiction, particularly in the context of the 
ACHPR which stipulates that disposal must be for the benefit of 
the people under Article 21.19 Three further criteria are 
enumerated by Crawford for determining whether a particular 
asserted right is a right of peoples. Is it a right of peoples
15 ibid at 167.
16 ibid at 169.
17 On the issue of the right to subsistence as part of the 
right to self-determination with particular regard to the rights 
of women, see Chinkin, C., and Wright, S., "The Hunger Trap: 
Women, Food and Self-Determination", 14 Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 1993, 262.
18 Crawford, “The Rights of Peoples:Some Conclusions” at 167.
19 Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is of course 
affected by the effect of corruption of African governments. 
Crawford states on this issue:
"...[T]he principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is certainly capable of operating as 
a guarantee of peoples against their own governments, 
limiting the capacity of governments for the time 
being in the interests of the community. In the case 
of provisions such as Article 21 of the African 
Charter, that would tend to make a State's natural 
resources policy justiciable in the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples's Rights"
Crawford, J. "Rights of Peoples:'Peoples or Governments"? in 
Crawford, J., (ed) RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, 64, footnote omitted.
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rather than a right of government or states? Is the right 
articulated so that it has legal consequences? Has the right 
achieved a sufficient degree of acceptance?20 The issue of self- 
determination of peoples involves questions of what constitutes 
a 'people' and whether the legal principle of self-determination 
is limited to a context of decolonisation.
Self-determination is linked to homogeneity21 and was historically 
limited to the ideals of democracy22 and the nation state. The 
concept and legal principle of self-determination is 
circumscribed within the legal principles of territorial 
integrity23 and the state as the primary entity in international
20 ibid at 167.
21 see Makinson, D., "Rights of Peoples: A Logician Point of 
View" in Crawford, RIGHTS OF PEOPLES at 74 on the point of self- 
determination in a decolonization context disregarding language, 
culture, history and group identification.
22 The Wilsonian ideal of self-determination revolved around 
the principles of democracy and political participation by the 
peoples of a state. See Cassesse, A.,SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES, Cambridge University Press, 1995, Chapter 1, hereafter, 
Cassesse, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES.
23 Self-determination does not always involve a claim to 
secession. See Brownlie, ibid at 6. One of the flaws of the self- 
determination principle is the inherent tension between the 
principle and territorial integrity. See Cassesse, A., SELF- 
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, at 32 7ff.
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relations.24 In an African context, the principle of utis
possidetis by which leaders agreed to accept the boundaries of
the colonial state means that the homogeneity required for an 
ideal nation-state is lacking.25 The adoption in 1964 by the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of Governments and States of the Resolution on 
the Intangibility of Frontiers26 affirmed the principle of utis
possidetis. It seems, however, to be circumscribed within the
bounds of territorial integrity under article 3, paragraph 3 of 
the OAU Charter. In Burkina Faso v Mali,21 the Chamber of the
International Court of Justice, ICJ, stated that an apparent 
conflict existed between utis possidetis and self-determination
but that it seemed that in Africa, maintenance of the status quo 
had been decided on as the wisest policy.
24 Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary General 
pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992, para. 10 and 19; hereafter 
Agenda for Peace. On competing claims of the state against self- 
determination Falk writes that:
"Part of the impetus for 'the rights of peoples' is to 
provide normative co-ordinates to assess claims on the 
basis of a world order logic that is mindful of 
statist claims, but also receptive to societal claims 
of am anti-statist character, including those of 
'captive nations' caught within the confines of these 
juristic entities often established and maintained by 
coercion, not consent, that we identify as States".
Falk. R., in Crawford, RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, op cit. at 23-24.
25 Another flaw of the principle of self-determination noted 
by Cassesse, is that external self-determination was limited to 
colonial peoples as a whole taking scant regard of conflicts and 
tensions between the population within state boundaries. 
Cassesse, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, op cit., 327 ff.
26AGH/Res. 16(1). See Brownlie, I, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON 
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 1971, 360-361 for text.
27 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 
1986 ICJ Rep., 554. See also, Naldi, G., "The case concerning the 
frontier dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali):Utis Possidetis 
in an African Perspective", vol 36, ICLQ, 893, 1987.
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Self-determination is also linked to sovereignty over natural 
resources. There are thus two strands to the principle; political 
self-determination and economic self-determination. Political 
self-determination comprises external self-determination and
internal self-determination. External self-determination is
primarily freedom of states and the inhabitants of that state 
from foreign rule. State determination is concerned with 
sovereign equality in the world order and a concomitant 
realignment of the world order,28 primarily economically. Internal 
self-determination is contained in the essence of the principle 
of self-determination which "requires a free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples concerned".29 If borders are 
inviolable, it is imperative that the tensions that may exist 
within boundaries are diffused with efforts to allow self- 
determination of groups within the national boundary through 
efforts that fall short of full self-determination or 
independence with internal self-determination, for example, 
through full participation in the affairs of the country. 
Internal self-determination might enable issues of minority 
rights to be addressed with some form of participation that is 
representative. It is, however, important that individual rights 
do not become subsumed to group rights and that the human rights 
aspects of self-determination are not overlooked.
The peaceful realisation of self-determination and stable 
territorial integrity is an important component of the 
maintenance of international peace and security.30 One of the
28 The New International Economic World Order is discussed 
in Part II.
29 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports, 1975, 12 
at 32. See also Cassesse, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES at 320.
30 see An Agenda for Peace, op cit. note 24. It has been 
noted elsewhere however that:
"Food, shelter, clean water, a healthy environment, 
peace, and a stable existence must be the first 
priorities in how we define or "determine" the "self" 
of both individuals and groups, instead of present 
definitions, which are based on masculinist goals of
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purposes of the United Nations is stated in its Charter in 
article 1(2) as the "[development of] friendly relations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace."31 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights makes no mention of the right to self-determination. 
The General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 deals with self- 
determination in a European decolonisation context. The 
preambular text reflects and affirms the importance of creating 
'conditions of stability and...peaceful and friendly relations 
based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self- 
determination. ..' There is an affirmation of the free disposal 
by peoples of their natural resources and an affirmation of 
principles of freedom and exercise of sovereignty. Article 2 
proclaims the right of peoples to self-determination, both 
politically and economically for social development. As noted 
above, numerous other U.N. General Assembly Resolutions affirm 
the principle.
These various declarations and proclamations stress the 
interdependence of peace, international security, friendly 
relations, state sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
participation, the right to be free from subjugation, economic 
development, sovereignty of a people over its natural resources 
and the right to freely dispose of those natural resources for 
the benefit of the people. One of the fundamentals of 
international economic relations is equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples.32 While the legal doctrine is 
established as applicable in a decolonisation context, there is
political and economic aggrandizement and aggressive 
territoriality"
Chinkin, C. and Wright, S., "The Hunger Trap:Women, Food and 
Self-Determination", op cit. note 17, at 294.
31 Chapter 1, Purposes and Principles.
32 Chapter 1 (g), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States.
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no consensus as to whether it extends beyond it. Cassesse states 
that self-determination is entrenched in international general 
rules in only three areas; as an anti-colonialist standard, as 
a ban on foreign military occupation and as a standard for racial 
groups to participate in government.33 The principle of self- 
determination in these three areas amount to jus cogens in
international law. As part of the process of ensuring 
international peace and minimising the potential for conflicts 
that might destabilise territorial boundaries, the principle of 
self-determination is generally interpreted within the bounds of 
territorial integrity. There appears to be a distinction between 
a territorial based right to self-determination as developed by 
the UN in the context of colonisation and the "ethnic-linguistic- 
national principle of self-determination advocated by Wilson".34
Self-determination in a neo-colonisation context is clearly 
fraught with difficulties since it would threaten the stability 
of states and consequently international peace.35 During the 
decolonisation process, self-determination was the preeminent 
concern rather than territorial integrity.36 Once independence was 
achieved by former colonies, the demand for self-determination
33 Cassesse, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, at 319.
34 see Hannum, H., "Rethinking Self-Determination", VJIL VOL 
34, No 1, Fall 1993, 1 at 32. Hannum's emphasis. Another flaw of 
the principle is its inability to grant any right of internal or 
external self-determination to ethnic groups and national, 
religious, cultural or linguistic minorities owing to the statist 
bias of international law. Minorities and groups are protected 
against racial discrimination, incidentally but not as a group. 
Only members of racial groups are legally entitled to demand 
suppression of discriminatory measures. Article 27 of the ICCPR 
takes account of minorities but as individuals. See Cassesse, 
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, at 327ff.
35See Hanauer, L., “The Irrelevance of Self-determination 
to Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara 
Case”, Emory International Law Review, 1995 v9 (1), 133. The
author argues that the right to self-determination is best 
characterised as a right to decolonisation using Western Sahara 
as an example.
36 Blay, S.K.N., "Self-Determination versus Territorial 
Integrity in Decolonization", New York University Jnl. Int. Law 
and Politics, 1986 vl8(2), 441.
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by various groups has been cautiously regarded. For instance, the 
Biafrans, East Timorese and Sahrawi people37 have not been able 
to achieve self-determination resulting in full independence, 
although disputes about the contents of the right allows claims 
that they have some right. The fact that the definition of 
peoples is imprecise further compounds the issue.38 Competing 
minority rights claims, if heeded, would threaten the stability 
of a state. Perhaps also, since minority rights are protected 
through other human rights norms,39 there has not been the impetus 
or even the necessity to deal with the problems of a 'people' 
under the doctrine of self-determination.
"The standard of legitimacy in the post-colonial era 
is not observance of the norm of self-determination, 
but rather adherence by the government of a state to 
widely accepted international human rights norms. As 
these norms expand to include rights of particular 
importance to ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
cultural communities, self-determination loses some of 
its attraction as a means of protection. As human 
rights norms expand to include political participation 
and protection of identity (within a larger context of 
continuing protection for the individual members of 
both minorities and majorities), self-determination 
can be more meaningfully and readily exercised through 
options short of secession."40
37 The claims of these three peoples must be distinguished since 
the Biafrans wanted secession from Nigeria whereas the other two 
want self-determination in a non decolonisation context.
38 Cassesse posits the view that however obliquely, 
international legal rules specify the units of self- 
determination, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES op cit at 327.
39 Brownlie questions the helpfulness and validity of 
asserting distinct rights of peoples when it may be dealt with 
by existing human rights norms. See Brownlie, I., op cit. in 
Crawford, J. (ed) RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, chapter 1.
40 Hannum, H. op cit. note 34, at 66.
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If self-determination is the only means to ensure democratic 
participation in the decision of social and economic affairs by 
a people then clearly the application of human rights norms will 
be insufficient to enable that type of "functional sovereignty".41 
If political internal self-determination is possible through the 
devolution of power to regions or minorities without secession, 
then it is possible to have the effect of self-determination 
buttressed with recourse to international human rights norms as 
an additional safeguard. If this is not possible, or is an 
inappropriate way to guarantee the rights of a homogenous group, 
then the legal doctrine still has validity but perhaps in a 
contemporary modified form. A refusal to acknowledge the real 
concerns of a group of people on the issue of their self- 
determination often results in protracted conflict that in itself 
jeopardises the security of a state.42
Internal political self-determination is a pressing issue in much 
of sub-Saharan Africa. Bad governance, whether military or 
civilian, lack of accountability, lack of transparency and 
corruption in Africa have played a role in denying people the 
right to both economic43 and political self-determination which 
is unacceptable. An arbitrary distinction is drawn by governments 
between self-determination of a state and self-determination of 
peoples, in an African context. Self-determination from 
colonisation has meant in reality a state's right to self­
41 ibid.
42 The case of the Ogonis in Nigeria is a case in point. 
While there is no open conflict between the people and the state 
as such, they have been targeted with the full force of the 
military government, See Annual Report of Human Rights in 
Nigeria, 1994 by the Civil Liberties Organisation.
43 Obebe, 0., “The right to economic self-determination: 
Nigeria under the Shagari government”, Temple Inti Comparative 
Law Jnl, 1988, v2, 39. The author argues that the General 
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, and other such international documents, could be used 
to underlie a claim against the Shagari government for corruption 
of the right to economic self-determination of the Nigerian 
people.
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determination which is sovereign equality on the world stage. It 
has not meant self-determination for peoples to participate 
freely in the governance of their country, it has not meant 
democracy, it has not resulted in accountability and it has 
certainly not resulted in transparency.44 The essence of self- 
determination, the need to have regard to the freely expressed 
and genuine will of the people is not universally respected.45 The 
principle of self-determination clearly has universal scope and 
appeal, but not universal applicability particularly since 
customary rules only grant the right to three specific classes 
of people as indicated above.46 It may be argued that the right 
is conferred on peoples of states that are parties to the 1966 
Covenants on Human Rights under common article 1. The reality, 
however is that political internal self-determination has been 
reduced solely to territorial integrity without civil and 
political rights; the effect of which has been to render people 
powerless to have a say in their own future.
" [T]he capacity of a people to exercise rights of 
self-determination in a political sense is 
inextricably connected to economic and cultural 
integration. Where political, economic, and cultural 
cohesion disintegrates, basic rights of survival also 
become impossible."47
44 see Hannum, H. op cit at 8.
45 Recent events in Nigeria following the annulment of the 
Presidential election in 1992 demonstrate the point. The reaction 
of civil society in organising and mobilising in order to protest 
the annulment and the institution of another military government, 
even though dissent has been harshly punished and is muted at 
present, is indicative of a move on the part of citizens to have 
their genuine will represented in government.
46 Cassesse, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES op cit at 327ff.
47 Chinkin, C. and Wright, S., op cit. note 17, at 264.
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1.Possibilities of Self-Determination for Women48
Self-determination, particularly internal self-determination, has 
the capacity as a legal principle to enable the full 
participation of all citizens in the affairs of their state. 
While at present, as noted above, self determination in an 
African context seems limited to external self-determination, the 
principle itself offers scope for and the promise of the 
representation of the will of the people. Undoubtedly, the 
heterogenous nature of most African societies and competing 
minority claims make a true application of internal self- 
determination complex, it is nevertheless possible. Women as a 
group tend to be marginalised politically, economically and 
culturally. If their voice (s) could be heard as a part of the 
genuine will of the people in the representation of the will of 
the people in the governance of their country, then self- 
determination could enable a representation of their needs as 
part of a larger societal process. Feminist legal theory, as a 
representation of women's requirements on a wider political 
spectrum, can also facilitate this achievement. It can do this 
if it is informed of the specificities, cultural, economic or 
otherwise, which can affect the articulation of the needs of 
women, the expression of these requirements and aid the 
protection of these requirements as rights issues.
Self-determination for women is not simply restricted to 
participatory rights although that would be an improvement. Self- 
determination consists of economic and social development and of 
the opportunities for economic and social development. Therefore 
issues of education, health and mortality rates are good 
indicators of how well women as a group (while the recognition
48 see Chinkin, C., "The Potential and Pitfalls of the Right 
to Self-Determination for Women", 93ff in Bowen, S., (ed), HUMAN 
RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, 1997 Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands.
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of women as a group is in itself problematic49) are able to 
"pursue their economic and social development".50 Self- 
determination is linked to basic survival rights in addition to 
political expression. Despite achievements by advocates of 
women's rights, women and girls find that access to education, 
employment, healthcare, food and even life are influenced or 
limited solely because of their gender. For example, in the area 
of education, at primary school level rates of enrollment for 
girls is approximately equal to rates of enrolment for boys, yet 
at tertiary level there is a higher percentage of boys. Girls 
form 44% of the primary student body in Nigeria51, 55% at 
secondary level52 and only 24% at tertiary level.53 The drop 
between secondary and tertiary education can be attributed to a 
number of factors. If there exist financial hardship within the 
family, girls may be taken out of school to enable boys to 
continue. Girls can also help by working thereby contributing to 
the family's income or by looking after younger children. There 
is also a gender bias in education. Women in higher education,
49 See further Spike Peterson, V. and Parisi, L., “Are women 
human? It's not an academic question” in Evans, T. , HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIFTY YEARS ON: A Reappraisal, 1998, Manchester University Press, 
which in locating women within heterosexism, discusses the forms 
of subordination suffered by women within heterosexist groups 
which manage to separate women from women in other groups on 
distinctions of for example, class, age, sexuality; distinctions 
heterosexism uses to normalise its groupings and its social 
constructs. Primarily concerned with the continuation of the 
group, heterosexism subsumes women's interests to the larger 
interest of perpetuating the group and separate women from other 
women in other groups. The distinctions made in the group 
structures further also means that women in a certain group will 
oppress women in other groups. In that way, the separation of 
women from other women is assured, being always subsumed to 
grander heterosexist survival social constructs.
50article 20, ACHPR.
51Neft, N. and Levine, A.D., WHERE WOMEN STANDrAN 
INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN 14 0 COUNTRIES 
1997-1998, Random House, New York, 1997, 39.
52ibid at 40. There is no explanation for the rise in female
enrolment between primary and secondary level from the authors.
53ibid at 43.
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when they continue to that level, tend to predominate in what are 
traditionally considered women's areas; home economics, arts and 
languages.
In employment, women form 34% of the total workforce54 in Nigeria 
and 43% participate in the work force.55 Discrimination, which can 
take the form of unequal pay, poor training or lack of 
advancement opportunities is a major problem for women. Poor or 
inadequate childcare facilities may mean that working mothers are 
restricted to low-paying part-time jobs. When women do paid work, 
they are to be found at the lower levels of the particular 
industry. In Nigeria, six women per every 100 men are to found 
in administrative or managerial positions(chief executives, 
higher administrative posts, heads of villages), 56 35 per every 
100 men are to be found in technical and professional positions 
(nurses, teachers etc)57 and their average earning are less than 
men' s .58
In terms of healthcare, a 12 week fully paid maternity leave is 
granted to all women government workers in Nigeria but excludes 
the majority of women who do paid work outside this area although 
some private sector industries also provide maternity leave. The 
government has no official policy regarding childcare and public 
childcare facilities are few. Most day care facilities are 
privately owned and are open only to those with resources to use 
the service. Health care on the whole is poor and is privately 
provided. Access to health care is determined by wealth and a 
large proportion of the population will have access only to the
54ibid at 51.
55ibid at 55.
56ibid at 63.
57ibid at 66.
58no figures are provided for differentials between men and 
women's wages in Nigeria but the authors estimate that among the 
countries reporting nonagricultural wages for women and men, the 
average wage for women is about 75% of men's wages, ibid at 70.
120
health care it can afford. The average life expectancy is low, 
56.6 years for women and 54.1 years for men. The maternal 
mortality rate is 1,000 deaths per 100,000 live births.59
Women's economic and social development as part of the process 
of their self-determination is affected by a number of factors. 
The lack of parity between men and women in the areas of 
education and subsequent employment is based on institutionalised 
discriminatory practices and these hinder the self-determination 
of women. Women's economic self-development is hampered by the 
types of work they are able to do in addition to their 
responsibilities as mothers and cares of the old. They are 
affected by initial lack of educational opportunities because of 
a bias towards boy children, as members of the work force they 
suffer from a lack of employment prospects and are paid a lower 
wage. Political self-determination has not resulted in economic 
and social self-determination for women. Self-determination has 
not resulted in equal autonomy for men and women. Women's needs 
differ from men's and women's experiences,60 socially, culturally 
and economically need to be taken into account for their self- 
determination. A Yoruba woman's life experience differs from a 
Yoruba man's life experience. In order for a Yoruba woman to be 
fully emancipated, her social, cultural and economic reality need 
to inform what may constitute self-determination for her, as a 
woman. Women need to be included in the internal self- 
determination process because not only do women experience 
situations differently to men, experiences among women differ 
according to class and wealth. The principle of self- 
determination itself contains elements which can be used to 
address the problem. It is an inclusionary legal principle which 
can be relied upon in tandem with the participatory elements of 
feminist legal theory to claim equal opportunities for women 
which will enable them to develop socially and economically.
59ibid at 370.
60see further Chapter 4 on feminist legal theory and the 
marginalisation of women's experiences.
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PART II THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
1. The New International Economic Order and Development
The call for a New International Economic Order in 1974, which 
preceded later calls for and recognition of a right to 
development, was linked to moves on the part of the developing 
countries to attempt to ensure their economic growth in 
particular and development in general. If they were economically 
strong, their sovereignty could not be impugned by the operation 
of market forces, they would be autonomous and equal to other 
countries in the world order. The removal of economic disparity 
would hopefully lead to social restructuring on a global scale.
The call for a New International Economic Order was therefore 
important for a number of reasons. It was based on ideas of 
solidarity, international cooperation and the 'common heritage 
of mankind'. African states could not be autonomous if there was 
no growth. Economic growth was restricted by the existing world 
economic system which inherently favoured the developed 
countries.
The core instruments relating to the new international economic 
order are the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order,61 the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order,62 the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States63 and General Assembly 
resolution 3362 (S-VII) on development and international economic 
co-operation.64 There are other resolutions which have a bearing 
on the establishment of the new order.65 The underlying purpose
61 GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI) , 1 May 1974.
62 GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974.
63 GA Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
64 16 September, 1975.
65 These include the Declaration on Social Progress and 
Development, GA Resolution 2542 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
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is to redress the balance of inequities and inequality between 
developed and developing countries.
"The present international economic order is in direct 
conflict with current developments in international 
political and economic relations...[T]he world economy 
has experienced a series of grave crises which have 
had severe repercussions, especially on the developing 
countries because of their generally greater 
vulnerability to external economic impulses. The 
developing world has become a powerful factor that 
makes its influence felt in all fields of 
international activity. These irreversible changes in 
the relationship of forces in the world necessitate 
the active, full and equal participation of the 
developing countries in the formulation and 
application of all decisions that concern the 
international community."66
The fundamental purpose of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States is :"...to promote the establishment of the new 
international economic order, based on equity, sovereign 
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among 
all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems."67 
Fundamentals of international economic relations include, 
sovereign equality of all States, equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples and respect for human rights and
with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
of 24 October 1970 and the International Development Strategy for 
the Third United Nations Development Decade, GA Resolution 35/36 
of 5 December 1980, annex.
66 Paragraph 2, Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, op. cit., footnote 2.
67 Preamble, Declaration on Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order.
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fundamental freedoms.68 The new economic order was to form the 
basis of development of all countries and integral to it was 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and 
international levels. Essential features of the NIEO cover a 
number of areas in which there exists imbalances between 
developed and developing countries. It includes control over 
natural resources, regulation of the activities of transnational 
corporations, equitable prices for primary commodities and 
exports of developing countries and strengthening the 
technological capacity of developing countries.69
The right to development70 is linked to the economic order since 
"...the concept of 'development' is understood not only in terms 
of economic and material well-being but as being directed towards 
the physical, moral, intellectual and cultural growth of human 
beings."71 It relates to the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights as well as to civil and political rights. It has 
collective and individual dimensions. It comprises two strands 
of obligations: the obligation of states to co-operate and
practice solidarity and the obligation on states to ensure the 
promotion of higher standards of living and respect for human 
rights. The former imports some kind of duty on the part of the 
developed countries towards the developing countries, the 
starting point of which may be ascribed to the obligation of 
member states under article 56 of the United Nations Charter "to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
article 55" which include "higher standards of living...and
68 Chapter 1 (b) , (g) and (k) , Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States.
69 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev, The New
International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights, 
Raul Ferrero, para.2 03.
70 Although the United Nations did not adopt a declaration 
on this right until 1986, it was recognised in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
71 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev.
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conditions of economic and social progress and development" and 
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all..." The latter duty is that which 
states owe to their citizens and firmly brings the observance and 
respect for human rights into the context of the right to 
development. The right to development thus forms a link between 
the economic order and the promotion of human rights.
It seems that demands for a New International Economic Order 
became superceded by calls for a right to development which was 
taken up by the United Nations and was passed as a General 
Assembly Resolution, although not without some hostility to the 
NIEO and the Right to Development from the West, in 1986. There 
is no clear reason for this but the connection of economic 
development and rights protection, including the right of 
peoples' over their wealth and natural resources as delineated 
under article 21, of the ACHPR seems to have found voice within 
the context of the Declaration on the Right to Development. In 
many ways, it seems that new ideas and issues become 
incorporated. For example, the growth of globalisation,72 the 
universalisation of the economic market and the advance of 
technology73 are the new issues yet they are encompassed in the 
old ideas: the protection of the rights of individuals in the 
face of untrammelled economic expansion of trans-nationals; free 
trade ideals that seem to favour developed countries; fears of 
economic imperialism; imposition of a dominant economic culture 
and the efforts of developing countries to assert their
72 on globalisation within international law see further 
Simma, B. & Paulus, A.L., "'The International Community':Facing 
the Challenge of Globalization", 9 EJIL (1998), 265 and Dupuy, 
P.M., "International Law:Torn between Coexistence, Cooperation 
and Globalization. General Conclusions", 9 EJIL (1998), 278.
73 see further, Myers, J. , "Human Rights and
Development:Using Advanced Technology to Promote Human Rights in 
Sub-Saharan Africa", Case W. Res. J. Int' 1 L. vol 30 No 2-3, 
1998, 343, on how Africa needs to participate in and improve its 
technological development to enable it to compete in the world 
market and become better equipped to ensure its social and
economic development.
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sovereignty to limit this influence. The core issues remain the 
same; the universalisation of a dominant economic system which 
threatens and weakens the autonomy of developing nations.
2.The Right to Development
The right to development has been described as a third generation 
or one of the solidarity rights i.e., a group or peoples' right. 
The proliferation of such rights has had divergent reactions. The 
success of the human rights movement has led to an increase in 
the demands for recognition of new rights.74 This essentially 
means that the concept of rights cannot be dealt with in a 
discrete manner. Rights discourse must be contextually relevant. 
Human rights law must take account of groups of people excluded 
from protection.75 In the context of the developing countries geo­
political and socio-cultural factors must be taken into account 
in rights application. Certainly, the recognition of new rights 
increases the burden on states and international institutions 
such as the United Nations, but this is not an acceptable reason 
for non-recognition.
The Declaration on the Right to Development76 is ambiguous as to 
the content of the right to development and as to whether it is 
an individual, peoples' or state right. There is reiteration of 
various United Nations instruments such as the Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; reference to the rights of 
peoples to self-determination and international peace and 
security as essential elements for the realisation of the right
74 See Alston, P., “Making space for new human rights:the case of
the right to development”, 1988, Human Rights Yearbook, 8,
Harvard University Press.
75 For work on the exclusion of the rights of women from
human rights law see Chapter 4.
76 GA Resolution 41/128, 4 December 1986.
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to development. The Preamble states that the human being is the 
central subject of the development process and notes that efforts 
at the international level to promote and protect human rights 
should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international 
economic order. Yet there is no individual articulation of what 
form the composite right to development should take. It has the 
status of a human right77 and "...implies the full realization 
of the rights of peoples to self-determination, which 
includes... the exercise of their inalienable right to full 
sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.”78 The 
duty of states to co-operate in ensuring development and to take 
steps to eliminate violations of human rights is enumerated79
Bedjaoui80 writes that the content of the right to development has 
two aspects:1) a right to develop erga omnes claimed by a state
and opposable by it to all others and 2) a right claimed by a 
state over others which may be exacted by that state from other 
states and from the international community. The right to develop 
erga omnes consists of permanent sovereignty over resources,
reparations for past injuries and the means necessary for 
development. State sovereignty is defined through its political 
aspects yet the political sovereignty of a state may be abrogated 
by economic pressures from other countries or foreign economic 
entities with no legal redress available. This means that states 
cannot be truly sovereign unless they are fully developed in 
order that they may be equal and not subjected to external 
economic pressures. " [T]he right to development is a sine qua non
77 article 1(1)
78 article 1 (2)
79 article 3(3) & article 5.
80 Bedjaoui, M. , "Some Unorthodox Reflections on the 'Right 
to Development', in Snyder, F., & Slinn, P., (eds) INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, Abingdon, Oxon, 
Professional Books Ltd, 1987, hereafter Snyder & Slinn, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT,86-116 at 101 ff.
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of sovereignty."81 Thus, "the intrinsic condition of the existence 
of a state's sovereignty is its permanent sovereignty over the 
natural resources of its territory; there is neither state 
sovereignty nor State independence without sovereignty over these 
resources. The second proposition is that any persistent breach 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a threat to 
international peace and security."82 Reparations for past 
injuries takes the form of aid and special bilateral 
arrangements, the practice of which is justified by former 
administering states with the concept of 'mutually beneficial co­
operation' and ideas of solidarity. The last point of the means 
necessary for normal development means that a people should never 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence. For a state to exact 
its right of development over others, it must be able to 
participate on an equal basis. To do this, the international 
division of labour must be altered so that a state or peoples 
gets its due.
The idea of a NIEO obviously challenged international law given 
the hostility of the West occasioned by the declaration. It 
raised the issue of whether it was purposive or normative.83 
That, and that the concept of the right to development was 
regarded as destabilising to the established principles of 
international law meant that international law was regarded as 
being in a state of crisis. The old order could be seen 
critically as an instrument to consolidate underdevelopment for 
the benefit of the 'rich' countries; consequently, international 
development law could be seen alternatively as an instrument to 
adapt international law to new economic purposes, or as an
81 Bedjaoui, ibid at 103, in Snyder & Slinn, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF DEVELOPMENT.
82 ibid at 104.
83 Slinn, P., "Differing approaches to the relationship 
between international law and development" in Snyder & Slinn, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT, pp27-39. Slinn discusses how 
the different terms used to describe the law of development in 
English and French have different imports which mirrors the 
different views of international law and its use.
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instrument of destabilization in international law.84 There 
emerged two opposing schools of thought. The first regarded the 
NIEO as having no legal reality as General Assembly resolutions 
are not binding. The second regarded it as forming part of 
positive international law, consequently General Assembly 
resolutions were binding. These opposing views can broadly be 
broken down into a North/South political stance. For the North, 
if the NIEO had no legal reality, there could be no challenge to 
the status quo whereas the South, desirous of a more equitable 
and pluralistic form of international law, regarded the 
resolution as part of positive international law. The extreme 
standpoint initially adopted, however, disregarded the role of 
the law, international or otherwise, as a tool for change.85
The political resistance to the right to development assumed that 
the law of development had no origin in the principles of 
international law.86 Bedjaoui locates the basis of the right to 
development within the concept of international solidarity. On 
the issue of to whom the right should accrue, he notes that 
making the right to development an individually based human right 
obscures the fact that a state's search for development is 
impeded by a variety of factors and will penalise the state for 
not guaranteeing a right determined by external factors. The 
fundamental problem is that "...underdevelopment is a structural 
phenomenon linked to a given model of international economic
84 Flory, M., "A North-South Legal Dialogue: The
International Law of Development", in Snyder & Slinn, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT, pp 11-26.
85 Pellet, A., "A New International Legal Order : What Legal 
Tools for What Changes?" in Snyder & Slinn, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
DEVELOPMENT ppll7-135. Pellet is of the view that if there is a 
crisis, it only affects international lawyers, not the law itself 
since new rules of law can accompany economic changes.
86 In actual fact, Kwakwa identifies the content of the 
international development law as part of the duty of states to 
co-operate for global welfare with the principles on which 
development is based existing in treaties and customary law. 
Kwakwa, E., "Emerging International Development Law and 
Traditional Law-Congruence or Cleavage?", Georgia Jnl of Inti and 
Comp. Law, 1987, vl7(3), p431-455.
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relations, and to a certain international division of labour."87 
He suggests that individual claims to a right to development 
would weaken a state at the time it is striving to fight against 
international factors which connive to keep a state 
underdeveloped. The right to development is regarded as a 
corollary of the right to self-determination since it is not 
possible to acknowledge a right to self-determination without 
simultaneously recognising a right of the people to develop. 
Therefore, the right to development is a state right or a right 
of peoples and takes precedence over the right of the individual. 
In locating the basis of the right to development within the 
concept of international solidarity, three stages are identified 
by Bedj aoui:
a) interdependence as a result of the global nature of 
the international economy
b) the universal obligation incumbent on every state 
to develop the world economy, an obligation which 
makes development an international problem of the 
first order and
c) international solidarity itself as a basis.
Since there has always been a single world economy88 as no country 
has ever been economically self-sufficient, there needs to be a 
universal approach to the problem of development. This universal 
approach does not presuppose that the current structure of the 
world economy must continue unchallenged. The invocation of the 
right to development means a challenge to the status quo so that 
there is a balance between growth and development of the 
developing countries and the continued well-being of the 
developed countries. The duty incumbent on states to safeguard
87 Bedjaoui, op. cit. note 80 at 91.
88 see Dupuy, P.M., “International Law:Torn between 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization. General Conclusions”, 
9 EJIL (1998), 278 on globalisation.
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future generations applies to development and this form of 
international solidarity may be invoked as a basis of the right 
to development.
3. The Right to Development and Human Rights
Notwithstanding the legal arguments as to the effect of the 
proclamation of the right to development on international law, 
the practical effect has been an additional legal ground to focus 
breaches of human rights, particularly in the context of 
development projects. An unforeseen occurrence, however, was the 
move on the part of the governments of the developing world to 
trade off human rights for economic development notwithstanding 
that observance and respect for human rights is regarded as 
integral to both the right to development89 and the NIEO.90 It is 
realistically impossible to separate economic development from 
human rights since the rights of participation that are so often 
denied to citizens are necessary for discussion on how best a 
country should develop. " [H]uman rights observance...is essential 
for the creation of minimum conditions necessary for political 
stability which will ensure... development."91 Responsibility for 
the failure of the African state has been placed by some 
commentators on autocratic regimes whose actions have resulted 
in huge population displacements. For example, Mutua says, "While 
it is true that external factors have played havoc with Africa's 
ability to develop and become self-reliant, there can be little 
doubt that the bulk of the continent's woes have been engineered 
by the African political elites."92
89 Declaration on the Right to Development, article 6.
90 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Chapter 
1 (k) .
91 Kibwana, K., "Human Rights and/or economic development: 
which way Africa?" Third World Legal Studies, 1993, pp43-57 at 
45.
92 Makau Wa Mutua, "The interaction between human rights, 
democracy and governance and the displacement of population", 
Int. Jnl of Refugee Law, 1995, V7(Special Issue), pp37-45 at 43.
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In spite of attempts to achieve a basic minimum condition of life 
for people, poverty and underdevelopment persists. A basic needs 
approach to development was adopted in the 1970s; the essence of 
which was to ensure that everyone had access to basic social 
goods. There is disagreement over the definition of basic needs 
but the core includes food, water, health, education and 
shelter.93 Definition of the basic minimum is problematic. Does 
it mean providing a specific level of goods and services or 
achieving conditions which lead to a minimally satisfactory life? 
In what way is a full life to be measured? Are standards to be 
the same for all countries or relative to the level of 
development? Human rights is linked to the economic concept of 
basic needs. The ICESCR encompasses most of what would be termed 
basic needs. The Right to Development goes beyond it to include 
cultural and political development. Moral and legal imperative 
is attached to these needs as rights and consequently there is 
an increased moral and political commitment to their fulfilment 
as well as international legal status. Monitoring the fulfilment 
of basic needs is complex. Its achievement depends on the 
structure of the economic system in addition to cultural and 
sociological factors. Whatever method is used to fulfil basic 
needs, the indices of success should include variables that show 
a state of life as indicators such as life expectancy, infant 
mortality rates, literacy rates and mortality rates. If the 
concept of basic needs were accorded human rights status since 
most of what it indicates is contained in the ICESCR, it might 
increase the level of commitment expended to achieve them. 
Enforcement would require the establishment of mechanisms to 
monitor the variables such as infant mortality rates before 
success can be measured. There would need to be "mechanisms for 
recording relevant aspects of human well-being.1,94
93adequate food, clothing, housing and an adequate standard 
of living have the status of rights under article 11 ICESCR.
94 Stewart, F., "Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and 
the Right to Development", 11 Human Rights Quarterly 1989 347-374 
at 369.
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Efforts to ensure that people obtain or have access to a basic 
minimum condition of life include development projects. A 
development project may be directed towards development of 
infrastructure, services, production and marketing or training. 
For example, World Bank projects are initiated, planned, 
negotiated, implemented, monitored, evaluated and audited in 
accordance with an elaborate set of procedures built around the 
concept of a "project cycle", which consumes years, often at 
least ten. Many development projects entail deliberate external 
interventions into the physical and social environments and lives 
and affairs of particular communities and groups which are 
politically vulnerable, impact quite differently on particular 
groups and often adversely in social and economic terms, and 
often create or exacerbate serious environmental problems which 
in turn adversely affect people. The World Bank has developed a 
'social1, 'gender' and 'environmental' analysis as required 
components of project planning and design. Recognition of an 
obligation to make these kinds of analyses are large steps 
towards a recognition that all of the processes involved in a 
project cycle must be put under a regime of law designed to 
assure the protection and full exercise of human rights by 
project affected people.95
James Paul looks at the legal bases for the obligation to protect 
and promote rights in the context of development projects. He 
examines the relationship between particular kinds of development 
projects and particular rights, the kinds of harm caused when 
these rights are ignored and the strategies that International 
Development Agencies, IDAs, can adapt to meet their duties to 
protect and promote rights and analyses whether the assumption 
of these obligations would constitute illegal political 
interference in the affairs of the countries concerned.96
95 The information in this paragraph is taken from Paul, 
J.C.N., "International Development Agencies, Human Rights and 
Humane Development Projects", Denver J. Inti L + Pol, Vol 17 no. 
1, 1988, pp67-120, footnote 1.
96 ibid at 69.
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Development projects are seen as a means to address conditions 
which constrain productivity, growth and betterment of peoples' 
lives. Their impact on the human rights of identifiable groups 
are often foreseeable and this imposes a duty to protect and 
promote the rights of affected people. The establishment of rules 
and policies to meet this obligation will make it easier for IDAs 
to analyse human rights issues.
The categories of harm identified97 in international development 
projects are exclusionary, substantive and lack of redress. 
Exclusionary harm involves denial of participation which results 
in inadequate information on both sides. Substantive harm is that 
which involves landlessness or displacement which leads to health 
and safety risks. Lack of redress means that the peoples affected 
receive inadequate compensation for the harm caused or none at 
all.
Human rights law is relevant to the development process in a 
number of ways. Article 55 of the UN Charter obliges member 
states to promote "development" and "human rights and fundamental 
freedoms". Various promulgations by the UN such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, particularly article 
14 all address rights protection and the needs of particular 
groups of people. The obligation to promote and protect these 
rights ought to be assumed by all international agencies which
97 Paul, J. , "Law and Development into the '90s:Using 
international law to impose accountability to people on 
international development actors", Third World Legal Studies, 
1992 ppl-16 at 2-3. See also Tomasevski, K, "Monitoring human 
rights aspects of sustainable development", American University 
Jnl of Inti Law & Policy, 1992, v8 (1), pp85-116. The paper
discusses how to ensure development policies do not conflict with 
human rights obligations and analyses possible substantive 
criteria that may be used for monitoring the human rights aspects 
of sustainable development. Tomasevski suggests the extension of 
the environmental impact assessment to human rights in 
development.
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operate within the international system since although, strictly 
speaking, these are obligations of states, states are members of 
these organisations. Further, reaffirmation and incorporation of 
these rights occur in resolutions and declarations of the 
General Assembly which affirm the indivisibility and 
interdependence of political and economic rights. The Declaration 
on the Right to Development itself mentions human rights and its 
indivisible nature,98 drawing upon affirmations in regional 
instruments such as the ACHPR.
Many development projects run roughshod over people's interests 
in food, health, land and education.99 IDAs should aim to adhere 
to the standard of international legal rights protection in the 
realisation of their projects. In so far as the right to 
development is proclaimed as a human right, it must be taken 
seriously by those engaged in development activities. The 
imposition of the modern state and modern law means that the 
rights discourse is important. Poor/rural people may not have the 
capacity to use law in order to assert their right. The notion 
of the rights discourse may be alien to their traditional 
cultures and structures although the basic values which underlie 
the rights discourse exist. It is important that people in the 
developing world have the right to know they have basic rights 
and struggle to assert and adapt broad guarantees to their 
concerns.
The imposition of development forces the issue more. 
Participation through the identification of particular interests 
potentially affected by a development project and articulation
98 articles 1,2, 6, 8, 9.
99 The interaction between States, international organisations 
such as the World Bank, IMF, non governmental organisations, 
urban elites and rural women and the conflicting agendas may 
alienate the same people who are to benefit from projects. These 
sorts of problems are not diminished by legally formulated 
rights. See further Harries, C., “Daughters of Our 
Peoples:International Feminism meets Ugandan Law and Custom”, 
Colum, H.R. Law Rev, vol 25, 493, 1994.
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of rights by the people will empower them. Rights to equality can 
be enforced, or at the very least its abuse discouraged by IDAs, 
by ensuring that the principles of CEDAW, in particular article 
14, are borne in mind in planning and implementing projects. 
Awareness that discrimination based on class, ethnicity and sex 
is built into the political economies of development in most 
countries should inform all stages of the process so that certain 
groups, for example, women are not further disadvantaged. Past 
failures to consider the adverse effect of projects on people can 
be combatted with enlisting meaningful participation of all 
categories of project-affected people otherwise the project may 
not be justified in spite of its cost. Those whose rights are 
threatened must enjoy full rights and legal resources to enable 
them to dispute the legality of proposed projects.
International law can play a role in reducing the adverse effects 
of development projects by making the actors accountable. 
Existing human rights standards, both substantive and procedural 
should be invoked. Given that IDAs are a part of a system that 
sets standards of rights, they ought to be expected within their 
projects to take cognisance that their projects do not denigrate 
any human or environmental rights. The preamble of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development states that "the human 
person is the central subject of the development process and that 
development policy should therefore make the human being the main 
participant and beneficiary of development". The means that IDAs 
should be accountable for the effect of projects to ensure that 
project affected people actually benefit.
Identification of rights to be protected in the development 
process would facilitate accountability. Those identified 
include; the rights of participation, basic needs rights, rights 
of equality, rights of workers, rights to security in land and 
the right to redress wrongs.100 Once the legal obligation to 
respect and promote human rights has been accepted, IDAs must be
100 Paul, J. , "Law and Development into the '90s" op. cit. 
at 6-12.
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put under a more specific rule of law through their own codes. 
These should include explicit rights of participation through a 
duty to inform, transparency, standards to protect substantive 
rights and rights of redress.
4. Monitoring Human Rights Aspects of Development
The World Bank, as the primary lending institution is legally
prohibited by its Articles of Association from political 
interference in the affairs of members.101 This limits the role of 
the Bank and allows it to abdicate responsibility in the 
protection and promotion of civil and political rights. Political 
events which have a bearing on the economic conditions of a 
member or on the Bank's ability to supervise a project may be 
taken into account. The persuasive nature or otherwise of UN 
General Assembly resolutions depends on how consistent the 
resolution is with the Bank's Articles of Agreement since these 
Articles will not be modified or amended to suit General Assembly 
resolutions. Therefore, as a general rule, declarations, 
statements or resolutions for the Bank to take into account human 
rights in its lending policies will only be persuasive in so far 
as they coincide with the Bank's legally stated purpose.102 In 
addition, although the Bank is a specialised agency of the UN, 
under its Relationship Agreement with the UN, the Bank is 
required to function as an independent organisation.
Notwithstanding limitations imposed on the Bank by its Articles 
of Agreement, given that it is heavily involved in financing 
development projects world wide, it is a myopic standpoint to
101 Shihata, I., “The World Bank and Human Rights :An Analysis of 
the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements”, Denver J. Inti 
L. & Pol., vol no. 1, 1988, pp38-66.
102 ibid. at 43-44. The author refers to the case of South 
Africa and Portugal as examples of cases when the Bank maintained 
its position that it was prohibited from interfering with the 
affairs of its members. Lending to Portugal was suspended on 
economic grounds and lending to South Africa was stopped on the 
grounds it was no longer eligible economically.
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take to separate politics from economics. Development projects 
may adversely affect a disproportionate number of people than the 
projected benefits and the Bank should ensure that borrower 
governments fulfil their agreements to protect human beings. "The 
idea that destruction of a single human being jeopardises 
humanity as a species has not attained acceptance in the 
development policy formulation.1,103 The difficulty lies in 
establishing mechanisms and substantive criteria that may be used 
for monitoring the human rights aspect of sustainable development 
since the development process itself is not governed by the rule 
of law and democracy. There are obstacles to effective 
monitoring,104 the primary factor being lack of procedures and 
mechanisms to provide redress in cases of human rights violations 
stemming from development. The extension of the analogy of 
environmental impact assessment to human rights in development 
might serve as a tool for monitoring the effects of a planned 
development - the human rights impact assessment.
"The model of the environmental impact assessment is 
useful in developing a feasible scheme for monitoring 
human rights aspects of development because of the 
conceptual proximity of both issues to each other.
Both environmental protection and human rights 
protection are inherently cross-cutting issues, 
spanning the entire process of development...Another 
similarity is the focus on harmful side-effects of 
development projects. In cases where the side-effects 
are severe and irreversible, the necessity of 
introducing safe-guards becomes persuasive and serves 
to mobilize public support... [S]uch an assessment 
would serve to identify possible adverse effects, and 
would also provide for the introduction of safeguards 
for the prevention or mitigation of the possible 
adverse effects identified. As in environmental
103 Tomasevski, K, op cit. , note 97, at 78.
104 ibid at 83-85.
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protection, methods of redress and/or compensation 
would be possible".105
Transparency in the development process is an important 
prerequisite to establishing effective monitoring structures as 
is identification of the rights most affected by development.106 
In September, 1993, the World Bank's Executive Directors 
established an independent Inspection Panel107 to help ensure that 
Bank operations adhere to the institution's policies and 
procedures including those to promote sustainable development and 
reduce poverty. The Inspection Panel enables any group of
105 ibid at 92. For the adverse impact of development on the 
environment see further; Rowlands, I., "The international
politics of environment and devlopment:the post-UNCED agenda", 
Millenium, Summer 1992, pp209-224, Silveira, M.P.W.,
"International Legal Instruments and sustainable
development:principles, requirements and restructuring", 
Willamette Law Review, 1995, v31(2), pp239-251, Shearer,C.R.H., 
"International Environmental Law and Development in Developing 
Nations:Agenda setting, articulation, and institutional
participation",Tulane Environmental Law Jnl, 1994, v7(2), pp391-
430, Cycon, D., "When worlds collide: Law, Development and
Indigenous People", New England Law Review, 1991, v25(3), pp761- 
794, Wilson, W., "Environmental Law as Development Assistance", 
Environmental Law, 1992, v22(3), pp953-976 and Parkinson, F., 
"Towards an international river basin development law? (With 
special reference to Latin America)" in Snyder & Slinn 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT.
The issues in environmental law and human rights in 
development are similar. Lack of participation by the people to 
be affected by projects and little political influence means that 
resulting harm is not compensated adequately, if at all. This 
lack of political power is reflected at the international level 
in the relationship between developed and developing countries. 
The latter's minimal role in the institutional structures for 
environmental protection and the cost involved taken together 
with external economic pressures means that they can only 
inadequately enforce the rapidly emerging standards of 
environmental protection.
106 see above, pl36-137 of this work for rights identified 
by James Paul.
107 IBRD Resolution 93-10 and IDA Resolution 93-6. A review of 
the resolution was issued by the Bank on 17th October, 1996, 
“Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Resolution”, (the 
clarification). For further details of the Inspection Panel and 
text of the Resolution establishing the Panel, see further 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/INS PANEL.html
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individuals, who consider they may or might be harmed or that 
their rights and interests have been or may be directly or 
adversely affected by Bank-supported projects, to ask the Panel 
to investigate their their complaints that the Bank has failed 
to abide by its policies and procedures. The Bank has received 
13108 formal requests since it began operations in 1994 including 
three from Africa.109 The role of the Panel is to carry out 
independent investigations and its functions is to inquire and 
recommend. If the Board decides that a request shall be 
investigated, the Panel will collect information and provided its 
findings, independent assessment and conclusions to the Board. 
On the basis of the Panel's findings and Management's 
recommendations, the Executive Directors will consider the 
actions, if any, to be taken by the Bank. The Bank is to make 
public the Panel's report, Management recommendations and the 
Board's decisions.
5. Women and Development
Formal legal protection for the right of women to develop and for 
the realisation of their economic, social and cultural rights is 
contained in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).110 This is in addition to
108 As of 28 July, 1998.
109 These are Tanzania:Power VI Project, Lesotho/South 
Africa:Proposed Loan for Phase lb of Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project and Nigeria: Lagos Drainage and Sanitation Project
(Credit No.2517-0). See World Bank Home page at www.worldbank.org 
and www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/lNS PANEL.html
110 Article 13 states:
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in other areas 
of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, 
in particular:
(a) The right to family benefits;
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other 
forms of financial credit;
(c) The right to participate in recreational
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formal rights of non-discrimination.111 The majority of the 
world's women contribute to the global economy through 
agriculture, therefore access to land and possessory rights in 
land is an important aspect of women's right to development. 
However, customary law in many countries limits the right of 
women to own land. The discriminatory effect of customary law is 
often affirmed by statutory law which follows custom in family 
matters. Land and access to credit are clearly important for the 
realisation of development. Institutionalised discriminatory 
practices at all levels ensures that women are excluded from the 
development process. Politically, they are inadequately 
represented and as a consequence issues which affect them most 
are omitted from the agenda. This phenomenon occurs at national 
and international level. In the area of development projects, 
there is little participation by the peoples who are to benefit 
from the project. Given that women participate little or not at 
all in the decision-making process,112 their input is minimal in 
this area.
activities, sports and all aspects of 
cultural life.
Article 14 states:
1. States Parties shall take into account the 
particular problems faced by rural women and the 
significant roles which rural women play in the 
economic survival of their families, including their 
work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and 
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the 
application of the provisions of this Convention to 
women in rural areas.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in rural 
areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women, that they participate in and benefit 
from rural development and, in particular, shall 
ensure to such women the right:
(a) To participate in all the elaboration and implementation 
of development planning at all levels;
(f) To participate in all community activities.
111 CEDAW, articles 1, 2 & 3.
112 the goal of equal participation in the decision making 
process by women and men is referred to in the Beijing Platform 
for Action, para 183.
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The legal basis for redressing the problems faced by women in 
development has its foundation in the principle of non­
discrimination. In various international documents, the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination in terms of access to 
opportunities are affirmed and re-affirmed.113 Discrimination 
against women manifests itself in a form specific to a given 
milieu. Hence factors that limit a woman's right to develop in 
for instance, an African country, have their roots in 
prejudicial, discriminatory attitudes that assign an inferior 
role to women. This has historically limited their participation 
in decision-making in areas which impact directly on their lives. 
As traditional societies are being replaced by modern, industrial 
society, so women's participation has remained minimal and their 
exclusion more entrenched; in effect a cultural lag. Thus, the 
rights discourse has, until comparatively recently, not taken 
cognisance of their needs and requirements.
Lack of awareness of their rights has also further compounded the 
problem. This is being tackled by various women's organisation 
at the grass roots level who are instrumental in consciousness 
raising, using the language of rights discourse in order that 
women, and other groups, negatively affected by development 
projects and development issues in general can begin to assert 
their rights. As long as transparency exists within the 
development process and institutions involved in development 
projects recognise rights of participation of the people who will 
be affected by a project and allow them to take part in the 
process, and so long as they themselves, as international 
organisations recognise that they are bound by international laws 
and principles, then they can actually be a part of the process 
that ensures, for instance, the formal legal equality of women 
by taking into account their needs and requirements.
113 UDHR, art. (2), ICCPR, art 2(1), ICESCR, art2(2) 
CEDAW,arts.(1), (2) & (3), Vienna Programme of Action, para. 18.
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A World Bank114 document states that women head about 40% of 
African households. They supply an average of 70% of the labour 
for food production, 50% of labour in domestic food storage, 60% 
in food marketing and 100% in on-farm food processing. Despite 
these figures, a wide of range of laws and regulatory practices 
impede women in obtaining credit, education, training and medical 
care. This obviously has high developmental costs in terms of 
maximisation of economic output. The distortions in economic 
resource allocation is linked to the legal principles underlying 
them. Gender neutral provisions do not take into account 
inequities within the structures of society. These legal norms 
thereby affect the economic development of women.
During the Beijing Conference, the World Bank Chairman, Mr 
Wolfensohn received a petition which requested that the World 
Bank take four initiatives to respond to the Platform for Action. 
These were promoting the participation of grassroots women's 
groups in economic policy formulation, institutionalising a 
gender perspective in the design and implementation of projects, 
increasing Bank lending for basic education, health and credit 
programmes and increasing the number of women in senior 
management. On the first initiative, the Bank has responded by, 
for example, integrating gender into their Policy Assessment 
which is one of the main instruments used to identify social and 
economic development priorities for low-income and vulnerable 
groups and which serves as one of the analytical tools for 
defining future policy and lending strategies. Gender has also 
been factored into adjustment programmes and economic reforms 
since evidence from poverty adjustments show that women and men 
are affected differently by poverty and by policies and 
programmes. Pilot countries for this gender adjustment in Africa 
include Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda and Cameroon. The Bank has also 
begun to involve NGOs in policy formulations. On the second 
initiative, the Bank has incorporated gender dimensions into the 
selection, design and implementation of agricultural projects,
114Women, Legal Reform and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
World Bank website, http://WWW.WORLDBANK.ORG.
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and reviews new projects on whether gender issues are addressed 
and rates them accordingly. On the third, the Bank has specific 
programmes directed to women and on the fourth initiative to 
increase women in its senior management, is taking institutional 
action.115
In assessing the failure of the law to ensure equality between 
men and women consideration needs to be given to where the fault 
lies. Failure might lie in the construction of the law, in its 
administration, entrenched custom or cultural practice which 
contravenes the law in that society or it might lie in the 
ignorance of those affected by the adverse effects of the law or 
a combination of all these. There are, certainly, weaknesses in 
substantive rule of law provisions. Marriage, succession and 
property laws are at times discriminatory and custom will 
abrogate certain statutory rights.
For example, in a Nigerian case, Idehen v Idehen,116 the
provisions of the Wills Law (1958) of Western Nigeria, applicable 
in the states of Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Edo and Delta under section 
3(1) states that "Subject to any Customary Law relating thereto, 
it shall be lawful for every person to devise, bequeath or 
dispose of, by his will executed in a manner hereinafter 
required, all real and all personal estate which he shall be 
entitled to, either in Law or in equity, at the time of his death 
and which if not so devised, bequeathed and disposed of would 
devolve upon the heir at law of him, or if he became entitled by 
descent, of his ancestor, or upon his executor or administrator." 
There had previously been two conflicting views of the 
interpretation of this provision; that it rendered void any 
disposition of property by will inconsistent with customary law,
115 For full details of the Bank's gender initiatives see 
further, http://www.worldbank.org/gender/how/report.htm
1161991, 6 N.W.L.R Pt 198, 382. See also Sagay, I.E.,
"Customary Law and Freedom of Testamentary Power", Journal of 
African Law, 1995, vol 39, No. 2, 173 for an analysis of case law 
development on this particular area.
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including intestate succession, or that it merely qualifies the 
property disposed of by will and does not render void 
testamentary disposition per se. When the case came before the 
Supreme Court, it was held by a majority of 5 to 2 that section 
3(1) does not restrict testamentary power as such but merely 
qualifies the subject matter that can be disposed of by will. The 
issue to be considered is whether the property in question is 
subject to customary law and whether the testator can devise the 
property under customary law. If the testator is allowed to 
devise the property under customary law, then he may dispose of 
it by testamentary disposition.
The facts of the case involve the testamentary disposition of 
certain property, which under customary law would always devolve 
on the eldest son but which the testator had bequeathed to 
another. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, the 
testator had no authority to bequeath the property since under 
the relevant customary law he could not devise the property. 
While the parties involved in this case were both men, it was 
interesting to see that the judgement did not consider the 
substance of the customary law as to its discriminatory aspects. 
The customary law and its application were accepted in toto. The 
effect of this decision, in the context of the abrogation of 
statutory provisions is that when faced with actual and potential 
discriminatory customary law, its substance is not questioned. 
The statutory rules of interpretation are applied to the relevant 
provision without, in my opinion, sufficient consideration to its 
effects. This case serves to illuminate the difficulty of 
modifying entrenched customs and customary law even when their 
application would contravene statutory, constitutional and 
international non-discrimination provisions.
In a subsequent case, Lawal-Osula v Lawal-Osula, 1993, 117 the
Court of Appeal extended the subject matter to be subject to 
customary law to all the properties of the testator while
1172 NWLR Pt 274, 158.
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purporting to follow the decision of the higher court. The case 
illustrates the lack of integration between modern laws and 
customs, the later Court of Appeal decision highlights the 
inconsistency in the application of rules in lower and higher 
courts and the whole process of administration of law, in this 
example, shows the detrimental effect to women. If custom 
prevents women from inheriting property and to evade this 
problem, testamentary disposition is made, which will be set 
aside, even on a qualified basis, it becomes impossible to reform 
the law both substantively and in its application. Further, the 
wishes of the testator are thwarted and the likelihood of 
improving the ability of women to develop is impeded.
Strategic means of obviating the problems include law reforms, 
empowerment of women through education, public education for 
organisations responsible for implementation of law reforms, the 
judiciary and law enforcement officers. Access to law needs to 
be improved and participation in the process of law reform, for 
example, of NGOs and other grass roots organisations, will aid 
useful development of the law.
Economic adjustment programmes or structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) have also had a detrimental effect on women.118 
Linked with general development programmes, they have tended to 
omit women's economic contributions because they are not as 
valued as the economic contributions of men. SAPs are intended 
to improve trade regimes, allocation of resources and efficiency 
in the use of resources. They do not, however, pay sufficient 
attention to the social costs and neither did the economic 
measures consider gender as a distinguishing factor. Men and 
women participate in the economy in different ways because they 
have differing constraints and will therefore be affected 
differently by the economic measure. One of the ways in which 
they participate differently is in the allocation of resources 
such as land, labour, capital and access to capital, access to
118see World Bank, "Gender and Economic Adjustment in Sub- 
Saharan Africa", http://WWW.WORLDBANK.ORG.
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credit, technology and training. Gender neutrality in underlying 
economic concepts makes women's economic and non-economic work 
invisible. Moreover, unpaid work is not considered economic and 
is not included in the national product which provides an 
incomplete picture of economic activity. Therefore, what may be 
considered in conventional economic analysis as efficiency 
improvements may merely mean a shift from the visible, male 
economy to the invisible, predominantly female economy. Economic 
adjustment programmes have realised the social costs of the 
measures and have begun to factor imbalances in gender divisions 
of labour and identify gender differentiated constraints into the 
design of the programmes. In the United Nations Secretary- 
General 1 s Report on An Agenda for Development, he stated that 
structural adjustment programmes must have "a clear human 
focus".119 While the report affirms that development is a 
fundamental human right and is the most secure basis for peace, 
it goes on to say that societies must take into account in 
development decisions, amongst other things, "...cultural values 
and expectations."120 This is an unfortunate inclusion since one 
of the primary reasons women have been so adversely affected in 
the development process is because cultural values impede or deny 
them the opportunity to acquire the means to fully participate 
in the process. Nonetheless, the Recommendation of An Agenda for 
Development states that
"...in virtually every dimension of development 
whether political, social, economic, environmental or 
security related - the role of women is central. 
Policies and institutions that suppress the real 
potential of half of the Earth's people must be 
reformed. The empowerment of women must be recognized 
and utilized as a powerful tool for liberating the
119An Agenda for Development, 1995, United Nations, New York, 
UN Doc A/48/935, 6th May, 1994, para. 110.
120ibid., para 64.
147
full creative energies of a society."121
CONCLUSION
As an illustration of the specificities of the rights discourse 
within an African context, the legal principles of self- 
determination and the right to development demonstrate how, in 
spite of the encompassing elements of these principles, their 
practical operation does not always fulfil their purpose. Women 
as part of the wider group are unable to have the genuine 
expression of their will expressed in terms of participation in 
the decision-making process and in their economic and social 
development. This is in addition to the cultural and economic 
marginalisation they suffer as part of the institutionalised 
discrimination within the society. Locating the principle of 
self-determination and the right to development within the rights 
framework, not just a social development framework, shows that 
their application in practice does not enhance women's position.
The right to development is expressed as a need to develop for 
the benefit of the whole society. There is little participation 
by women in the decision making process on projects specifically 
aimed at benefiting them or in those intended to benefit their 
society as a whole. Yet the key to making both the right to self- 
determination and the right to development work, are 
representation, transparency and accountability which are 
integral elements of the principles. Feminist legal theory as an 
inclusive theory can be used to make the operation of these 
principles more effective once the theory itself is informed by
121ibid., para 74, An Agenda for Development:Recommendations.
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the issues of race and culture which adversely affect the 
realisation, promotion and protection of the human rights of 
women in an African context.
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CHAPTER 4
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS:THE OMISSION OF RACE AND
CULTURE
INTRODUCTION
Although the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
sex is contained in the United Nations Charter,1 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights2 (hereafter UDHR), the two 
International Covenants3 and regional documents on human rights,4 
the recognition of issues affecting women that act in concert to 
maintain their subordinate positions politically, economically 
and culturally in society as a direct result of their gender has 
only recently been recognised as issues of human rights.
There is a clear disparity between formal legal protection and 
reality. This has been attributed to the distinction between the 
public and private spheres in law making, the
institutionalisation of gender roles, the complicity of
communities and the state in maintaining social conditioning with
1 Adopted 26th June 1945, entered into force 24th October, 1945 
(as amended by General Assembly Resolutions), 557 UNTS 143, 
article 1(3).
21948, UN Doc A/811, adopted 10 December, 1948, General 
Assembly Resolution 217A(III), articles 2 and 7.
international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
UNTS 171, 1966, articles 2 and 26, (hereafter ICCPR) and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
993 UNTS 3, 1966, article 3 (hereafter ICESCR).
4African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 17 
June, 1981 by Eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organization of African Unity, OAU, entered 
into force 21 October, 1986, reprinted in 21 ILM 58, 1982,
articles 2 and 3 (hereafter ACHPR), Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), 
signed in Rome, 4 November, 1950, entered into force 3 September, 
1953, 213 UNTS, 221, article 14 (hereafter ECHR) and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969, signed 22 November, 1969, 
entered into force 18 July, 1978, 1144 UNTS 123, reprinted 9ILM, 
673, 1970, articles 1 and 24.
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regard to gender roles, for instance with protective legislation, 
and the problems with the implementation of corrective 
legislation to ensure equal rights in the face of this 
institutionalisation of the subordination of women. Action in the 
private sphere, relegated by international law to domestic 
jurisdictions with certain exceptions, a notable exception being 
human rights law, is treated as purely private acts of the 
individual. Private action by the individual and areas that are 
considered private such as marriage are of course regulated. Yet 
there remains an area within the regulated sphere that is 
considered a private matter for individuals and it is more 
usually within such areas that the subordination of women is 
located and the complicity of communities in maintaining this 
subordination is apparent.
This public/private dichotomy is transferred to law-making 
internationally and existing international standards have been 
found demonstrably androcentric and exclusive of issues directly 
affecting women. This has to some extent been counter-acted by 
law-making within the United Nations although the problems of 
effective implementation remains; a problem which exists also 
within municipal jurisdictions.
Human rights law can only be implemented domestically although 
there exist monitoring bodies attached to treaties. The work of 
these monitoring bodies is limited to monitoring the 
implementation efforts of those States that have ratified the 
treaty and their effectiveness depends on States parties to the 
relevant treaty cooperating in producing and submitting timely 
country reports and responding to them. The right of individual 
application to the relevant body is restricted to States who have 
ratified the relevant optional protocol5 and further, the 
committees themselves are usually hampered by financial and time 
constraints. States participate in international law on a
5 for example, the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which came into 
force on 23rd March, 1976.
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consensual basis and consequently, they retain the right to opt 
out or limit their treaty obligations through a variety of means 
such as denunciation, reservations as to certain treaty terms, 
derogations in specified circumstances and various accommodation 
clauses which require that the right of an individual must be 
protected in conformity with the rights of others and with due 
regard to morals or on public order and national security 
grounds.6
The use of reservations to certain treaty terms is a thorny 
problem, particularly with regard to human rights treaties. While 
they allow a greater number of States to accede to the treaty in 
question, the reservations may defeat the purpose of the treaty 
itself and in effect make a nonsense of the obligation. The 
United Nations, while it has contributed significantly to the 
development of international law, is a political organisation. 
Negotiation of treaty terms is a lengthy process fraught with 
difficulties and different ideological stances often have to be 
incorporated. This usually results in widely drafted open-ended 
terms to which reservations may be subsequently made. The large 
number of reservations made to the Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women7 is demonstrative. The 
reservations made are typically those relating to customary law, 
including religious law, even though the object of the Convention 
is clearly to seek protection from the adverse effects on women 
from those laws. The reliance on relativity, cultural, religious 
or otherwise, by governments, political elites and religious 
bodies negatively impacts on the successful implementation of 
women's rights since the areas where relativity is claimed are 
primarily cultural and customary, prime areas for violations of 
women's human rights.
So, while women's rights are notionally accepted as human rights
6 See, for example, article 10(2), ECHR.
7 UN Doc. A/34/46, adopted 18th December, 1979, 1249 UNTS 14, 
reprinted in 19 ILM 33, 1980, referred to as CEDAW or the Women's 
Convention.
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and are an integral and indivisible part of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, State parties1 obligations to protect these 
rights in accordance with the provisions of CEDAW are 
circumscribed by reservations to core treaty terms and the 
implementation of these fundamental rights is curtailed.
Part I of this Chapter looks at the growth of the concept(s) of 
women's rights and the challenges it poses to international human 
rights law. Formal guarantees for the protection of women's 
rights within the United Nations system are discussed, followed 
by the inadequacies with formal guarantees of women's rights. 
Part II discusses the omission of race and culture in feminist 
legal theory and the use of essentialism as a tool of feminist 
theory. Efforts to theorise Black feminism are then considered. 
This is followed in Part III by a discussion of cultural 
relativism and how relativist arguments fail women. The Chapter 
aims to highlight how the omission of race and culture from 
feminist legal theory and the failure of cultural relativist 
argument to provide promotion and protection for women's human 
rights, marginalise African women in the rights discourse.
Essentialism assumes that the sole defining trait of a woman is 
her gender, itself a social construct based within her society. 
For a vast number of women, however, race and culture are equally 
important defining traits,8 not least because the perception of 
others in the identification of women of colour, or non-White 
women, rates their difference as a relevant factor. This 
difference, from the position of the onlooker and the perception 
of difference, from the position of the individual, has an impact 
and an effect in the lives of women of colour which essentialism 
ignores. In ignoring the difference of race and in my opinion, 
culture, and relying only on gender difference, essentialism can 
only offer a partial solution to the subordination of Black women 
from a differing culture because it relies on an ethnocentric 
view. This of itself is not problematic. To a large extent, we
8 other defining traits include age and sexuality and arguably, 
class.
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all rely on an ethnocentric perception of the world. The reliance 
on essentialism is, however, problematic when a feminist 
viewpoint or theory, admittedly necessary to influence policy 
decisions on redressing the gender-based subordination of women 
is accepted as representative of all women. Subordination on the
basis of race, apartheid, is not acceptable. Discrimination on
the basis of race is protected in various international human 
rights instruments.9 For Black women, race is an issue as well as 
gender. For Black women inhabiting a culturally oppressive world, 
culture is an issue, race is an issue, gender is an issue. The 
accumulated effect of the difference these factors make cannot 
adequately be tackled solely on the basis of gender. Feminist 
discourse, because it inherently challenges the status quo, can
be useful to address these additional factors. The discourse 
itself must be challenged on the basis of its omissions in order 
that it is fully representative of all women. Further,
representative feminist legal theory with respect to women's 
human rights can aid a comprehensive policy formulation that will 
address and apply to all women. Western feminisms are dominant 
in the movement for women's human rights and are predicated on 
a Western approach to rights which silences African feminists. 
The danger, as it appears at present, is that issues which are 
assumed to be a priority of women may be a priority for only 
certain groups of women in certain parts of the world. These 
issues, given the status of women's human rights become the focus 
of well-meaning implementation strategies across the world with 
little reference to the immediate concerns of women in that 
environment.
The following section discusses cultural relativism or what I 
call gendered relativism and its adverse impact on women's 
rights. Cultural practices usually fall within the private sphere
9see for instance International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, 660
UNTS, 195, 3 ILM 164, 58 AJIL, 1081 and the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 1973, UN Res 3068 (XXVIII).
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and while they may vary from country to country, they vary also 
within countries and within communities in the country. They 
include, depending on the laws of the country, religious law and 
practices. Cultural practices may be as egregious as female 
genital surgeries or as routine as obtaining a father's 
permission to marry his daughter. On the whole they tend to 
impact negatively on women, hence the reference to gendered 
relativity. Since these practices may be derived or seen to be 
derived, from religious practices and long-standing custom, they 
are extremely difficult to combat. Moreover, reservations to 
CEDAW, as mentioned earlier, often relate to customary, religious 
or cultural practices. While the spectrum of practices is wide, 
the effects are detrimental to women's rights in a number of 
ways.
Customary laws which deny women the right of inheritance or to 
own property ultimately deny them the right to development or 
independence. Financing of projects in the form of loans requires 
collateral which a lot of women will not have because they cannot 
own property. Efforts to improve women's rights in these 
situations require a prioritisation of issues that may differ 
from those of women in developed countries. Work is being done 
in these areas but discretely, often on an ad hoc basis; for 
example, in development studies or international development law, 
gender and development is an adjunct to main development studies 
issues. This approach is comparable to adding Black women's 
experiences to footnotes or referring to difference in 
parenthesis. It marginalises and ultimately it fails people. My 
argument is that a holistic approach, advocated indirectly in the 
Beijing Platform for Action10, which recognises the cumulative 
effect of race, gender and culture and the difference these 
factors make in law, access to opportunity and ability to 
develop, will enable feminist legal theory in its approach to 
human rights law to be truly representative.
10 A/CONF. 177/20, 1995.
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References to feminism in the context of this study is to 
feminist theory, that is written theory. While there exist 
examples of feminist activism in different countries across the 
world which are a valid illustration of the empowerment and the 
fight for the economic, social and political independence of 
women, this study is concerned with the theoretical development 
of feminist work as solipsism and how this methodology runs the 
risk of marginalising a large proportion of those it has come to 
represent. Since feminist action in many developing countries is 
primarily based on activism as opposed to theory, the foundation 
of feminist theory on which this work is based is the theory 
which has predominantly developed in the West, notably in the 
United States and Europe.
PART I. WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
1. The Concept(s) of Women's Rights
The application of feminist theory to law, initially within 
municipal systems and latterly within the international order has 
demonstrated that organisational and normative structures of law 
are essentially androcentric and exclusionary with regards to 
women. This has been attributed to the liberal construct of the 
public and private spheres of law making,11 a political tool for 
the organisation of the state originating in the nineteenth 
century. The replication of the spheres of law-making in the
"The fundamental problem women face 
worldwide is not discriminatory treatment 
compared with men, although this is a 
manifestation of the larger problem. Women 
are in an inferior position because they 
have no real power in either the public or 
private worlds, and international human 
rights law, like most economic, social, 
cultural, and legal constructs, reinforces 
this powerlessness."
Charlesworth, H., 'What are "Women's International Human 
Rights"?, in COOK, R. , (ED), HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1994, 57 at 60, hereafter COOK, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN.
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international legal order has resulted, particularly in the area 
of human rights, in the exclusion of issues of major concerns to 
women since they are marginalised in the policy making process.
Questioning why gender has not been an issue in international 
law, Hilary Charlesworth et al indicate the possibilities of
feminist scholarship in international law.12 One of the 
difficulties of developing an alternative feminist perspective 
to international law lay in the differing perspectives of 
feminist theory. The cause of women's subordination has been 
located in the absence of their life experiences in 
institutionalised societal structures. The identification of this 
dissonance, in law, for instance, although it applies in all 
disciplines, crystallised into attempts to devise an approach to 
develop a theoretical means of combatting institutionalised 
gender discrimination within existing structures.
Feminist theory initially approached the solution to societal 
inequities between men and women on an equality-based strategy.13 
In the West, notably in the United States, an attack on the 
prevailing ideology enabled middle class women to move from the 
home into the workplace. Attention focussed on sexual crimes 
influenced policy in a number of ways; the requirement of 
corroboration of a rape victim's evidence was modified or 
repealed,14 shelters for battered women were set up, divorce laws 
were reformed to become gender neutral, no fault divorces were
12Charlesworth, H., Chinkin, C. , & Wright, S., “Feminist
Approaches to International Law”, 1991 AJIL, vol 85, 613.
13Goldstein, L.F., "Can this marriage be saved? Feminist 
Public Policy and Feminist Jurisprudence." ppll-40,in Goldstein, 
L.F. (ed) with an introduction, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:THE
DIFFERENCE DEBATE, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1992, 
hereafter, Goldstein, L. THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE.
14The repeal of corroboration of a rape victim's evidence
took place in the United States. See Goldstein, L.F. in
Goldstein,L.F. THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE, op cit. Corroboration 
remains in other jurisdictions e.g. in the United Kingdom.
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adopted and custody became characterised by the best interest of 
the child. The use of the law and non-discriminatory principles 
afforded some solution to the problems. If women were treated 
equally, on the same terms as men using existing law, the balance 
could hopefully be redressed. The equality rhetoric, however, 
caused other problems. Working mothers needed child care 
facilities and in divorce cases, the underlying economic 
inequities of society were not taken into account in calculating 
what was in the best interest of the child. The parent who earned 
more was assumed to be able to take better care of children 
economically and this usually meant men. Yet, gender stereotypes 
of women as carers and nurturers of the family meant women were 
more often given custody with little or no financial assistance 
to ensure that women could economically provide for the children. 
Moreover, equality based strategy did not help those women who 
were unable to compete on the same basis as men; it assumed 
socio-economic equality. Further, there was an underlying 
assumption that there were no differences between men and women 
that laws could not address.
Women are subject to restrictions on their aims and ambitions by 
cumulative factors. Deep-rooted societal expectation regarding 
their capabilities, what they ought to aspire to, limitations on 
their ambitions through parental and childcare responsibilities 
are the practical realities that may curtail the ability of women 
to achieve on equal terms with men. The equality-based strategy 
was incapable of addressing discriminatory practices dependent 
on biological differences between men and women, for instance in 
the workplace. A pregnant woman does not equate to a man 
incapacitated by illness and difficulties arose with the limits 
of formal legal equality. Tellingly, equality based strategy 
accepted the benchmark of men's terms of success as a measure for 
a woman's success in society15 and inevitably it failed to resolve 
the problem. The whole point identified by feminist theory in 
general is that the life experiences of women are missing from
15see Becker, Mary, E.,"Prince Charming:Abstract Equality", 
pp99-146, in Goldstein, L., THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE.
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the norms and regulations of society. It was bound to cause 
problems to try and fit a different life view into an existing 
structure which had identified shortcomings. Expectations of a 
woman's role in society had in certain instances the force of law 
in the form of protective legislation which aimed to protect 
women from certain types of work, for example, nightwork. This
protective category16 is comprised of exclusionary provisions
which reflect a societal concept of women as a group which should 
or should not engage in specified activities. Protective
doctrines accentuated the difference between men and women, 
interpreting this difference, primarily biological, in a 
negative, restrictive way. It resulted in the exclusion of women 
from areas of the public sphere and from lucrative employment, 
instead of seeking a solution in practical terms to the 
difference between men and women such as the provision of
childcare or tax breaks for childcare to enable those who wanted 
to work to do so. Equality rhetoric approached the problem with 
a view that if women and men were treated the same, the problem 
would be alleviated if not resolved. It did not address cultural 
inequality in the private sphere. The non-discriminatory 
category17 is a reflection of equal treatment between men and 
women and its application and implementation may be equated with 
equality rhetoric. In actual fact, equality rhetoric masked 
differences in women's experience. It did not adequately deal 
with inequality of opportunity nor did it obviate discrimination. 
Further, it did not enable solutions to the unique economic and 
social problems women faced.
A modification of the equality rhetoric accentuated a difference 
or accommodation theory within the equality rhetoric whereby 
women's difference from men would be taken into account.
16see generally Hevener, N. , “An analysis of Gender Based 
Treaty Law:Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective”,
8 HRQ, No. 1, 1986, pp70-88.
17Ibid, at 78.
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Gilligan's18 work, based on a sample of White middle class women 
and girls, demonstrated that there is a different voice, most 
often associated with women; the voice of caring and connection. 
At the time, the limits of the equality based strategy were being 
identified and a theory of difference to accommodate women's 
perceived difference from men and highlight their point of view 
was being posited. This accommodation of difference may be 
equated with Hevener's corrective category19 which involves the 
identification of women as a separate group needing special 
treatment in order to alter specific treatment that women are 
receiving. While potentially empowering for women because it 
requires that differences between men and women be specifically 
redressed, this position is fraught with difficulties because 
attention to difference accepts it as a relevant defining factor 
which may ultimately be used to justify treating women 
differently and unequally without taking into account social and 
economic causes of inequalities.20 The danger of a return to 
protectionism is obvious. Feminism of difference perhaps accepts 
institutional structures rather than attempting to dismantle 
these structures. It can fail to see gender difference as 
socially constructed rather than biologically determined. It 
accepts the standard as male and where a difference is noted it 
is because it is not male and accommodation becomes necessary. 
The problem of trying to accommodate women's differences without 
reverting to traditional gender roles remains.21
18Gilligan, C.,IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT, Harvard University Press, 1982, reprinted 
1993.
19Hevener, op cit. note 16, at 74.
20see Fineman, M., “Feminist Theory and the Law”, Harvard 
Jnl. L. & Pub. Pol., 1995, vl8(2), pp349-368 on the limitation 
of equality rhetoric, the potential problems of difference and 
accommodation theory and the splintering of feminist theory into 
individualism which results in tokenism without challenging the 
foundational causes of inequality or coming up with a theory 
that can accommodate the chimera of the causes of women's 
subordination.
21see further Becker op cit., note 15 and Williams, J.C., 
"Deconstructing Gender", pp41-98in Goldstein, L.F. THE DIFFERENCE
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The accentuation of difference between men and women gives rise 
to the question of whose difference or whose voice speaks of this 
difference. Concern22 that questioning the difference women have 
to men, and between women, has been raised on the grounds that 
it may lead to splintering of feminism because greater reliance 
is placed on individual characteristics such as race or sexuality 
in defining difference. Ultimately, it has been argued23 it leads 
to tokenism. This need not be the case. Feminist theory of 
difference in its location of social and economic inequalities 
between men and women within a systemic and institutionalised 
inequitable social structure has application in all societies and 
within all cultures. Once we begin to construct the impact of 
difference, be it between men and women, we begin to see its 
importance in the reality of people's lives in spite of formal 
legal protection which indicates otherwise. We begin to 
appreciate how that difference or cumulative differences have an 
impact, adversely or not, on people and note the omissions in how 
we organise our societies and in societies. This is a positive 
factor. To resolve a problem, we need to identify what is wrong. 
Individual characteristics, such as race, group identity, such 
as culture, are important differences. It is incumbent on us to 
seek to understand how these differences impact differently on 
individuals and groups and the effect they have. Certainly, it 
may lead to a 'splintering' but that is not sufficient reason not 
to explore the ramifications of difference. The overriding 
problem with societal organisation especially with respect to law 
and, for the purposes of this work, international law, is that 
the point of reference is by definition a male norm and a white, 
middle class, male norm at that. If that norm fails women on that 
basis, it doubly fails anyone with additional differences. In 
working towards an inclusive, representative feminist 
jurisprudence to eliminate the subordination of women, these
DEBATE.
22see Becker op cit. note 15 and Fineman, op cit. note 20,
for example.
23 Fineman, M, ibid, 357.
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differences are a valid constituent.
Notwithstanding the diversity of feminist approaches to law,24 the 
issue of a differing perspective or voice25 remains a valid 
consideration in a critique of law. Engle's critique of feminist 
approaches to human rights has been somewhat superceded by the 
proclamation of women's rights as human rights in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action26 following the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993. The identification of 
problems with using the law to combat women's subordination, 
notwithstanding the human rights status of women's rights, 
remains valid.
Human rights as defined in international law are Western 
conceived and may, as a consequence of prioritisation, fail to 
address adequately the concerns of women in the Third World, a 
concern this work addresses. Human rights law has to give 
greater weight to economic or social rights and the rights that 
concern women of cultural and ethnic minorities. Identifying the 
approach to achieve this is difficult. In attempting to secure 
women's place within the international framework, a reliance on 
that framework is necessary. Yet, the framework itself has been 
challenged. The dilemma is whether to use the doctrinal or 
institutional approach i.e. use the language of the discourse to 
critique it27 and thus to raise the preliminary question of the 
ability of the doctrine or institutions to protect women's human 
rights, or whether to take an external approach and critique the 
whole system for systematically excluding half of the human race
24 Engle, K., "International Human Rights and Feminism:When 
Discourses Meet." 13 Mich. J. Intl. L., 517, 1992 for a critique 
of rights and human rights law.
25 see Gilligan, C., op cit. note 18.
26A/CONF. 157/23 .
27Engle describes the proponents of these approaches as 
liberal feminists. See Engle, op cit. note 24, at 534 and 557 
respectively.
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while claiming to be representative.28 The latter approach 
critiques the framework for being inherently based on male 
defined concepts and grapples with trying to achieve women's 
rights even if the framework itself has to alter to enable this. 
The international order has been shown to be impervious to women 
because of its organisational and normative structures and is 
consequently thoroughly gendered.29 Problems identified within 
municipal structures exist within the international system 
because its organisational and normative structures are 
essentially replicated. This is problematic because issues of 
concern to women remain marginalised or relegated to a special 
category while issues of concern to men who are 
disproportionately represented in the international order become 
general human rights concerns. The objectivity of legal reasoning 
has also been challenged.30 It is my opinion that the 
institutional approach is best placed not only to address the 
problem of women's marginalisation but to redress it.
This work represents an attempt to deal with doctrinal issues of 
cultural difference, it raises the issue of the role of 
institutions, particularly, African regional institutions31 in 
protecting rights relying on an African value approach while at 
the same time it relies on the existing international framework 
and the rights discourse as a valuable means of achieving the 
protection of women's rights. To do this, it accepts that human 
rights are universal, that women's human rights are an integral 
part of human rights and seeks to ensure that differences of race 
and culture and the effect and impact they have are a constituent 
of feminist legal theory in its attempt to redress the
28Engle's radical or cultural feminists, ibid, p557.
29Charlesworth et.al. op cit., note 12 particularly pp621-
634.
30Romany, C., “Women as Aliens:A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights law”, 6 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1993, pp87-12 5.
31see Chapter 2, Part II of this work.
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institutionalised subordination of women.
"A feminist analysis must insert itself into the 
critique of the illusion of coherence projected by 
international law. By dissecting the structure of 
international legal argument and exposing its 
artifactual nature, a feminist critique can reveal how 
such construction serves to perpetuate the alienation
of women within international law. By attacking the 
doctrinal framework, a feminist critique shows how the 
interplay of sources and process doctrines keeps women 
outside the boundaries of the legal argumentative 
framework" .32
Sources, substance and process doctrines comprise the structure 
of international legal argument. Substance doctrines are 
substantive rules about international conduct. These doctrines 
operate without reference to any derivative values and obscure 
the fact that the men formulated the values which underlie the 
doctrines.
"Exposing the political and moral choices encoded in 
sources doctrines require identification of the forces 
that forge the discursive and non-discursive 
conditions which give legitimacy to such doctrines.
The "consensual story", which privileges state 
agreements, derives from a contract to which women are 
neither direct nor indirect parties. In the creation 
of international society, patriarchal values hide from 
the "social contract" the contract's sexual 
counterpart and thus imbue the terms and principles 
with male values."33
Process doctrines delimit actors and their jurisdiction; two
32Romany, C, op cit. at 94.
33ibid at 93.
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significant areas of which are participation and jurisdiction. 
Participation doctrines establish sovereignty and do so without 
reference to substance of law while in limiting sovereign 
authority, jurisdiction doctrines remain procedural, also without 
reference to substantive law.34
"A critique of process doctrines which challenges 
their independence and which exposes their exclusions 
has great potential for a feminist reconceptualization 
of human rights law. Participation doctrines which 
establish sovereignty rely on facts and practices that 
encode women's exclusion. Women are the stateless 
subjects of international law according to such facts 
and practices. The construction of these facts and 
practices keeps the alien status of women entrenched.
Under this construction, women are aliens within their
states and aliens within an international society
defined by participation doctrines which do not deem 
them to be actors. The jurisdiction doctrines - in 
charge of delimiting avenues of legitimate interchange 
where authoritative norms are elaborated, and which 
must remain procedural and free of sources that rely 
only on consent - also relegate the "subjectivity" of 
women to outer boundaries".35
With the organisational, normative and structural foundations of 
international law flawed in gender aspects, the human rights 
framework has foundational problems that necessitates a 
reconceptualisation of the rights discourse. A prime candidate 
for this rethinking of the human rights framework is the 
challenging of the public/private dichotomy which is "the 
fundamental basis of the modern state's function of separating 
and concentrating juridical forms of power that emanate from the
34ibid at 92-95.
35ibid at 95.
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State... [t]he distinction impl[ying] that the private world is 
uncontrolled."36 Clearly this is not correct since the State 
regulates certain aspects of the domestic/private sphere, for 
example, there are laws on marriage, divorce, regulation of 
abortion and inheritance rights.37 The public sphere is productive 
while the private/domestic sphere is [re]productive with a 
greater economic value attached to the former, primarily, male 
sphere. This construct has in certain instances been reproduced 
in certain principles of international law.38 By its nature, 
international law is consensual, governing certain matters of 
'public' importance such as international peace and security 
inter alia with a large remit of areas falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of states.39 Human rights law is a clear 
exception. Women's exclusion from the law making processes in 
domestic jurisdictions and their relegation to the private sphere 
marginalises their concerns. The exclusion of women from the 
processes delineating which rights constitute human rights 
renders insignificant their concerns. The drafting of the 
language of rights is limited solely to state action excluding 
acts by private actors which may otherwise amount to violations 
of human rights such as violence against women.
"The assumption that underlies all law, including 
international human rights law, is that the 
public/private distinction is realrhuman society, 
human lives can be separated into two distinct 
spheres. This division, however, is an ideological 
construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from 
sources of power. It also makes it possible to
36Charlesworth et.al., op cit., note 12 at 627. See also 
Romany, C. ibid, p96ff.
37see further Eisler, R., "Human Rights:Towards an Integrated 
Theory for Action” 9 HRQ 2 87, 1987.
38Charlesworth et.al., op cit.
39see Article 2(7) United Nations Charter on non­
interference in domestic jurisdiction.
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maintain repressive systems of control over women 
without interference from human rights guarantees, 
which operate in the public sphere."40
The role of law and indeed the state in perpetuating gendered 
systems is key within feminist jurisprudence in addressing the 
entrenched subordination of women. Whose political power is 
represented in the definition of legal rights, the limitation on 
rights analysis and the life experience which underlie the 
substantive principles of human rights law to which the law ought 
to be committed?41 "To the extent that the state is viewed as 
genderless, as not implicated in the construction of gender 
subordination, state responsibility for the perpetuation of that 
subordination goes unrecognised. Therein lies the need to 
confront the gender stratification embedded in the liberal 
state."42 A reconceptualisation of the norms of state 
responsibility43 within a feminist approach to human rights would 
require action to prevent abuses regardless of the loci, be it 
in the public or private sphere. State inaction would amount to 
complicity with private actors through systematically failing to 
provide protection for women from private actors who deprive them 
of their rights contrary to the state's treaty obligations.44 An
40Charlesworth et.al., op cit. at 629.
41see generally Binion, G. , “Human Rights:A Feminist 
Perspective”, 17 HRQ,No 3. 1995, pp509-526, especially at 514. 
See also Bunch, C., “Women's Rights as Human Rights:Towards a Re­
vision of Human Rights”, 12 HRQ 486, 1990.
42Romany, C. op cit. at 100
43See Cook. R., "State Accountability Under the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women", 
in COOK, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, p228ff.
44 "An illegal act which violates human rights 
and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (for example), because 
it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of 
the act itself, but because of the lack of
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alternative approach would ascribe responsibility to the state 
for failure to fulfil its obligations to ensure non- 
discriminatory protection of the law.45
A further challenge to international law in terms of feminist 
approaches is that of restating sovereignty46 through a critique 
of "...the ways in which State sovereignty sets the functional 
and allegorical parameters of international law."47 The 
marginalisation of women from the organisational, normative and 
structural processes of international law needs to be remedied; 
the main means of doing this is clearly through increased 
participation by women in those processes. However, reliance on 
individual characteristics that define women, such as race and 
sexual orientation, in order to legitimate theoretical discourse 
may lead, it has been argued, to token representation in 
practice.
"... [A] notion of representation that is dependent on 
the individual poses serious difficulties. It carries 
with it not only the potential for divisiveness but 
also the certainty of exclusion within the 
hypothetically available community of feminists. 
Moreover, individual-based representation allows 
tokenism to flourish and nurtures continued resistance
due diligence to prevent the violation..."
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 1988, Ser.C, No.4., at para. 172.
45The public/private distinction is being eroded with 
regards to fundamental rights in some jurisdictions; for example, 
certain states have been made responsible under the American 
Convention for private interference with freedom of expression 
using art. 13 of that Convention and CEDAW art 15(3). This 
example is quoted in Romany, C., op cit note 6 at 121.
46Knop, K., "Re/Statements:Feminism and State Sovereignty in
international Law", Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 
vol 3, Fall 1993, 293.
47ibid at 296.
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to the radical potential for change through the 
ideological and structural implications of feminism 
within institutions."48
This argument is not convincing. The identification of various 
defining factors for women, instead of being divisive, is
actually a bonus. In order for feminist theory to be a useful 
tool in challenging the status quo, it needs to be
representative. To be truly representative, it must allow to 
flourish all the different voices of all women and it must take 
on board the issues they raise. Perhaps, of necessity, the 
movement needs a dispersion of views before it can coalesce into 
a truly global, representative theory. That ultimate goal is 
worth seeking even if at present the cacophony of multifarious 
voices seems deafening. Such an inclusive approach that will 
radicalise the core of the international legal order is
necessary.
"Feminist jurisprudence provides very substantial 
challenges to human rights law as it is 
institutionally understood. These include both 
fundamental questions about the processes by which 
human rights are defined, adjudicated, enforced, as 
well as questions about the substance of what is
thereby "protected". And, while the focus of analysis 
is on women's experience, a feminist approach might 
have immediate implications for the rights of all 
disempowered peoples and raise questions about social 
organizations generally. If it were necessary to offer 
one word to capture the essence of feminist 
jurisprudence, in general and in its significance for 
human rights analysis, it is inclusion. The enterprise
critiques the experience of women as persons excluded
from legal protection and from proportionate political
48Fineman, op cit, note 20 at 358.
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and economic power."49
One such approach is identified by Knop50 as statism; sovereignty 
as an aspect of political power. She argues for democratic
government as a criterion for recognition of the state and 
indicates how a trend away from statism may be used to ground 
arguments for increased participation and representation in the 
law-making process by women. If the status of the state in 
international law rests on its respect for the right of 
participation in democratic governance, then it is open to women 
to insist that the right be interpreted, using feminist critique, 
in a way that affords women equal representation in government.51 
If international status can be defined by a state's legitimacy 
in terms of its belief in the right to participation, its status 
could also be additionally considered on other gender-conscious 
ideas of representation and democracy.52 Clearly the equality 
rhetoric is insufficient to ensure women's participation and 
adequate representation. Women, as a group, should be able to 
participate in international decisions that affect them. A 
rejection of the 'centrality of the state' may enable the 
participation of non-state actors in the influencing of the 
development and implementation of international law.53 The role
4 Q » » »Binion, G., op cit., note 41 at 513.
50Op cit note 41. See her footnote 21.
51 Knop refers also to the equation of the concept of
internal self-determination with the right to representative
democracy by scholars such as Cassesse. See Chapter 3 infra for 
discussion of internal self-determination where a government 
gains legitimacy from proper representation of its peoples.
52see Knop, p298ff.
53Gunning, I ., "Modernizing Customary International LawrThe 
Challenge of Human Rights”, Virginia Jnl. Intl. L., v31(2), 1991 
pp211-247. Gunning questions the comprehensiveness of traditional 
formulations of national sovereignty and looks at the possibility 
of considering NGO and transnational participation in the 
creation of customary international law.
" [T]he traditional theoretical framework upon which
customary international law has rested - certain
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of non-state actors, particularly non-governmental organisations 
or NGOs, in the implementation of women's rights was acknowledged 
in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a non-binding 
but nonetheless influential UN document. References to 
implementation in the document under each of the heads of 
critical areas of concern, poverty, unequal access to education 
and training, violence against women, inequality in economic 
structures and policies, inter alia makes reference to the role
of NGOs in achieving the stated objective.
The establishment of the concept of women's rights as human 
rights has been demonstrated by illuminating the exclusion of 
women from the organisational, normative and structural processes 
of the law, both national and international. Feminist theory has 
had to challenge the lack of a gender aspect to the differing 
layers that construct the autonomy, objectivity and impartiality 
of the law to highlight the omission of women's experience from 
the international legal order. The reconceptualisation that 
ensued challenged the public/private dichotomy, the norms of 
state responsibility, ideas of state sovereignty and the 
exclusion of participation by non-state actors; all of which in 
concert may operate to allow increased participation by women in 
legal processes.
2. Formal Guarantees of Women's Rights
Notwithstanding the relatively recent acceptance of women's 
rights as human rights, there has been international law-making 
on the issue of rights concerning women. Human rights law-making
selected assumptions about human nature and 
interaction and by analogy states' actions and 
interactions - are now only a partial description of 
what nations do in fact.
To reflect this shift in power in international 
relations, customary international law as well should 
look to non-state actors as having the ability to 
create custom."
ibid at 221.
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in the United Nations54 has tended to be restricted to non- 
discriminatory provisions within the body of human rights 
treaties in addition to specialised standard-setting that has 
been corrective of certain treatment of women, or protective of 
them.55 The preamble of the United Nations Charter56 reaffirms 
'faith in fundamental human rights...in the equal rights of men 
and women'.
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established in 1945 a 
Sub-Commission of the Commission on Human Rights on Human Rights 
on the Status of Women which became a full Commission (CSW)in 
1946 with a mandate to promote women's political, economic and 
social rights. In 1946 also, a Division for the Advancement of 
Women was set up in the Department for Policy Coordination and 
Sustainable Development. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights57 (UDHR) states; 'Everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex...' In 1949 the 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of 
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, was adopted by 
the General Assembly.58 In 1951 The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) adopted the Convention Concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value.59
54The information on law making in the U.N. setting out 
milestones in the advancement of women was obtained from the UN 
Information Centre, Millbank Tower, London, SW1.
55see Hevener, N. , "An analysis of Gender Based Treaty 
Law:Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective", 8 HRQ, 
No. 1, 1986, pp70-88, for the application of her analytical
categories to treaty contents.
56Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A 
(III) of 10 December, 1948. See also Brownlie, I, (ed) , BASIC 
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
571948 UN Doc A/811 adopted 10 December, 1948.
58 Adopted 2 December 1949, entered into force 25 July 1956, 
96 U.N.T.S.271.
59165 UNTS 3 04, adopted General Conference of the ILO 2 9 
June, 1951, entered into force 23 May, 1953.
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The 1952 International Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women became the first global endorsement of equal political 
rights under the law, including the right to vote. It was also 
the first United Nations instrument in which states parties 
undertook specific legal obligations involving the principle of 
equal rights between men and women. In 1955 the ILO issued a 
Convention on Maternity Protection. In 1957 the Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women60 was adopted, granting women the 
right to retain or change their nationalities regardless of their 
husbands' actions. In 1958 the ILO Convention Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect to Employment and Occupation61 was 
adopted. UNESCO adopted in 1960 the Convention against 
Discrimination in Education.62
The UN General Assembly finally recognised the dimensions of 
discrimination on the basis of sex and called for a Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;63 
a first draft of which was submitted by the CSW in 1966. The 
General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights64 as well as the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights65 with prohibitions against discrimination based 
on sex. In 1967 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 'to 
ensure the universal recognition, in law and in fact, of the 
principle of equality of men and women'. In 1975, International 
Women's Year was celebrated with activities to promote
60Adopted 2 9 January 1957, entered into force 11 August 
1958, 309 U.N.T.S.65.
61362 UNTS 31, adopted 25 June, 1958, entered into force 15 
June, 1960.
62429 UNTS 93, UKTS No 44 (1962) Cmnd 1760, adopted 14
December, 1960, entered into force 22 May, 1962.
63Adopted by the General Assembly 7 November, 1967.
64 1976, 999 UNTS, 171.
65 1976, 993 UNTS, 3.
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recognition of women's contributions to society and equal rights. 
The first World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City and 
the Final Plan of Action called for the preparation and adoption 
of an international convention against all forms of sex 
discrimination with a recommendation on procedures for its 
implementation.
The General Assembly proclaimed the first Decade for 
Women:Equality, Development, Peace; 1975-1985, which officially 
paved the way for a wide range of actions to improve women's 
status. In 1976 the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Women was 
established to make financial resources available to further 
development projects aimed at women in developing countries. The 
United Nations International Research and Training Institute for 
the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) was also established by the 
General Assembly with a mandate to support the fuller 
participation of women in the economic, social and political 
spheres. In 1979 the General Assembly adopted the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women66 
(CEDAW) which defines discrimination against women as any 
distinction made on the basis of sex which impairs women's equal 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. In 1980, the Second World 
Conference on Women was held in Copenhagen to review progress 
made in the first half of the Decade on Women. It adopted a 
Programme of Action. In 1981 CEDAW entered into force with the 
required ratification by 20 countries. In 1985 the Third World 
Conference on Women was held in Nairobi at the end of the UN 
Decade for Women. The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies67 called 
for increased participation of women as equal partners with men 
in all political, social and economic fields, including their 
full access to education and training. The United Nations 
Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women became a permanent and 
autonomous organisation in association with the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and has been renamed the United Nations
66 UN Document A/34/46.
67 A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1
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Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
In 1993 the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women was adopted by the General Assembly.68 It defines 'violence 
against women' as any act of gender based violence that results 
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring 
in public or in private life. In 1995 the Commission on Human 
Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on violence against women. 
This marked a shift because it concentrated on protection for 
women who are subjected to gender based systemic violence. In 
1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing 
and adopted the Declaration and Platform of Action.69
The extensiveness of law-making within the UN directed at 
improving the status of women indicates that an awareness 
certainly existed that issues directly impacting on them was not 
being adequately tackled. Hevener's categorisation70 of 
protective, corrective and non-discriminatory legislation 
directed at women, indicates that while attempting to redress the 
imbalance, the foundational71 causes of this imbalance, including 
the limitations of the equality rhetoric72 and the philosophy 
underpinning the rights discourse was not challenged. What might 
be termed their failure to redress the balance is evidenced in 
the preceding section.73 Without a rigorous challenge to the core
68 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA 
Res 48/104, UN Doc A/48/49, 1993.
69 A Conf 177/20, 1995.
70 op cit., note 16.
71supra Part 1(1), The Concept(s) of Women's Rights, of this 
chapter, ppl56-171.
72Fineman op cit., note 20.
73see above for a discussion of feminist legal challenges to 
human rights and how women's experiences might be incorporated 
into legal framework of the international order.
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underpinning the status quo, the plethora of law promulgated 
remained a panacea and accounted for a continued marginalisation 
of women in the legal order. Notwithstanding, the adoption of 
CEDAW, and its subsequent large number of ratifications, 
represented a milestone. However, the use of reservations by 
States Parties lays open the question of whether its purpose is 
capable of being achieved and the next section deals with that 
issue.
3. Inadequacies with formal guarantees for the protection of 
women's human rights - the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the use of 
Reservations.
States retain the right to opt out or limit their treaty 
obligations through a variety of means such as denunciation of 
a treaty in the extreme, reservations to certain treaty terms, 
derogations in specified circumstances and various accommodation 
clauses which require the protection of rights in conformity with 
the rights of others. 'Clawback clauses'74 allow breach of 
obligations for specific public policy reasons and derogations 
allow suspension or breach of certain obligations in certain 
situations such as a state of emergency75 or war76 which has been 
defined as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which
74see Higgins, R. , "Derogations under human rights 
treaties", 48 BYBIL, 1976-77, 281.
75 see the Greek Case, 1969, 12 Yearbook of the European
Convention and also Lawless v Ireland, 1961, E. Ct. H. R. , 4
Yearbook of the European Convention.
76The derogation clause in the ICCPR is article 4, and 
article 15 in the ECHR. Article 4 requires notification to the 
Secretary General while article 15 envisages derogations in times 
of national emergency. There is no derogation provision in the 
UDHR, the ICESCR, CEDAW or in the ACHPR.
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affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the 
organised life of the community...".77 Core rights are protected 
from derogation.
Where states derogate from their treaty obligations, there may 
be procedural requirements such as under article 15 of the 
European Convention. This article requires the provision of full 
information about measures taken and why they are necessary 
necessary, the nature of the emergency, identification of 
legislation and orders which appear to derogate from the 
Convention and their significance with an additional requirement 
that the Secretary General be kept informed although there is no 
indication of a required time period. It was held in the Greek
case78 that the burden lies on the government to show that 
conditions meet article 15 with due regard being had to the 
state's margin of appreciation. There must also be a public 
emergency, actual or imminent at that date.
In general, qualification of rights tend to be weighed between 
the right of the individual and the rights of the community. When 
a right is restricted, it must be necessary,79 proportionate,80 
for a legitimate reason i.e. the requirements of morality and 
public order or ordre public, and authorised by law.81 This is the
state's margin of appreciation in implementation of rights, which 
has been most fully developed in Europe; the most advanced human
11 Lawless v Ireland, 1961, E. Ct H. R. 4 Yearbook of the
European Convention, 4.
78Derogations (Article 15 of the Convention) Greece, 1969, 
12 Yearbook of the European Convention.
19Engel & Ors. v Netherlands, 1 EHRR, 647, 1976.
*°Klass v Germany, 2 EHRR, 214, 1978.
81For instance, articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 17 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, article 5 of the ICCPR. Article 29(2) 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a general clause 
which indicates the limitations on the exercise of rights which 
may be permitted.
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rights regime. The margin of appreciation is the latitude the 
states have in implementing the law within their domestic 
jurisdictions having regard to national security and the rights 
of others inter alia.82 It is a matter of judgement whether this
margin the states have tips the balance too far away from the 
rights of the individual because the states decide what is 
necessary in a democratic society and what is moral. That may 
diminish in certain respects the human rights as guaranteed 
within international documents.
The use of reservations in multilateral treaties is governed by 
the Vienna Convention.83 Reservations allow states to be bound by 
the treaty while reserving the right not to be bound by certain 
specified terms. Factors inducing states to make reservations 
include those of a legal, political and practical nature. States 
make reservations for a number of reasons: where there exist 
inconsistencies in domestic statutory or constitutional 
provisions with treaty provisions; difficulty in maintaining 
constitutional balance between the jurisdiction of central and 
local authorities; inconsistencies with other treaty obligations; 
an unwillingness to enact new legislation on the part of 
governments; lack of expertise and resources in developing 
countries; compulsory dispute settlement clauses; an 
unwillingness to deal with certain states for political or 
ideological reasons and unforeseeable consequences of general 
ratification.84
82The European Commission said in the Belgian Linguistic 
Case, 1 EHRR 1968, 252, that a certain margin of appreciation is 
also allowed to contracting states under several articles which 
authorise restrictions on, or exceptions to the rights 
guaranteed.
83Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UKTS No. 
58 (1980) Cmnd 7974, articles 19-23.
84Coccia, M. , "Reservations to Multilateral Treaties on 
Human Rights", California Western Inti L. Jnl, 1985 vl5(l)ppl-51 
at 18-22. See also generally, Piper, Catherine, L., "Reservations 
to Multilateral Treaties:The Goal of Universality", Iowa Law 
Review, v71(l), 1985, pp295-322.
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A practical problem, particularly in human rights treaties, is 
how to ensure universal participation. Universal consent to a 
reservation was previously required by the State Parties to the 
treaty and a reservation was valid only if the treaty itself 
allowed it and other contracting parties had no objections to the 
reservation.85 The present approach in international law, 
reflected in the Vienna Convention is more flexible. A 
reservation authorised by the treaty does not require acceptance 
by other contracting States although objections to the 
reservation may be made by other contracting States. This in 
itself does not preclude entry into force of the treaty between 
the reserving State and the objecting State unless expressly 
stated by the objecting State;86 it simply means that the 
provisions to which the reservation relate do not apply between 
the two states to the extent of the reservation.87 This 
reciprocity of reservations allows the maximum number of States 
Parties to ratify treaties. The test of a valid reservation is 
whether it is incompatible with the object and purpose88 of a 
treaty which is a matter of subjective interpretation.89
Core human rights are regarded as rights owed erga omnes.30
85 see Coccia, ibid and Clark, B., "The Vienna Convention 
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against 
Women", 85 AJIL, 1991, 281 at 289 ff. Clark notes that unanimity 
was not necessarily a settled rule of customary internal law with 
American states using a flexible approach which is reflected in 
the Vienna Convention, following the judgement in the Genocide 
Convention (Reservations) Case, 1951 ICJ Rep, 15, which favoured 
a flexible system of reservations and established the 'object and 
purpose1 test. See also generally, Lijnzaad, Liesbeth, 
RESERVATIONS TO UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES:RATIFY AND RUIN?, 1995 
T.M. Asser Instituut, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
86article 20 (4) (b), Vienna Convention.
87article 21(3), Vienna Convention.
88article 19(c), Vienna Convention.
89Coccia, ibid pp22-34.
30Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co, (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ, 3.
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"An essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a State towards the international 
community as a whole and those arising vis-a-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection.
By their very nature the former are the concern of all 
States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations 
erga omnes... Such obligations derive, for example, in
contemporary international law, from outlawing of acts 
of aggression, and of genocide, and as from the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person, including protection from slavery 
and racial discrimination."91
The notion that reservations can be made to specific terms of 
human rights treaties or, in exceptional circumstances, that 
there may be derogations from these core obligations owed erga
omnes is inherently contradictory. There is tension between the
view that any form of derogation, reservation or qualification 
is incompatible at most, or inappropriate at least, with human 
rights and the right the contracting State retains to make 
reservations to treaties unless expressly prohibited. It seems 
anomalous to allow reservations to human rights treaties; 
" [i]ndeed, an argument may be made that all such reservations are 
void because every norm of a human rights treaty is jus cogens"92.
However, while there exists consensus that certain rights, such 
as the right to life93 are so fundamental that no derogations may 
be made, there exists no consensus that all rights are jus
cogens. A human rights treaty is ultimately treated by states as
91ibid at paras 33-34, also quoted in Coccia, ibid at 17.
92Coccia ibid, 16, footnote omitted.
93Even this right is subject to reservation in countries 
where capital punishment is used as a form of punishment; the 
USA, which only recently ratified the ICCPR is a case in point.
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any other multilateral treaty. Although the ethical meaning is 
different, the effect of the reservation is the same. While near- 
universal participation may enable general treaty obligations to 
be more readily invoked where there is a violation of the spirit 
of general treaty terms, specific reservations which are in fact 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty 
considerably reduce the scope of a contracting State's 
obligations.
The issue of the use of reservations was addressed by the Human 
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 24 (52).94 It
considered, inter alia, widely formulated reservations which
render ineffective Covenant -ICCPR- rights which would require 
any change in national law to ensure compliance.95 The Human 
Rights Committee's consideration of such widely drafted 
reservations is directly relevant in that most reservations to 
CEDAW tend to be of such a nature. Certain States,96 for instance, 
have made reservations to the terms of the Women's Convention in 
so far as it does not conflict with domestic law. In real terms, 
this means that a number of the obligations have been effectively 
excluded and as such the reservations are contrary to the object 
and purpose of the treaty. In its consideration, the Committee 
considered that the provisions of the Vienna Convention are 
"inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human 
rights treaties. Such treaties... are not a web of inter-State 
exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of
94The General Comment was adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee under article 40, paragraph 4, of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights at its 1382nd meeting 
(fifty-second session) on 2 November 1994. The USA and UK 
responded to the General Comment in 1996. They were not entirely 
in agreement with the HRC on its role and also on the use of 
reservations in treaties. See further Supplement No 40, 1996
(A/50/40), Reports of the Human Rights Committee, Official 
Records, 50th session.
95see para. 12, General Comment.
96Egypt and Bangladesh are a case in point and is discussed 
infra.
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individuals with rights."97 They refer to the "special character" 
of a human rights treaty which requires that the compatibility 
of reservations with the object and purpose of a treaty be 
established objectively with reference to legal principles. An 
unacceptable reservation would be 'generally severable1.98 The 
Committee recommended that reservations be specific and 
transparent and should not reduce obligations undertaken only to 
presently existing standards of domestic law.
In a report on the practice of reservations to treaties99 
presented to the International Law Commission, the Special 
Rapporteur had to consider inter alia, whether existing rules on
reservations were appropriate for international human rights 
treaties. If they were not, how should they be adjusted to take 
account of the special characteristics of such instruments? The 
Special Rapporteur considered reciprocity inappropriate in human 
rights treaties. The competency of monitoring bodies attached to 
treaties to assess the validity of reservations to that treaty 
is not established, although the Human Rights Committee in its 
Comment No. 24 (52) 100 recognised its own competence, neither is 
the effect of the declaration of a reservation as invalid in that 
context. In Belilos, a case which came before the European Court
of Human Rights, the court held that the State remained a party 
to the Convention because Switzerland's interpretative 
declaration on article 6(1) of the Convention failed to meet the 
requirements of article 64 and was therefore an invalid
97see para 17, General Comment, op cit., note 94.
98 Ibid, para 20.
"First report on the law and practice relating to 
reservations to treaties, Preliminary report by Alain Pellet, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/470, 30 May 1995 presented to 
the International Law Commission at its forty-seventh session. 
See especially paras. 138-142 on human rights treaties.
100see above for details of Comment No. 24.
182
reservation.101 The final report and proposed draft resolution was 
presented to the ILC at the forty-eighth session. It affirmed the 
regime established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and the application of this regime to all treaties, 
irrespective of nature or subject matter. It also reaffirmed the 
consensual nature of the way states bind themselves to a 
treaty.102 The wider concern that the flexibility of the Vienna 
Convention, in order to ensure widespread participation in treaty 
obligations, has been at the expense of the integrity of the 
treaties which have been subject to reservations103 remains 
unresolved. The ILC report has simply maintained the status quo. 
It remains to be seen whether other treaty monitoring bodies will 
follow the example of the Human Rights Committee in its General 
Comment. That in itself does not resolve the wider question of 
enforcement of treaty obligations against defaulting states, a 
problem which plagues international law in general.
In terms of CEDAW, the effect of the approach in the Vienna 
Convention is a fragmentation of the extent of treaty obligations 
incurred by individual States Parties, given the treaty's 
comprehensive nature.104
"By keeping the Convention in force between themselves 
and the reserving states, the objecting states are in 
effect allowing a reserving state to be a party 
without having to adhere to central tenets of the 
treaty, i.e. permitting a standard of adherence below
101 Belilos v Switzerland ECHR Ser.A, Vol. 132, 2 9 April, 
1988. See also para. 141. Special Rapporteur's report, ibid. and 
Lijnzaad op cit at 118 -123.
102The ILC did not have time to consider the report. See AJIL 
vol 91, No. 2, April 1997, 365 at 373.
103 see also Redgwell, C.J., "Reservations to Treaties and 
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24(52)" 46 ICLQ,
April, 1997, 390.
104 Clark, op cit. at 297.
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what they consider acceptable."105
There are a high number of reservations to the Women's Convention 
in comparison to other human rights treaties (except the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child) and the broad scope of 
some of them give cause for concern, in particular since some of 
the reservations go to the heart of the purpose of the 
Convention. Nine countries from Africa106 have made reservations 
to the Convention, five from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Tunisia) and four from sub-Saharan 
Africa (Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi and Mauritius).107 Algeria's 
reservations relate to article 2 on the elimination of 
discrimination against women, article 9(2) on equal rights with 
regard to the nationality of children, article 15(4) on equality 
between men and women relating to 'movement of persons and the 
freedom to choose their residence and domicile' and article 16 
concerning equal rights in all matters relating to marriage. 
These provisions are to apply insofar as they do not conflict 
with the provisions of domestic legislation in those areas. 
Egypt's reservation to articles 9 is without prejudice to the 
acquisition of a child of the nationality of his father. Its 
reservation to article 16 is without prejudice to the provisions 
to Sharia provisions in all matters relating to marriage, family 
and dissolution. Ethiopia's reservation excludes the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Lesotho's 
reservation relates to the restriction of article 2 where it 
conflicts with succession rights to the throne, it excludes 
application to religion and any legislative measures which would 
be incompatible with the Constitution of Lesotho. On 24 October, 
1991, Malawi withdrew its reservation to provisions of the 
Convention which would require the immediate eradication of
105 Clark, ibid at 307.
106I have deliberately chosen to concentrate on reservations 
made by African countries although other contracting states have 
made reservations.
107Text of reservations to the Convention as of 31 December,
1997.
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traditional customs and practices. Mauritius' reservation 
excludes equal employment opportunities and the right to equal 
remuneration. It also excludes the provision of article 16(1) on 
taking all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in marriage and family relations. Morocco's 
reservation excludes the provision of article 2 where they 
conflict with Sharia law, article 9(2) because of conflict with 
existing law and article 16 based on conflict with Sharia. 
Tunisia's reservation is similarly based on conflict with 
existing legislation under articles 9(2), 16 (c)(d)(f)(g)(h) and 
article 15(4).
A few states have made objections to such reservations. Denmark 
made an objection108 to Libya's reservation on 3 July, 1990 on the 
ground that 'a party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.' 
Denmark's objection did not expressly state that it did not 
preclude entry into force between itself and Libya. In the 
absence of an explicit statement, it must be assumed that the 
treaty has entered into force between both states. Finland also 
made an objection to Libya's reservation on the ground that the 
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty without precluding entry into force of the treaty between 
both states. Germany lodged an objection to the reservations of 
Egypt regarding articles 2, 9(2) and 16 and Mauritius regarding 
article 11(1) (b) (d) and article 16(1) (g) as incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention. The Convention, however, 
still applies between the reserving states and the objecting 
state. Further objections to Mauritius' reservations were lodged 
by Mexico on 11 January, 1985 on the grounds of incompatibility 
and by the Netherlands on 14 July, 1994 on the same grounds. 
Mexico's objection did not expressly preclude entry into force 
of the treaty between itself and Mauritius. The Netherlands also 
made objections at the same time to the reservations of Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya on the same grounds without precluding entry
108Again, I have chosen to concentrate on objections made to 
reservations by African countries.
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into force of the treaty between the Netherlands and the 
reserving states. Norway's objection to Libya's reservation is 
based on its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. There is no statement that this objection does not 
preclude entry into force of the treaty with Libya. In lodging
its objection to reservations made by Tunisia, Egypt and
Mauritius inter alia, the Government of Sweden stated:
" [T]he reservations in question, if put in practice, 
would inevitably result in discrimination against 
women on the basis of sex, which is contrary to
everything the Convention stands for...the reasons why
reservations incompatible with the object and purpose 
of a treaty are not acceptable is precisely that 
otherwise they would render a basic international 
obligation of a contractual nature meaningless. 
Incompatible reservations, made in respect of the 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women, do not only cast doubts 
on the commitments of the reserving states to the 
objects and purpose of this Convention, but moreover, 
contribute to undermine the basis of international 
contractual law."109
An attempt to discuss reservations to CEDAW which appear to be 
contrary to the Convention was effectively stymied by a hostile 
response from the countries concerned.110 The debate was 
essentially reduced to allegations of cultural imperialism and
109 Text of reservations to CEDAW as of 31st December, 1997.
110Egypt and Bangladesh, for example, exclude the application 
of the Women's Convention insofar as it is contrary to Shari'a. 
An attempt to focus on these two countries was strongly resisted 
and the discussion was reduced to politicking without 
appreciating the legal aspects of the extent of the reservations; 
what value attach to treaty obligations if a state can make a 
reservation that limits it obligations to the core purpose of the 
treaty? See Clark, 282 ff for the details of the debate on the 
reservations to the Women's Convention and the poor response of 
states parties to the Secretary General's request.
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an attack on Islam by the states concerned. Nonetheless, the fact 
that reservations in connection with the Women's Convention, were 
discussed, even if inconclusively, in addition to the CEDAW 
Committee's consistent encouragement to reserving states to 
review their reservations with a view to withdraw them means 
overall that "its establishment as a major normative treaty and 
its assimilation into the body of standard-setting instruments 
of public international law seem nonetheless assured."111 The use 
of the argument of culture has a two-pronged effect; it halts 
discussion and deters probing into what states deem to be their 
area of domestic jurisdiction and it also precludes discussion 
into what constitutes culture; itself a non-legal open-ended 
term. Yet it is within the definitional realm of 'culture' that 
most acts which impact negatively on the rights of women occur.
Having discussed the concept(s) of women's human rights, formal 
guarantees for the protection of women's human rights and the 
inadequacies with those formal guarantees, Part II discusses the 
omission of race and culture in existing feminist theory and the 
detrimental effect this has for the representation of all women 
in feminist theory. Part III, which follows, discusses cultural 
relativism to establish if there is a notion within African 
values which may serve to protect women's rights through 
indigenous traditions.
PART II. EVERYWOMAN1S HUMAN RIGHTS?
1. Race and Essentialism - A Feminist Oversight
Law is regarded as without colour, without gender and without 
race. Feminism is by its nature only concerned with the gender 
aspects of societal structure. Legal feminism is primarily 
concerned with demonstrating that the law is not without gender 
and has concentrated, quite rightly, on illuminating that the 
substance of law is imbued with a specific viewpoint aimed at
111Clark, 318.
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maintaining a certain societal structure. In highlighting the 
marginalisation of women it has presented women essentially as 
a homogenous group, while accepting that there may be certain 
differences in terms of, for instance, race or ethnicity. The 
salient and only issue for this purpose has been the gender of 
women to the neglect of any other factors which might negatively 
impact on the rights of a woman in a society that has 
institutionalised inequalities. While this has to a certain 
extent facilitated a cohesive approach, it has resulted in an 
incomplete method for tackling effectively the problems of women 
whose rights are adversely affected and compounded by factors 
other than gender. For a truly coherent approach, race and class 
cannot be factored out of the equation for a large number of 
women.
This section discusses the colourless nature of feminist 
approaches and how, in effect, it has succeeded in excluding a 
core and integral part of the oppression of many women - race. 
Race is as important a factor as gender in any approach to assert 
rights. The concept of the 'essential'112 woman obscures that 
fact. Oppression of women is discussed solely in terms of male 
versus female. Yet, in a societal order where racial hierarchy 
exists, race is clearly an issue of oppression for black women. 
While the race as a whole suffers from prejudice, women also 
suffer from gender discrimination within the race, in addition 
to racial oppression - an accumulative multiple form of 
oppression. It is not sufficient for commentators to concede that 
while there are differences between women, the oppression 
suffered across the board by all women is sufficiently similar 
for the problems to be tackled in a discrete matter. The crux of 
the matter is that it is not possible to separate in any 
meaningful way these issues. They impact on one another and are 
compounded by one another. Race is consequently a very important
112 see generally Angela P. Harries, "Race and Essentialism 
in Feminist Legal Theory", Stanford Law Review, vol 42 pp581-618, 
1989-90 on representations of the essential women in feminist 
legal theory.
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and salient issue that needs to be factored into the discourse.
In a seminal work on black women and feminism, Ain' t I a Woman113
bell hooks lends a historical perspective to the discrimination 
and oppression of black people, particularly black women, in the 
United States and thereby delineates the exclusion of black women 
from discourses on feminism and discourses on racial matters.
"No other group in America has so had their identity 
socialized out of the existence as have black women.
We are rarely recognized as a group separate and 
distinct from black men, or as a present part of the 
larger group of "women" in this culture. When black 
people are talked about, sexism militates against the 
acknowledgement of the interests of black women; when 
women are talked about racism militates against a 
recognition of black female interests. When black 
people are talked about the focus tends to be on black 
men; and when women are talked about the focus tends
to be on white women. No where is this more evident
than in the vast body of feminist literature."114
While the work is concerned with rights and race issues within 
the United States, attitudes and prejudices identified within the 
work are applicable to issues of race and women's rights across 
the board. Prejudicial attitudes to black people, in the United 
States of America, stem from the slave trade and slavery. Until 
theri separate abolition, the slave trade and slavery were 
attractive economic options. To justify the treatment of people 
in this way, they were characterised as savage and amoral, 
regarded as other than human. This dehumanisation meant that 
further violations such as rape and sexual abuse of women, 
whenever it occurred, could be more easily justified on grounds
113bell hooks, Pluto Press, 1982.
114bell hooks, ibid at 7. Author's italics.
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that the women were inherently sexually flagrant and wanton. It 
also meant that the gender role structures of the dominant 
culture did not apply among the slaves - thus there was no 
distinction in the roles given to male and female slaves; women 
did field work the same as the men with no allowances made for 
pregnant or nursing mothers. Women did have an additional 
economic reproductive value. On manumission, the newly freed 
slaves wanted to emulate the societal status quo but the myths 
used to justify slavery and oppression remained entrenched in 
society and negated against the full and equal participation in 
society. Participation in society meant an acceptance of the 
patriarchal system which the men favoured. To women who had been 
worked hard, it was an attractive option - the emulation of the 
role of the mistress which indicated to them a life spent simply 
running the household.
"Black activists defined freedom as gaining the right 
to participate as full citizens in American culture; 
they were not rejecting the value system of that 
culture.1,115
Participation in the value system of wider American society, 
however, could not by definition be possible. Endemic racism, 
which had been used to justify slave owning and trading 
persisted. It was therefore difficult for former slaves to 
participate fully within that system. Men could not be the 
providers in the accepted sense of the American way because they 
had to rely on former owners, and other members of society who 
had been complicit in their slavery for paid work. It was highly 
unlikely that they would receive payment for work that had 
previously been done for free save for the initial purchase 
price. Further, mythology about the savagery and violence of the 
black male, in fact all black people, inevitably resulted in a 
fear and mistrust of them and this contributed to the difficulty 
in obtaining employment. Women, however, were able to get menial
115ibid at 5.
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work usually in households. The apparent role reversal existing 
in black families in America today - the myth of the black 
matriarch - although the causes may differ and the complexities 
of the situation are outside the scope of this work - perhaps 
dates directly from the problems faced by slaves on manumission 
on integrating into wider society. Black men could not play the 
role of men as determined by society; patriarchy did not benefit 
them in the way it did white men. This situation within black 
families led to erroneous assertions in later works on black 
families that there existed matriarchy without taking into 
account racism's effects on black family relationships.116
The exclusion of black women's issues from the feminist agenda 
is glaring when the platform against which it is set is examined. 
The feminist movement operated on the basis of obtaining equal 
rights for women compared with men; the equality rhetoric. It 
still operates on that basis with some modification or 
accommodation for the difference between men and women. This is 
a valid approach and not an incorrect one, but it is an 
incomplete approach. The assumption is that this approach and the 
identified problems for women within industrialised, developed 
countries are the same for women across the world. If we take, 
for instance, early feminist activism for the right to work it 
is possible to show that working or having to work has not been 
an issue for black women regardless of context; that is, African 
or African-American. Black women in America have always worked, 
whether as slaves or through economic necessity. Black African 
women have always worked, be it in the fields, on the farms, as 
hawkers of goods, as entrepreneurs and latterly as professionals 
within the burgeoning middle class fields of banking, law, 
accountancy and medicine. African-Americans are, I would say, 
more concerned about institutionalised racism which limits their 
opportunities and restricts their progress economically and 
socially. African women are certainly very concerned about 
traditional cultural structures that operate to keep them from
116ibid, chapters 1, 2 & 3.
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fulfilling their potential. On the one hand they can work and do 
work. On the other they are hampered by societal expectations, 
of their own society as well as colonial society and the 
resulting amalgamation of expectations, as to a woman's role. The 
latter affects all women. On that ground feminist theory 
succeeds. It highlights the waste of potential of women across 
the globe through artificial constructs of gender roles.
African women are also very much concerned about the absence of 
rights in the areas of inheritance law, custodial rights marriage 
and divorce which culture and customary law manages to traduce 
in spite of formal legal equality in statutory laws. The right 
to choose one's marital partner for a Muslim woman is of 
overwhelming importance. Child care, which is a problem in 
industrialised countries for working mothers is not the pressing 
problem in African societies; the extended family network, 
however onerous in specific instances, provides child care.
The feminist movement claims to be representative of issues 
affecting women and it is but it is representative of a specific 
group of women - white women. It assumes that all that is 
required to improve the system is the acceptance of women into 
its structure because underlying that is the fundamental 
assumption that the foundational bases of that society is fully 
representative and applicable to all. Further, it uses the 
benchmark of its own society, it takes a Eurocentric view, is 
biased by its perceptions of other societies through its own 
values and assumes those values are applicable to all societies. 
Feminism accepts the notion of the dominant culture save in its 
gender aspects. Certainly, there are values which ought to be 
applicable to all individuals irrespective of national 
boundaries. Human rights are such values. The importance of 
rights and the rights discourse is unassailable. To use it 
effectively, however, particular with regards to women's human 
rights, we must accept that difference makes a difference and the 
acknowledgement of the nuance that difference highlights has a 
valid contribution to make to the implementation of women's
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rights across the globe.
"...[T]he potential radicalism of feminist 
ideology was being undermined by women who, while 
paying lip service to revolutionary goals, were 
primarily concerned with gaining entrance into 
the capitalist patriarchal power structure. 
Although white feminists denounced the white 
male...they made women's liberation synonymous 
with women obtaining the right to fully 
participate in the very system they identified as
• 117oppressive."
It is this very aspect of feminism, its claims to be 
representative, whether silent or not, that gives cause for 
concern. Gender seems to be the sole self-defining trait of white 
women and this denies the existence and experience of non-white 
women since they are specifically defined by their race. They are 
specifically defined by their race because gender is not the sole 
defining factor in their lives.
"The force that allows white feminists authors to make 
no reference to racial identity in their books about 
"women" that are in actuality about white women is the 
same one that would compel any author writing 
exclusively on black women to refer explicitly to 
their racial identity. That force is racism. In a 
racially imperialist nation such as ours, it is the 
dominant race that reserves for itself the luxury of 
dismissing racial identity while the oppressed race is 
made daily aware of their racial identity. It is the 
dominant race that can make it seem that their
• » t 1 1 Pexperience is representative."
117 ibid at 188-9.
118 ibid at 138.
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If the experience of one race is made to seem representative, it 
is without doubt at the expense and at the exclusion, whether 
intentional or otherwise, of other races. If that is the case, 
any theory that develops can be of only limited applicability 
because it is relational to a specific type of woman. Further, 
it is based on and relies on gender essentialism;119 the notion 
that there is an essential woman's experience which can be 
isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual 
orientation or other experiences. To achieve this some voices are 
silenced to privilege others and the silenced voices are those 
same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice, including the 
voice of black women.
In its endeavour to represent all people, law silences those 
without power and feminist legal theory is in danger of silencing 
those who have either been kept from speaking or ignored when 
they spoke, black women included. Feminist legal theory 
challenges the status quo but "...to be fully subversive, the 
methodology of feminist legal theory should challenge not only 
the law's content but its tendency to privilege the abstract and 
unitary voice, and this gender essentalism also fails to do."120 
The need for multi vocal description of women's voice is 
historically apparent but the pull for a unitary voice has been 
stronger to the detriment of the variegation that exists among 
feminists. Harries argues that the voice of the dominant culture 
has so prevailed that for instance, in feminist legal theory, it 
is mostly "white, straight, socioeconomically privileged people 
who claim to speak for all of us."121 In essence and in reality, 
feminist legal theory is white feminist legal theory and black 
feminism is on the periphery trying to fit into and challenge the 
status quo. There is no realisation or rationalisation of a 
reality where black women's experiences influence or determine
119 Harries, Angela P., “Race and Essentialism in feminist 
Legal Theory”, Stanford Law Review, Vol 42, 1989-90, 581.
120Harries, ibid at 585.
121Harries, ibid at 588.
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the solipsism of feminist theory except as a footnote or addendum 
or reply or challenge to the extant theory. The prevailing 
starting point is that of the dominant culture within which black 
women have to fit. "... [B]y defining black women as "different", 
white women quietly become the norm, or pure essential woman. 1,122 
Therein lies the problem with gender essentialism in feminist 
legal theory. By falling into the use of a unitary voice for the 
ease of academic accessibility, by distilling women's experiences 
into that of an essential woman, feminist legal theory tends to 
be without colour. Defining black women as different or 
acknowledging them in footnotes leaves their experiences and 
lives and issues important to them on the margins. Their voices 
remain peripheral. They are other, never the norm. In a critique 
of Catherine Mackinnon, Angela Harries notes that
"Mackinnon's essentialist approach recreates the 
paradigmatic woman in the image of white woman, in the 
name of "unmodified feminism". As in the dominant 
discourse, black women are relegated to the margins; 
ignored or extolled as "just like us, only more so".
But "Black women are not white women with color." 
Moreover, feminist essentialism represents not just an 
insult to black women, but a broken promise - the 
promise to listen to women's stories, the promise of 
the feminist method."123
While Harries' aim is not to introduce a gender essentialism 
based on the experiences of black women or others excluded from 
the mainstream, it suggests that where categorisation is 
necessary it must of necessity be tentative and relational. Not 
every woman has the luxury of having gender as the sole self-
122 Harries at 595. See 595ff for details of her 'nuance 
theory'.
123 Harries, ibid at 601, footnotes omitted. Harries' article 
critiques the work of Mackinnon and Robin West. She does not 
charge them with racism but illustrates how notable feminist 
works limit black women to the periphery - by relegating them to 
footnotes or not mentioning them at all.
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defining trait.124
"Far more for black women than for white women, the 
experience of self is precisely that of being unable 
to disentangle the web of race and gender - of being 
enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory, 
discourses of sexuality and color. The challenge to 
black women has been the need to weave the fragments, 
our many selves, into an integral, though always 
changing and shifting whole: a self that is neither 
"female" nor "black" but both - and."125
2. Theorizing Black Feminisms126
The identified divergence in life experience and perception of 
reality between black women and their white counterparts, 
particularly that of the "simultaneity of oppression",127 has 
given rise to a burgeoning school of black feminist theory. Of 
necessity, “Black Feminisms” must be contextualised as a Western
"The various intersections between gender, 
race, class, sexual orientation, and other 
differentiating characteristics affect how 
and when all women experience sexism. We are 
able to ignore the experience of our race 
because it does not in any way correlate 
with an experience of oppression and 
contradiction."
Kline, Marlee, "Race, racism and feminist legal theory", Women's 
Law Journal, 1989 vl2, ppll5-150 at 123.
125Harries at 604.
126The title for this section is taken from James, Stanlie, 
M. and Busia, Abena, P.A., (eds), THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS:THE 
VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF BLACK WOMEN, Routledge, 1993, hereafter, 
James and Busia,(eds), THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS.
127This phraseology is used by Brewer, Rose, M., "Theorizing 
race, class and gender: the new scholarship of Black feminist 
intellectuals and Black women's labor" in James and Busia, (eds) 
THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS.
196
based feminist theory in which race and the experience of the 
difference race makes is a predominant factor. Depending on the 
locus of a woman, race may be the factor that separates and 
excludes her from the full benefits of “White”, mainstream 
feminisms or it may be culture in a locus where race is not an 
exclusionary factor but where, perhaps, ethnicity is. 'Black 
Feminism' could be, in fact, also regarded as a misnomer, in its 
reference to colour, being as it were an all encompassing term 
to include all those, who on the basis of their difference, are 
excluded from mainstream feminism.128 Its importance may lie in 
its identification, inclusion and experiential reliance on 
factors other than gender which compound the oppression of women 
to develop a new approach to combat that oppression.
Clearly, gender as the self-defining trait of women, primarily 
relied upon in mainstream feminist works, has been an inadequate 
and indeed, an ineffective approach to reducing gender 
oppression. The recognition that race is a compounding factor in 
the oppression of women, will enable a more cohesive and holistic 
approach to tackling gender oppression. Further, this may enable 
identified inequalities in the world order to be addressed more 
effectively. Race is not only important in gender issues, it is 
also equally important in the institutionalised, structural 
hierarchies of the world order. We speak of the dominant culture 
in a given municipal society, it is also possible to speak of a 
dominant culture in the international order.129 The needs of the 
dominant societies will invariably dictate policy decisions on 
the basis of economic and other forms of power including military 
power and that factor itself will have ramifications for gender 
relations in those countries without a commanding position. 
Theorising black feminisms has two important possible effects;
128I term as mainstream feminism, 'feminisms' as a whole 
without comment on the different strains. The important factor 
in black feminism is its inclusive element; the element which 
acknowledges race as a composite factor together with gender in 
the oppression of women.
129For example, see Chapter 3 on the NIEO.
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(i) the identification and reliance on race as a defining factor 
in gender oppression at the individual level, (ii) the 
corresponding realisation that the omission of race by the 
dominant culture, be it locally or internationally, on a wider, 
community level is a direct result of race not being considered 
by them a defining trait. This makes the dominant culture 
experience representative and consequently marginalises those who 
do not have the same experience.
3. Differences within coznmonalities:African vs African-American 
experience.
The discussion of race and gender essentialism in the preceding 
section identified how race and gender are inextricably linked 
in the oppression of Black women. I stated above that 'Black 
Feminisms' may be a misnomer. That is because it encompasses the 
experience of all women of colour, irrespective of nationality
or ethnicity, and identifies that experience as distinct from 
mainstream feminism which is based primarily on the experience 
of white women. The common factor is that of race. Yet, there 
exist differences in the experiences of Black women - the Black 
African experience of gender oppression differs in aspect from 
the African-American experience of gender oppression or the 
immigrant experience. Again, the common factor is the systemic, 
institutionalised hierarchy of race which affects the social 
construct.
" [G]ender as a category of analysis cannot be 
understood decontextualized from race and class in 
Black feminist theorizing. Social constructions of 
Black womanhood and manhood are inextricably linked to 
racial hierarchy, meaning systems and 
institutionalization. Indeed, gender takes on meaning 
and is embedded institutionally in the context of the 
racial and class order:productive and social
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reproductive relations of the economy. 1,130
It is therefore imperative that there is recognition, not only 
of race as a qualitative difference in the reality of the lives 
of Black women, but also of the inequality on which these 
constructs are founded upon. The global institutionalisation of 
this racial hierarchy affects the economic realities of women 
worldwide and determines their social position vis a vis men 
within their society and other women in other societies.
In an African context, the globalisation of the racial hierarchy, 
has severe adverse effects on many countries, not least because 
of the economic inequities which result from this 
institutionalised hierarchy of race.131 Colonialism distorted 
social relations within African extended families. The 
importation of a capitalist mode of production separated the 
workplace and the home. Women's role in economic production was 
diminished with urban waged jobs restricted to men. Colonialism 
also sanctioned and institutionalised the political and legal 
status of African women as minors/dependants subject to male 
control.132 European constructions of femininity and domesticity 
decreased the legal and social status of African women.133 The 
structure of women's oppression under colonialism was shaped
130Brewer, Rose, M. , in THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS, ibid at
17.
1310f course the actions of autocratic, profligate 
governments and of economic globalisation exacerbate these 
problems.
132Courville, Cindy, "Re-examining Patriarchy as a Mode of 
Production." in James and Busia, THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS, at 
36 ff.
133see Mama, Amina, "Sheroes and Villains:Conceptualizing 
Colonial and Contemporary Violence Against Women in Africa", in 
Alexander, Jacqui, M. & Mohanty, Chandra, Talpade, (eds), 
FEMINIST GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES, 
Routledge, 1997, hereafter, Alexander & Mohanty, FEMINIST 
GENEALOGIES. Mama looks at the impact of colonial gender 
ideologies in African societies and the transformation of forms 
of violence.
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using household structure and familial ideology134 and it changed 
the form of oppression of women with the introduction and
development of the coexistence of dual political systems, dual 
patriarchal systems and dual modes of production.135
"The cultural, familial and political reality of
African women was restructured with the introduction 
of commodity production based on monopoly of the means 
of production, racist ideology, and a policy of
separate political and economic development. Under
colonial capitalism African women experienced three
forms of exploitation based on African women's
position in production, African women's position in
the family and African women's racial position in
colonial society."136
Comparison of African women and African-American women shows that 
two key factors have determined their subjugation; economics and 
race. Economics is defined as slavery in African American terms, 
it is defined as colonial exploitation of women's production in 
African terms. Underlying both forms of exploitation is racist 
ideology. This ideology enabled the exploitation of both men and
women. Yet, patriarchy, even within the blanket of racism 
discriminated against women on the basis of their gender, bell 
hooks notes137 that on manumission, men favoured the patriarchal 
society in their efforts to emulate social mores. In pre-colonial 
African society, notwithstanding the contribution of women 
economically, they were assigned an inferior position socially. 
Colonialism brought its own form of patriarchal ideology based 
on a capitalist mode of production. The same problems faced by
134id at 39.
135ibid at 40. See also Chapter 5 of this work for Nigeria 
case study example of changes wrought by colonialism.
136ibid at 42.
137see AIN'T I A WOMAN, op cit. , pl37
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freed slaves in trying to fit into society still exist among 
African-Americans. Prejudices used to justify exploitation and 
oppression still remain in the consciousness of society at large. 
In a multicultural society, it may be covert or even overt, but 
the racist ideology that underpinned for so long the maltreatment 
of a racial group still remains. Non-acknowledgement of this 
position fails to acknowledge the structurally unequal world 
order, the exploitation of resources, initially under colonialism 
and subsequently under institutionalised hierarchies which factor 
race out of the equation and make their experience 
representative.
Race, thus, is a relevant and integral definitional trait in the 
oppression of Black women. It is of no surprise, therefore, that 
feminist movements emerge generally in the wider context of 
social and political change. Within these movements for political 
change, particularly for independence, there is invariably 
tension between patriarchal ideology and women's call for a 
fuller emancipation encompassing both race and gender.
"Larger processes of globalization make it both 
difficult and necessary to talk about the nation­
state, to talk specifically about nationalism and, for 
our purposes, the problematical relationship of Third- 
World women to it. Anti-colonial nationalism has 
always mobilized women's labor in order to help 
consolidate popular nationalism, without which state 
nationalism would never have been able to solidify 
itself. It is no accident, therefore, that feminism 
often emerged within anticolonial movements. But the 
state mobilization of the feminine is contradictorily 
inflected. While, as Heng has argued, "women, the 
feminine, and figures of gender have traditionally 
anchored the nationalist imaginary", certain women, 
prostitutes, and lesbians are now being disciplined 
and written out of the nation's script; they have been 
invested with the power to corrupt otherwise loyal
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heterosexual citizens, positioned as hostile to the 
procreative imperative of nation-building, and, 
therefore, invested with the ability to destroy it. It 
is not only around questions of sexuality and gender 
that nation-states have structured their exclusions, 
however, but also in relationship to race and class 
hierarchies. It is these exclusions, as well as the 
state's ambivalent and conflictual relationship to 
sovereignty, that help to explain the failures of 
anticolonial nationalism. . . "138.
Alexander and Mohanty's position is interesting because not only 
does it acknowledge the role played by women in nationalist 
struggles, it goes further to identify the exclusion of women in 
certain aspects in society. This exclusion is not restricted to 
sex-workers or homosexual women. The threat of exclusion applies 
to all women who challenge the status quo in any way; women who 
do not accept the compliant feminine role applied to women in 
these societies, women who demand their rights. It is a failure 
of anti-colonial nationalism because the right to self-determine, 
once independence was achieved, no longer applied to specific 
groups such as women. The state or nation, once free of the 
shackles of colonialism became the arbiter of societal mores; 
further social transformation was no longer deemed necessary by 
the new elites. Culture or 'this is how we do things' became the 
response to any attempts to effect social change. Further, the 
complicity of the post-colonial state with interventionist 
policies of trans-national corporations into its economy 
undermines its power and more importantly, leads to the 
suggestion of forfeiture of sovereignty because the state then 
becomes complicit in its recolonisation.139 For activist fighting
138Alexander & Mohanty, FEMINIST GENEALOGIES, Introduction,
xxiv.
139ibid at xxiv. Interventionist economic policy by trans­
national corporations, TNC, and the question of undermining 
sovereignty is linked to the whole question of an inequitable 
world economic order which is discussed in Chapter 3.
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for the determination of the rights of women, quests for social 
change within a nationalist context were disappointing as once 
independence was achieved, women were expected to return to 
gender roles which may have been stifling, unfair and 
unfulfilling. Cultural expectations inform the role women are 
expected to assume in society. These expectations, transformed 
into practice and ultimately law are not without discrimination 
and seriously affect the rights of women.
The next section looks at cultural relativity and the question 
of women's rights to illuminate the adverse effects of 
discriminatory customary law.
Part III. GENDERED RELATIVITY
Culture has an undisputed impact in human rights issues. The 
desire to retain cultural difference in the globalisation of the 
language of rights results in an anomalous situation with regard 
to assuring human rights for women since they are adversely 
affected by the application of cultural or customary norms. There 
is a definite male bias in all societies, western or non-western 
and this is manifested in a variety of ways. Societal norms 
invariably ascribe a subordinate role to women which is reflected 
in law, customary or statutory, and that in turn consolidates the 
oppression of women. Women are discriminated against in property, 
inheritance, marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance provisions, 
inter alia on the basis of their gender. While there may exist
statutory provisions stating that there should be non­
discrimination on the basis of gender, the reality is entirely 
different.
The conceptual problem of human rights is enduring. Can human 
rights be perceived as absolute? Is there a concept of human
rights or are there visions of particular cultures? It has 
historically been the cry of African countries that the concept 
of human rights promulgated in the International Bill of Rights
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is Eurocentric in its inception and neo-colonialist in 
enforcement.140 There is a degree of consensus that human rights 
conceptions embodied in various instruments are of Western origin 
and that their conceptual framework and philosophical basis have 
their roots in the specific circumstances of western society. 
Proponents of cultural specificity on the contrary argue that 
human rights as conceived in the west are rejected in the 
developing world and Africa precisely because their philosophical 
basis is not only different but opposite. Whereas western 
conceptions are based on the autonomous individual, African 
conceptions do not know such individualism. In traditional 
Africa, the human being found worth within the community to which 
he/she related in terms of obligations and duties. This view is 
given a measure of force in the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples' Rights.141 Article 18(1) states that the family shall be 
the natural unit and basis of society, refers to community and 
peoples and emphasises duties and obligations to a community. 
This may be problematic in the context of women because it does 
not take into account the possibility that sections within a 
group may be disadvantaged. Moreover, it presupposes that there 
has been no dynamism in any African society which may have 
altered indigenous states and that whatever concept of rights 
existed, whether attached to obligations, was without 
discrimination.
The location of human rights specifically within a cultural 
relativist paradigm proceeds typically by asserting that African 
societies had concepts of human rights which differed from the 
western model and that western societies may do well to learn
140For a detailed discussion on cultural relativism see 
Chapter 2. This objection was raised at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in June 1993 by a number of Asian countries; notably 
China. The Conference itself witnessed many of the problems 
scholars and practitioners have for years trying to solve; what
is the modern meaning of human rights? It also witnessed abuses 
of rights that the International Bill of Rights try to protect 
when China refused the Dalai Lama the right to exercise freedom 
of speech.
141Chapter II, articles 27-29 ACHPR.
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from some of these concepts. The usual emphasis is on the 
communal nature of rights; social harmony and an emphasis on 
obligations and duty to a community. I do not agree with the 
notion of community based rights. Indigenous African societies 
may have been organised communally but it is not a natural
progression that individual rights were sublimated to community 
rights.142 In any event, it is this very nature of communal 
organisation and socialisation that enables the subordination of 
women and allows the negation of rights that they may be entitled 
to both under statutory legislation in the domestic arena and 
under international treaty law. This is compounded by an under­
developed jurisprudential theoretical foundation of human rights 
in Africa. The conceptual/theoretical foundation of human rights 
discussion has largely been confined to positivist legal
questions on two levels; national and international. The national 
has pertained to the nature of the constitutions in Africa; the 
extent to which they do or do not protect human rights and if 
they do, how far these are respected and enforced. On the
international level, the debate has taken the UN instruments as 
a point of departure and generally argued on the relevance or 
lack thereof of to Africa, the mechanisms for their protection 
and the desirability of a regional system of protection of human 
rights.
The Africanist concept of human rights,143 thus, values
communitarianism and social harmony over individual rights. The 
preference for social harmony could be regarded as the stifling 
of individual rights. It is oppressive for a general group right 
to override individual rights constantly in the maintenance of 
the status quo. As noted, earlier, in terms of the protection of 
women's rights, it is the foundational values which underpin 
these notions that act in concert within communities to oppress 
women. Arguments of cultural relativism do not take on board
142see Chapter 5 on indigenous structures of the Egba of 
Abeokuta in Nigeria.
143 See for example, Shivji, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA, op cit.
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these underlying issues and do not challenge discriminatory 
practices within cultures as such. Cultural relativism is 
concerned with the exclusion of alien influences from a society, 
it is concerned in a broad way with the protection of the rights 
of a people to maintain their form of civilisation, however 
imperfect or discriminatory and finally, it is concerned with the 
maintenance of the status quo.
Customary practices forming culture are, however, not static. 
They vary, for instance in Nigeria, from ethnic group to ethnic 
group and within such groupings they vary according to 
demarcations of class and religion. Moreover, cultural practices 
are modified by their adherents over a measure of time due to 
factors such changing attitudes to religion and indeed, 
education. A liberal view on the issue of culture is that of 
Nwokedi, a judge of the Nigerian Supreme Court, who said in Agbai
v Okogbue:
"Customary Laws were formulated from time immemorial.
As our society advances, they are more removed from 
its pristine social ecology. They meet situations 
which were inconceivable at the time they took root.
The doctrine of repugnancy in my view affords the 
courts the opportunity for fine tuning customary laws 
to meet changed social conditions where necessary, 
more especially as there is no forum for repealing or 
amending customary laws. I do not intend to be 
understood as holding that the courts are there to 
enact customary laws. When however customary law is 
confronted by a novel situation, the courts have to 
consider its applicability under existing social 
environment.1,144
Such views are not as commonplace as one would wish. The argument
144 (1991), 7 N.W.L.R. Part 204, p391, S.C. This was a family 
law case on the rights of inheritance between spouses on the 
issue of testamentary disposition by wives.
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of culture in the area of human rights is however compelling for 
its advocates. If, as I noted above, cultural relativism may at 
times be seen as a manifestation of the sovereignty of a people 
to protect its customs, it is also worthwhile to maintain an 
awareness of who is putting forth the argument. If culture is
dynamic and variable within the wider society, political mileage 
may be got out of its use.
" . . .we must examine the resonance of the word 
"culture" at all levels of society, acknowledging that 
various groups have different degrees of participation 
in culture and that participation occurs in multiple 
contexts. When women's groups or individual women talk 
about culture, we must remind ourselves that there can 
never be a purportedly popular notion of culture that 
is unmediated by the positionality of the speaker; we 
must look at the claim for exemption on cultural 
grounds in relation to the axes of class, ethnicity, 
race, sexuality, age, and so on. We need to listen 
with care, but also with skeptism, to sweeping 
definitions of this thing called culture, forged as 
they are in a world of constantly expanding difference 
and complexity."145
The disparity between formal legal guarantees, domestic and 
international, and actual protection for women's rights is clear. 
Implementation can only be effected within domestic jurisdictions 
although the international system can, and in certain instances 
does, influence domestic protection particularly through case law 
decisions where national systems are inadequate or fail to 
protect women's human rights. The following section looks at 
select case law about women's rights from Africa. International 
standards were persuasive in some of these decisions but the
145Rao, Arati, "The Politics of Gender and Culture in 
International Human Rights Discourse", 171 in Peters, Julie & 
Wolper, Andrea, (eds) WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS:INTERNATIONAL 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, Routledge, New York, 1995.
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issues which gave rise to the disputes themselves demonstrate 
discriminatory cultural practices which adversely affect women's 
rights.
In the case of Karimatu Yakubuf1Ae the issue at stake was the
right of a young girl to choose her marital partner. The case was 
governed by Muslim law which in Nigeria is considered as 
customary law.147 Three suitors expressed their desire to marry 
her. While she was away to consult family friends about her 
choice, her father married her off to one of the suitors, Umaru 
Gwagwada. Karimatu was 19 years old. On learning of the marriage, 
Karimatu proceeded to dissolve the marriage, after trying, 
unsuccessfully, to enlist the assistance of family members in 
making her case. She then married a suitor of her choice. Her 
father, together with Gwagwada sued her in the local area court 
where she lost the case. Her appeal to the Shari' a Court of 
Appeal to assert her right to choose her marital partner was also 
unsuccessful. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, she won the case 
on a technical point of Shari'a law. The Court's opinion, however 
was that "... [0]ne conclusion on which there is consensus of 
opinion in the Maliki School of Islamic law is that a father has 
the right to compel his virgin daughter in marriage without her 
consent and even if she has attained puberty (defined by the 
Court to begin at 14 years) ..." This judgement contradicts 
section 39 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex.148 It also directly 
contradicts the right of a woman to choose a spouse under CEDAW
146Court of Appeal, Nigeria, Appeal No.CA/K805/85. A summary 
of the case is on file with candidate.
147"Moslem (sic) law is religious law based on the Moslem 
faith and applicable to members of the faith. In Nigeria, it is 
not indigenous law; it is received customary law introduced into 
the country as part of Islam.", Obilade, A.O., THE NIGERIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1979, 83.
148 Women suffer discriminatory practices in a number of 
areas in Nigeria; marriage, child custody laws, inheritance 
rights, property rights etc. These will be discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 5.
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in article 16 (1)(b) which provides that 'States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations 
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women...[t]he same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter 
into marriage only with their free and full consent.' Further, 
the decision, by not taking into account the discriminatory 
effect of the right of a parent under Islamic law to marry off 
to a suitor of one's choice one's daughter and not one's son, the 
decision fails women by refusing to consider, as it may have 
done, Nigeria being a party to CEDAW without reservations, an 
appropriate modification of existing customary laws which 
constitute discrimination against women.149
In contrast, in a Tanzanian case, Ephraim v Pastory,150 the High
Court ruled unconstitutional a customary law rule which prevented 
women from alienating clan property. In the case, the respondent, 
Holaria Pastory, who had inherited clan land from her father by 
a valid will, sold the land to the second respondent, who was not 
a clan member in 1988. The appellant Ephraim filed a suit for the 
declaration that the sale was void as women under Haya customary 
law have no power to sell clan land. At first instance, the 
Primary Court held that the sale was void. Haya Customary Law 
provides that, "Women can inherit, except for clan land, which 
they may receive in usufruct but may not sell. However, if there 
is no male of that clan, women may inherit such land in full 
ownership."151 Mwalusanya, J. noted that courts are not impotent 
to invalidate laws which are discriminatory and unconstitutional 
and cited case law to support the position that discriminatory
149Article 29(f), CEDAW.
150Bernado Ephraim v Holaria Pastory and Gervazi Kaizige, in 
the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, (PC) Civil Appeal No. 70 
of 1989 (From District Court of Muleba District at Muleba in 
Civil Appeal No. 89/88 and Original Case No. 63/88 of Primary 
Court of Muleba District at Kashasha), on file with candidate.
151Laws of Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law 
GN. No. 436/1963, para 20., on file with candidate.
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laws can be declared void for being unconstitutional. As a matter 
of fact, the court found the customary law on inheritance 
discriminatory to women and henceforth took it to be modified and 
qualified to the extent that both males and females could sell 
clan land.
In Unity Dow v Attorney General,152 the application was for an
order to declare Section 4 of the Citizenship Act of Botswana, 
1984, ultra vires. The applicant, a citizen of Botswana married
a citizen of the United States of America. Prior to the wedding 
in 1984, they had a child and after their marriage they had two 
more children. Laws in force prior to the Citizenship Act
conferred citizenship on the eldest child born before the
applicant's marriage but the terms of the Citizenship Act
conferred no citizenship on the other two children because their
father is not a Motswana; whereas, had they been born outside 
marriage and their mother was a citizen, citizenship would have 
been conferred at birth.153 The Court's reasoning made reference 
to the OAU Convention on Non-Discrimination (while noting that
152High Court of Botswana held at Lobatse, MISCA. 124/90, on 
file with candidate.
153Sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act of Botswana read: 
"4. (1) A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen
of Botswana by birth and descent if, at the time of 
his birth-
(a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or
(b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his 
mother was a citizen of Botswana.
(2) A person born before the commencement of this Act 
shall not be a citizen by virtue of this section 
unless he was a citizen at the time of such 
commencement.
5. (1)A person born outside Botswana shall be a
citizen of Botswana by descent if, at the time of his 
birth-
(a) his father was a citizen of Botswana;
(b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his mother 
was a citizen of Botswana.
(2) A person born before the commencement of this Act 
shall not be a citizen by virtue of this section 
unless he was a citizen at the time of such 
commencement."
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the signing of the Convention does not give it the effect of law 
in Botswana), the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women as well as the Constitution of 
Botswana in holding both sections (4) & (5) of the Citizenship 
Act discriminatory. On appeal,154 based on whether there had been 
a proper interpretation of the relevant parts of the Constitution 
on discrimination, inter alia, the Court upheld the decision of
the first instance in holding that section 4 of the Citizenship 
Act infringed the fundamental rights and freedoms155 of the 
respondent with regards to freedom of movement156 and protection 
from discrimination.157 No pronouncement was made on section 5. 
Direct reference was made to the principle of non-discrimination 
as included in international law and it was persuasive in the 
court's decision.
In V.E.W. Otiena v Joash Ochieng Ougro,158 a Court of Appeal case
in Kenya, the right of a widow to bury her husband was at issue 
as opposed to burial under Luo customary law by his relatives in 
his village. It was initially held that the deceased should be 
buried in his clan home according to tradition. Submissions on
behalf of the appellant included the contention that denial of
the body of her deceased husband, according to his wishes, for 
burial would be discriminatory against her as a woman. The Court 
said, "At present there is no way in which an African citizen of 
Kenya can divest himself of the association with the tribe of his
father if those customs are patrilineal." The Court went on to
state that the deceased was born and bred a Luo and under Luo 
customary law his wife on marriage becomes part of the deceased's 
household as well as a member of her husband's clan. Upon death
154Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 4/91, on file with 
candidate.
155section 3, Constitution of Botswana.
156section 14, id.
157section 15, id.
158The Nairobi Law Monthly, April, 1988, 10.
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of a married Luo man, customs dictate that the clan takes charge 
of the burial as far as taking into account the wishes of the 
deceased and his family. A Luo who has not established his own 
home in accordance with custom (such as the deceased) will be 
buried in his father's home. Under Luo custom, the widow has no 
right to bury her husband and she does not become the head of the 
family on the death of her husband. On the issue of 
discrimination against the widow, the Court referred to section 
82(3) and (4) (b) of the Kenyan constitution which allows for 
discriminatory rules respecting burial. Further, the Court 
considered there was nothing repugnant to justice and morality 
in the applicable Luo customary law. It went on to say, "[t]he 
elders, who are custodians of African customary law...owe it to 
themselves and to their communities to ensure that customary laws 
keep abreast of positive modern trends so as to make possible for 
courts to be guided by customary laws."
These select cases illustrative the sporadic influence of human 
rights law on women's human rights in domestic jurisdictions, 
sometimes in direct contradiction to States Parties legal 
obligations under treaty law. They also demonstrate the 
difficulty of eradicating cultural practices. Culture, including 
its negative aspects from the perspective of an outsider, is a 
defining factor in the identification of a group. Identification 
with a culture, at present, can entail identification with all 
its aspects, however adversely they impact on sections of the 
community. While human rights remains suspiciously regarded as 
a form of imperialism in some sectors, the tendency will be to 
rigidly adhere to culture, whereas, in the normal course of 
events, some practices may have become modified.
Discriminatory practices against women are endemic and cut across 
state boundaries. While the select case law above is restricted 
to African countries, there are other examples of discriminatory 
cultural practices, some of which have come before the
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international system.159 They illustrate the difficulty in 
implementation of women's human rights while cultural and 
customary practices remain unchanged. This difficulty and the 
problem will remain as long as any challenge to cultural 
practices is resisted. The reality is that, for the most part, 
cultural relativity is gendered relativity and if the basis and
practice of culture are not continually revised and questioned, 
as required of States Parties by CEDAW under article 5, what is 
being said is that women as a class are not deserving of the full 
protection of human rights and that can never be acceptable. 
Further, we need to question always whose culture is being 
protected and who benefits from the maintenance of a cultural 
status quo.
" [T]he notion of culture favored by international 
actors must be unmasked for what it is: a falsely
rigid, ahistorical, selectively chosen set of self- 
justificatory texts and practices whose patent 
partiality raises the question of exactly whose 
interests are being served and who comes out on top.
We need to problematize all of culture, not just the 
perceived "bad" aspects. When we limit our inquiry to 
egregious violations, we limit our capacity to 
ameliorate human pain to just that one instance of a 
"bad cultural practice." Without questioning the 
political uses of culture, without asking whose 
culture this is and who its primary beneficiaries are, 
without placing the very notion of culture in 
historical context and investigating the status of the 
interpreter, we cannot fully understand the ease with 
which women become instrumentalized in larger battles 
of political, economic, military, and discursive
159 See for example; Lovelace v Canada, 2 HRLJ 158 (1981) , 
Aumeeruddy Cziffra v Mauritius, 2 HRLJ 13 9 (1981), both of which 
came before the Human Rights Committee, for European and American 
cases see Cook, R., "International Human Rights Law Concerning 
Women", 23 Vand. J. of Transn'l L., (1990) 790 - 811.
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competition in the international arena."160
CONCLUSION
While feminist legal theory has certainly posed a challenge to 
normative law and made some gains, implementation has been 
fraught with difficulties. The gains made are by no means 
complete; feminist legal theory itself faces some challenges, not 
least, the fact that it fails Black women by not taking into
account their experiences in its reconceptualisation. Its
omission of the impact of culture as a defining factor needs also
to be redressed. If legal feminism is to be representative of all 
women especially in influencing policy changes in human rights 
law and imbuing women's human rights with the moral imperative 
that it deserves, if it is to speak with one voice, it must 
address the issue of gender essentialism and race, it must 
address the issue of culture and it must acknowledge the
difference these accumulated factors make in the lives of women. 
It needs to do this because any gains made, particularly when it 
influences policy changes that may result in treaty obligations, 
will affect women all over the world. Failure to do this will 
only result in the marginalisation of women in the developing 
world because the issues which have given rise to the changes 
will only have limited applicability to their lives. Race and 
racial discrimination is as important a defining trait to Black 
women as their gender. Culture and cultural practices are 
important in their socialisation. Theorisation based exclusively 
on gender will only result in an incomplete solution. An 
incomplete solution will marginalise and any form of 
marginalisation will merely replicate the existing normative 
order.
It is important also to be aware of the limitations of the rights 
discourse, particularly with regard to developing countries such
160 Rao, Arati, op cit. at 174.
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as Nigeria. Core rights - democratic rights - which would enable 
the protection of human rights are restricted. There is no 
enforceable right for the people to self-determine; no 
representative government. Sovereignty is restricted to 
governmental sovereignty. The human rights discourse is 
inherently challenged by cultural relativism. Yet women's rights 
are more adversely affected under the guise of culture. By not 
taking into account race, feminist legal theory fails Black 
women; by not taking sufficient note of culture, feminist legal 
theory fails Black women and in its assumption that the legal 
discourse is the foremost tool in the implementation of rights, 
feminist legal theory fails Black women. Race and racism will 
affect access to justice, culture will restrict access and 
authoritarianism will negate access. While feminists are not 
directly responsible for these difficulties, the presumption is 
that feminist legal theory represents all women. While this
presumption subsists, it is imperative that feminist legal theory 
makes all necessary efforts to be truly representative by 
recognising and incorporating these differences in their theory 
otherwise feminist legal theory will simply replicate the 
international legal order in its marginalisation of Black women.
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CHAPTER 5
THE REALITIES OF CULTURE:THE STATUS OF EGBA YORUBA WOMEN 
WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF YORUBA SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter looks at the status of women within the structural 
organisation of the Yoruba people as an illustration of the 
realities of cultural tradition and to illuminate the argument 
that culture and cultural values are specifically gendered. It 
demonstrates that gender discrimination is institutionalised 
within the political and social organisation of the Yorubas 
specifically, and more generally within Nigeria.
In the normal course of events, developments within society might 
have modified these discriminatory elements but colonialism has, 
somewhat contradictorily, enabled the fossilisation of certain 
customs, perhaps in rebellion against external influence. In the 
establishment of a detached central government authority over 
diverse ethnic groups on independence, colonial influence has 
ensured that primary identification with ethnic rather than
national identity serves as a claim of allegiance, together with 
all the customary mores that entails. This means, in practice, 
that the laws and customs people identify with is that of their
ethnic group rather than statutory federal or state law,
particularly with regards to personal matters.
Further, reflecting practice, the Constitution relegates the 
regulation of personal laws to the customary law of the 
individual concerned. In terms of rights protection, although 
human rights are regarded as rights against the state, this
primary allegiance to custom along ethnic lines means in effect 
that the state is not regarded in any meaningful sense as the 
arbiter and protector of rights. Customary law within the 
community fulfils that role. Institutionalised gender 
discrimination within the customary laws and customs of the
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various communities need to be addressed at a localised level 
even though it is possible to ascribe imputability to the state.1 
The disconnection between the role of the state and the local 
communities renders the rights discourse fraught with 
complexities in the enforcement of international human rights law 
in this milieu.
Part I of this Chapter begins with a brief history of the Yoruba 
people and its means of organisation, both social and political; 
it then proceeds to look at the impact of colonialism and the 
influence it has had on indigenous modes of organisation. Part 
II looks at the status of the rights of women under personal 
laws, in particular, the parallel system of customary and 
statutory rights. Part III discusses feminist critiques of 
cultural relativism and looks at how feminist legal theory might 
be useful in the promotion and protection of women's human rights 
in any cultural setting.
PART I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2 
1.Political Organisation
The Yoruba people predominantly occupy the south western part of 
Nigeria although groups of them may be found in neighbouring 
African countries following demarcation of territory along state 
lines. Historically, Yorubaland consisted of various kingdoms 
based on territory although the same language is spoken with a 
variation of dialects. It consists primarily of Egba, Oyo, Ondo,
1 see Chapter 4 supra, especially ppl67-168.
2 There are several anthropological studies on the Yoruba 
people. Some concentrate on parts of Yorubaland which this work 
is not directly concerned with but are generally useful for 
information on the Yorubas. See Bascom, W. , THE YORUBAS OF 
SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., USA, 1969, 
which concentrates on Ile-Ife and also, Johnson, S. Rev., THE 
HISTORY OF THE YORUBAS FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BEGINNING 
OF THE BRITISH PROTECTORATE, Routlegde & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 
1966, 1st published in 1921, for a comprehensive history. See 
also Biobaku, S.O., THE ORIGIN OF THE YORUBA, University of 
Lagos, 1971.
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Egbado, Awori, Ijebu, Ekiti, and Ilorin people.3 This thesis 
concentrates on the Egba Yorubas of Abeokuta although comparison 
and references may be made with other Yoruba people. They are 
essentially the same people ethnically although groups make 
distinctions betweeen localities; for instance an Egba Yoruba may 
make a distinction between an Egba and an Oyo Yoruba person.
The political organisation of the Yoruba people is monarchical. 
It is headed by a King or Oba if entitled to wear a crown or
baale if not. The Oba of a particular town or kingdom4 had a
specific title, for instance the Oba of the Yoruba Egba people
is the Alake of Ake, later the Alake of Abeokuta. Until 1800,5 
the key unit of political organisation was the town or ilu. At
central or local level, the system of government was monarchical, 
headed by an Oba or baale. The Oba as head of the kingdom had
absolute powers but in practice he was not an absolute ruler. He 
ruled, usually in consultation with a council or igbimo which had
specific names depending on the kingdom. In Egba towns, the 
igbimo was called the Ogboni. Igbimo in specific towns consisted
of the most senior chiefs who were usually representatives of 
certain lineages but in some towns they were also required to be 
members of associations such as the Ogboni. In some towns, the
role of the Oba was formalised in their unwritten constitution.6
3see Fadipe, N.A., THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE YORUBA, Ibadan 
University Press, 1970, Chapter 2 on ethnic history.
4 see generally Smith, Robert, S. KINGDOMS OF THE YORUBA, 
James Currey, 1988, especially Part I.
5 see Atanda, J.A., AN INTRODUCTION TO YORUBA HISTORY, 
Ibadan University Press, 1980, Chapter 3 from which most of the 
information on political organisation until 1800 was drawn, 
hereafter, Atanda, YORUBA HISTORY.
6 an example is that of Old Oyo, the capital of the Old Oyo 
Empire. The Oyo Mesi, the council of state, could reject an 
Alafin, the ruler, who acted ultra vires or became an oppressive 
ruler. A sentence of rejection would be pronounced by the Basorun 
and head of the Oyo Mesi on behalf of the Oyo Mesi and ran as
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In Ijebu and Egba, the Osugbo and Ogboni cults respectively
dominated the governmental structure. Other areas which lacked 
formal constitutional power of rejection had an understanding 
that the igbimo could organise a general uprising of the people
to get rid of an oppressive ruler. There was representation of 
people through expression of their wishes to chiefs who were 
members of the igbimo who would raise the issues in council
meetings. They then reported back to the people through the 
baale. Chiefs chosen by cult, or age-grade served the interests
of those members as those chosen on lineage served their lineage 
interests.
The Oba was also checked by religious duties and rituals. The
Yoruba people believe that the well being of the community was 
bestowed by orisa, deities and their ancestors. To appease these
deities and ancestors sacrifices and festivals were held in their 
honour. It was the duty of the Oba to see that these festivals
were observed. In addition, priests of the orisa prescribed
taboos which the Oba had to obey.
1.1 The role of women in politics7
Women played various roles in the political organisation of 
Yoruba society in the middle to late nineteenth century.8 In Old 
Oyo and New Oyo kingdoms, women had certain roles. The women of
follows, "The gods reject you, earth rejects you, the people 
reject you." Any Alafin rejected had to commit suicide. Atanda, 
YORUBA HISTORY, at 20.
7 see generally Mba, Nina, NIGERIAN WOMEN MOBILIZED - 
Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900-1963, 
Berkeley, University of California, 1982, hereafter, Mba, 
NIGERIAN WOMEN MOBILIZED, where the information on this section 
on women in the political structure was taken.
8 written records of the organisation of the Yoruba tend to 
date from this period, perhaps a reflection of the colonial 
influence.
219
the palace were called in general iyaba but they were of various
rank and grade. The highest in rank were the iya afin, who were
usually the wives of the preceding alafin, next in rank were the
ayaba of the present alafin, then the female ilari (slave
officials) , then the ordinary slave women. The iya afin were
pristesses of orisa both in the palace and in town i.e. iya naso
of Sango and iya nkolara of ogboni who had charge of the room
where the rite of orun was performed. The iya oba was present
with the basorun when the orun rite was performed and she was the
feudal head of the basorun. The iya kere was in possession of the
paraphernalia used on state occasions and could withhold them to 
demonstrate her displeasure thereby preventing state receptions. 
The iya afin were the official mothers of male iwarefa, who could
only approach the alafin and arrange festivals and communal
labour through them. They acted as political and religious 
advisers to the iwarefa and people in the town approached them
for political favours. People gave their daughters to the alafin
through the iya afin.
There were many women ilari who besides their palace functions,
carried out administrative duties in the town. The eni-oja had
charge of the alafin's market; the olosi, one of the three
eunuchs, was under her control and shared responsibility with her 
for the market. One of the female palace officials, the obagunte,
attended all Ogboni meetings on behalf of the alafin but could
not take part in discussions. The head of the Ogboni had access
to the alafin through this woman offical who linked the Ogboni
to the osi efa and otun efa, two of the top three iwarefa palace
officials. There were also female Ogboni in their own right, one
called Erelu.
In Egbaland and particularly, Abeokuta, the Ogboni were part of
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the OJba's council. In each township Ogboni there was at least one
woman member known as the Erelu and often there were others known
as Otun Erelu, Osi Erelu, Ekerin Erelu. These women members were
selected, as were new male members by the senior Ogboni chiefs,
on the basis of merit in terms of leadership ability, wealth and 
contributions to the well-being of the town. Women generally made 
Erelu in their natal not marital towns. At times, the Erelu was
also a member of the iwarefa. Beside the Erelu, who were members
of the Ogboni in their own right, one wife of an inportant Ogboni
chief could be initiated into the society with her husband at his 
installation. When the spokesman of the Ogboni came out to
announce their decisions, bells were rung summoning people to 
listen. The townspeople could discuss and question the decisions 
and women were as free as men to do so.
Aside from the women members of the Ogboni, each township had its
own Iyalode society which was concerned with running the affairs
of women. The Iyalode was never a member of the Ogboni because
the Iyalode title was the female equivalent of the warrior line
of titles, the ologun, who were not Ogboni. The Iyalode was
originally an Oyo title adopted by Ife, Ibadan and Abeokuta. The 
powers of the Oyo Iyalode were quite limited as it was undercut
by the powers of the women in the palace such as the Enioja. In
Ife, before introduction of the title of Iyalode, there was the
title of Ojuma for the head of the women in town and the Yeyeloja
for the head of the market. These women had seats in the geru,
the courts of justice; were in charge of the market women and 
settled disputes among them. They were fulfilling the role of the 
Iyalode but the actual title, when introduced, was not regarded
as an important office.
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In Ibadan,9 government was by chiefs who were selected on merit. 
In the nineteenth century, merit was largely determined by 
military prowess. The introduction of the Iyalode title in the
1850s was in recognition of the contribution to the military 
success of the town made by a wealthy woman trader, Iyaola, who 
gave liberal credit facilities to war chiefs and fielded her own 
soldiers. In Abeokuta, founded as a result of the movement of 
population during the Yoruba wars, the Iyalode title was adopted
after 1830. Each township had its own Iyalode society but the
title of Iyalode of all Egbaland was first bestowed in
recognition of the contributions made by a woman, Madam Tinubu, 
to the defence and military prowess of Abeokuta. In the 1864 
Abeokuta-Dahomey war, Madam Tinubu was largely responsible for 
providing Egba warriors with guns and ammunitions. The Iyalode
is a town chieftaincy based on merit and its office was more 
important where chiefs rather than the Oba wielded more executive
power and where chiefs appointed on merit rather than lineage. 
The institution of the Iyalode was circumscribed; women were
given only one chief in council. Female Ogboni chiefs were not
seen as representing women as such. Women played little part in 
the administration of the Oba's palaces but selected women were
involved in the rituals of installation, death and ceremonies. 
Two women were very important; the Iya Oba or official mother and
the Moshade, who actually crowned the Oba and had to be present
at the installation of any chief. Both women were selected by the 
Ogboni.
Women's roles were largely ceremonial and they were selected for 
their roles; therefore there was no real representative element. 
Female Ogboni chiefs were not seen as representing women as such.
Their participation in the governance of the community with other 
female chiefs, however imperfect or unrepresentative, afforded 
a mode for issues affecting women to be taken into account by
9the chief city of Oyo, formerly Oyo kingdom.
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society within the existing organisational structure. The Iyalode
societies which existed to run the affairs of women were not the 
loci of power, political power was vested in the council of the 
Oba. They afforded a forum for issues affecting women to be
discussed and for representations to be made on their behalf 
before the king. While there was no sex segregation in Yoruba 
government, the participation of women in government was 
circumscribed. There was inequitable gender representation, 
limited participation which was primarily ceremonial and issues 
affecting women were regarded as separate and not a part of the 
mainstream. Discrimination based on gender was part of the 
political structure.
The civil wars of the mid-nineteenth century between the Yorubas10 
led to some modification of the governing structure. The influx 
of refugees into towns meant that it was no longer possible to 
run them on the existing basis, particularly since some of the 
refugees brought with them intact their own machinery of 
government to organise their part of town. A modified system 
evolved to accommodate this development. It consisted of a 
council of the head chiefs of the refugee groupings with one or 
two of the senior chiefs of the previous inhabitants - a sort of 
federal system. The head chief of the host town was the overall 
head of the head chiefs. The individual councils of the enlarged 
towns still functioned and looked after the affairs of their 
respective peoples.
10 for detail of the war years see Ajayi & Smith, YORUBA 
WARFARE IN THE 19TH CENTURY, Ibadan University Press in 
association with the Institute of African Studies, University of 
Ibadan and Cambridge University Press, 1971, Smith, R.S, KINGDOMS 
OF THE YORUBA, James Currey Press, 1988, particularly Part III, 
ppl09-140, Falola, T. & Oguntomisin, D., THE MILITARY IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY YORUBA POLITICS, University of Ife Press, 1984 
and Atanda, ibid.
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2.Social Organisation11
The basic unit of social organisation was and remains the ebi or
family. Seniority played a great factor. The oldest man was 
regarded as the head of the family, the baale or literally, the
father of the house. Although he took counsel with other senior 
members of the family his decision was expected to be final. He 
settled disputes and because of deference to age, each member of 
the family was required to respect and obey his or her immediate 
and other elders. On the death of the baale, the most senior male
kin took over the role.
3.Dispute Resolution and Administration of Justice
Administratively and judicially each town was divided into wards 
or adugbos which were named. The head of the adugbo was an ijoye
or olori itun. Each adugbo was made up of a number of agbo ile,
compounds, headed by a baale or olori ebi, that is, the head of
the compound or the head of the extended family. Baale is an
informal title while the ijoye's appointment must be confirmed
or approved by the Oba. The baale saw to the general welfare of
his compound and informally settled disputes. The ijoye saw to
the welfare of members of his ward. As he usually had a larger 
and more complex area to govern he had his own igbimo assisting
him in the administration of the ward. He also performed judicial 
functions and had a formal court. The court tried all civil cases 
involving persons belonging to different compounds and within his 
ward and imposed punishments. The highest court in town was the 
court of the Oba. Apart from judicial functions, the Oba and his
igbimo had legislative functions with implementation being the
responsibility of the Oba.
11 further details of social organisation is contained 
within later parts of the chapter as invariably it forms an 
intrinsic part of personal laws and customs. See later sections 
on traditional marriage and inheritance and succession.
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The approach to administration of justice in traditional Africa 
differs to that of the Anglo-American.12 Individuals related to 
one another in accordance with kinship patterns. Administrators 
of justice in communities were usually elders and rulers. There 
was no effective distinction between executive and judicial 
functions. The primary aim was to promote the welfare of their 
communities. In dispensing justice, the elders saw themselves 
essentially as peacemakers called upon to reconcile divergent 
interests, not to apply strict legal rights of one party or the 
other; the objective was to seek genuine settlement that would 
disperse feelings of rancour. Peacekeeping was the distinguishing 
feature of African traditional jurisprudence. The administration 
of justice did not have to be formal; an adult witnessing a 
dispute could, if the disputants agreed, settle it on the spot. 
A serious dispute involving members of two or more different 
families required a formal hearing.13
The Yoruba gradation of courts was initially the baale's court
i.e. the head of the compound would try and settle disputes, 
following that it would proceed to the village Chief's court 
where a settlement could not be reached, after that the district 
chief's court and finally the Oba, that is, the Alake's court on
appeal. The procedure was and remains that the disputants would 
state their case before the elders with the plaintiff stating 
his/her case first. While the case is being stated the elders can 
interrupt and ask questions and both the plaintiff and the 
defendant can also interrupt each other. Witnesses are called on 
both sides and can be questioned by the parties to the dispute 
and by the Chief. In order to reveal all the relevant facts, the 
parties are allowed to speak more than once, refuting or 
corroborating evidence submitted by anyone concerned in the 
dispute. Remembrancers, or those who recall customs and social
12Adewoye, Omoniyi, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN SOUTHERN 
NIGERIA, 1863-1943, Columbia University, PhD Thesis, 1968, 
Modern History, preface.
13 ibid, see generally Chapter 1 on indigenous dispute 
resolution mechanisms.
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norms, may be used. There were no professional advocates in 
traditional southern Nigeria but a system of quasi-representation 
was not unknown. For instance, babaogun (literally father-in­
battle) , may be used to represent one informally and behind the 
scenes, in very grave matters. The applicable law was unwritten 
and generally what was accepted through custom by the community 
as binding. After hearing the opinion of the lesser chiefs, the 
presiding chief will pronounce judgement. No one is usually 
judged wholly right or wholly wrong. In cases of disagreement of 
opinions between the elders, the presiding Chief has the final 
say. Proverbs are used.14 The guilty party is expected to 
apologise and the acceptance of the apology means forgiving and 
forgetting the cause of the dispute. The closing ceremony may 
involve the sharing of kolanut to symbolise and illustrate the 
spirit of reconciliation which underlies the whole process. It 
is meant to indicate a burying of the dispute. As the disputants 
are genuinely reconciled, there is usually no need for an appeal.
To a certain extent, religion and status regulated the conduct 
of men and women. For instance, in a dispute between a head of 
family and a minor not belonging to that family, the latter had 
to be represented by someone of the same status as the former. 
A poor member of society aggrieved by injustice suffered at the 
hands of a powerful Chief would be best represented by another 
Chief as powerful in order to have any chance of redress.
Elders are deemed to derive authority because of their role as 
guardians of the society and also because of the belief that 
ancestors are watching. Religion was, and remains, very important 
and laws derived some of their strength from religion. A belief 
in the supernatural acted also as a regulator of behaviour and 
administration of justice. Ordeals such as juju were used to
prevent perjury. Justice and morals were considered coterminous
14,1 [T]o the Yoruba, 'the proverb is the driving force in a 
discussion'", Fadipe, N.A., THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE YORUBA, Ibadan 
University Press, 1970, hereafter, Fadipe, SOCIOLOGY OF THE 
YORUBA,at 3 02.
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and the Chief was both the dispenser of justice and keeper of the 
public conscience.
The merits of the traditional system lie in its simplicity, its 
speed, its relative informality, its inexpensiveness and in its 
accessibility. It derives its legitimacy and authority from the 
values, moral and religious, underpinning the social and 
traditional political organisation of the society. There was no 
charge for a baale since he was doing his duty in maintaining
harmony in the compound. At the village chief's court, a small 
hearing fee was paid by both disputants depending on wealth and 
this could be paid in kind before the cash economy i.e. in 
kolanuts. At the end of the 'trial', the successful party had his 
deposit returned. The loser may be required to pay a fine in 
addition to losing his fee. Any money paid to the court is shared 
by the chief and his supporters. The defects of the system lie 
in the use of ordeals which were a poor substitute for thorough 
investigation. The interference of status did not allow for 
parity.
The system was subsequently undermined by the colonial 
administration. Powers that were previously shared and therefore 
checked each other were vested in one person which caused an 
imbalance. The system was further weakened by a number of 
factors; ultimate power rested with the British resident and 
District Officer; in addition, Christianity and western education 
served to foster individual independence which weakened reliance 
on the old system.
4. Colonialism and its impact
Customary law in Nigeria has been characterised by three factors; 
it is unwritten, it is accepted by the community whose affairs 
it regulates being an expression of behavioural patterns among 
a people and its sanctions may either be centralised in the hands 
of one person - a chief - who exercised that customary law on
227
behalf of the people or the community acted as a whole.15 Muslim 
law,16 although largely written, is in practice regarded as 
customary law. Customary law sources lay in tradition which may 
be interpreted differently by its subjects so there exists a real 
element of uncertainty. In addition, customary law ranges over 
social as well as legal matters; there are obligatory norms and 
there are discretionary norms. Legal norms were discretionary 
insofar as they did not impinge on an important aspect of 
community life.
Prior to the introduction of British institutions, customary law 
was the sole governing law, and the machinery for its 
administration was customary tribunals which varied from one area 
to another. For example, in the north of the country, the so- 
called Northern Territories, the judicial system consisted of the 
Emir as supreme judge acting with the advice of his Executive 
Council. Routine judicial work was entrusted to legal officers - 
the Alkali. In the West, the Foremost Chief and the rest of his 
chiefs sat in council to decide administrative and executive 
matters.17 In the East, the machinery of justice was a council 
also, but one which in theory consisted of all adult males but 
in practice was a council of family heads and other elders. 
Generally, throughout the Southern states disputes occurring 
within the family were often settled by the family or family head 
with the assistance of elders. Minor disputes involving parties 
of different families might be settled by elders of both 
families. In cases of serious disputes, perhaps matrimonial, a 
gathering of elders agreed upon by the parties would form to 
mediate on the issues.
15see Nwabueze, B.O., THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN NIGERIA, 
Butterworths African Law Series, 1963, especially Chapter 6.
16 references will only be made to Muslim law in passing 
since it is classified as customary law. It is not possible to 
deal in any depth with variations that result in rights ad status 
of women under Muslim law.
17Yoruba people occupy the south west of Nigeria and details 
of political, organisational and social structure has been 
discussed in more detail above.
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In 1900 the British government assumed complete "power and 
jurisdiction" over the entire country. The legal consequences 
were acute. "In all cases [of change of sovereignty] the result 
is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the 
municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such
rights as that sovereign has, through its officers, recognised. 
Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him 
nothing."18 Had this rule been applied strictly, customary law 
would have been completely abrogated but British colonial policy 
of indirect rule was to refrain from altering personal laws and 
to a certain extent favoured preservation of certain indigenous 
structures which ensured that customary law was given due 
consideration.
There are obvious definitional problems with customary law since 
there is no one set of customs prevailing all over the country 
or region.19
"The customary law system is made up of those rules of 
customary law and practices of the various peoples of 
Nigeria and there are estimated to be over 250 ethnic 
groups in the geographical area known as Nigeria.
These rules and practices have been given the force of 
law by virtue of some local legislation and are 
enforceable in the ordinary courts of the land subject 
to the qualification that they should not be repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, 
contrary to public policy or inconsistent with any law 
for the time being in force."20
18Lord Dunedin in Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of 
State for India (1924)L.R. 51 I.A., 357, quoted in Nwabueze op 
cit.
19see further, Park, A.E.W., THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW, 
Lagos African University Press:Sweet & Maxwell, 1963.
20Hon Justice Augie, "Women's Rights in Law and 
Practice:Social Welfare", in Obilade, A.O. (ed) WOMEN IN LAW, 
Southern University Law Center and Faculty of Law, University of
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Customary law is expressed as "...a mirror of accepted usage."21 
A particular customary law must therefore be in existence at the 
relevant time and must be adhered to by the community. Speed Ag 
C.J. said in Lewis v Bankole22 that the native law and custom
which the courts enforce must be "existing native law and custom, 
and not that of bygone days". Implied in both these statements 
is the view that customary law is not a frozen and rigid system 
but one which develops and modifies itself in order to accord 
with changes. For instance, the traditional Yoruba rule to deal 
with a situation where a man has died leaving a number of wives 
and a large number of children is to divide his property into as 
many portions as he had wives and distribute it accordingly. This 
custom is known as idi-igi. It gave rise to a number of disputes
and to avoid the expense of litigation in the newly established 
courts, there evolved an alternative custom known as ori-ojori,
whereby, if the head of the family so directed, the property 
could be divided into as many parts as the deceased had children. 
When such a situation came before the courts in Dawodu v Danmole23
it was held that idi-igi should be used since repugnancy to 
British law did not equate with repugnancy to justice.
In 1900, statutory native courts (statutory courts to administer 
justice among indigenes supposedly along the lines of traditional 
indigenous tribunals) created by the British were empowered to 
make rules embodying customary law to minimise any perceived 
vagueness. This had a procedural as well as substantive impact 
on the application of the law. Once such rules were made, they 
had the force of law. Subsequent changes in the content of 
customary law were due to four factors (i) repugnancy to the
Lagos, 1993, at 251.
21Bairamian F.J., Owonyin v Omotosho, 1961, 1 All NLR 304 at
309.
22 1 9 0 8, 1 NLR 82 at 83.
23 1 9 6 2 1 WLR 1053 and 2 SCNLR 215
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British principles of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, (ii)incompatibility with local enactments (several 
enactments were passed to outlaw what were considered to be 
undesirable practices such as trial by witchcraft or juju. In
this way, certain customs were expressly abrogated. The supremacy 
of these enactments over local law almost led to the abolition 
of trying customary criminal cases in native courts in 193324),
(iii)the influence of British law in a number of areas such as 
marriage, inheritance, land tenure and succession and
(iv)modification in the process of adaptation into rules.25
4.1 Historical Development of British and Native Courts
British Courts
There were three distinct administrations in Nigeria in 1900; the 
Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Southern 
Nigeria was served by the British Supreme Court, a court of law 
and equity. It was organised as three organs; divisional courts, 
full court and district courts. Northern Nigeria also had a 
Supreme Court but its jurisdiction was confined to certain areas. 
Outside the designated areas, the court only had jurisdiction in 
matters involving foreigners or indigenous people in the service 
of the colonials. Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated 
in 1914 and a Supreme Court was established for the whole 
country, and for each province a Provincial Court. In 1933 the 
Provincial courts were abolished. The Supreme Court was retained 
under the Supreme Court (Amendment Ordinance) 1933 but its 
jurisdiction was reduced. It was confined primarily to the 
township of Lagos where it exercised exclusive unlimited 
jurisdiction over all classes of people and matters. It also 
possessed concurrently with the Protectorate High Court, 
established to replace the Provincial courts, unlimited criminal 
jurisdiction over foreigners throughout the Protectorate and over
24see further Nwabueze, op cit. p. 7.
25see generally Nwabueze.
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indigenes in the townships. This particular jurisdiction was to 
be exercised by the High Court. The Protectorate Courts 
Ordinance, 1933 established the Magistrates court in addition to 
the High Court. Together with the native courts they were charged 
with the administration of justice in the Protectorate. In 1943 
the High Court was abolished. As a consequence the Supreme Court 
was given unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout 
the country, subject only to the jurisdiction of native courts 
in land tenure, family status, guardianship of children and 
testamentary disposition of property under customary law.26 Again 
in 1954, under the Federal Constitution, Nigeria was divided into 
three regions. In each there was a legislature with power to make 
laws for peace, order and good governance of that region within 
the field reserved for that region. A federal legislature having 
unlimited legislative competence within the federal territory was 
based in Lagos although with powers limited to certain specified 
matters in the rest of the country.
Native Courts
These were statutory indigenous courts established in each of the 
three Colonial Administrations in 1900; that is, the Protectorate 
of Lagos and the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria.
Native Courts in Southern Nigeria 1900-1914
These were initially created in 1900 as inferior courts with a 
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Court. Each 
court's base was a territorial native court area formed by 
grouping a number of contiguous villages or towns together 
without any regard for tribal or cultural affiliations. There 
were two types of native courts; a higher and lower grade called 
native councils and minor courts respectively. A native council 
consisted of the District Commissioner as President and Africans 
appointed by warrant to represent the various villages or towns 
served by the court. "The type of people who got appointed were
26Apparently, the reason for the frequent change was the 
shortage of qualified English lawyers to be appointed as judges.
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those who impressed the District Commissioner with their courage 
to come forward and meet the Europeans. The traditional rulers 
seldom passed this test, and so were, for the most part, left 
out."27 This statutory native court did not depict the traditional 
native court. The court was dominated by its president whose 
presence deprived the African members of any say in the formation 
of the court's decision which was delivered and recorded in their 
names. They played an advisory role, consulted only when the 
President needed assistance on points of customary law. Although 
the court was to apply customary law, as President, the District 
Commissioner was wont to apply law that he was familiar with, 
English law.
Prior to colonisation, traditional courts had unlimited authority 
and were supreme. Their apparent defects lay in the lack of 
efficient enforcement methods. There was no incarceration system; 
it is unclear whether this was a result of social cohesion or 
simply a lack of such a system. Statutory native courts were 
granted enforcement mechanisms such as power of arrest or by 
levying of execution as in the English practice. Prisons were 
also built. The only thing statutory native courts had in common 
with traditional pre-colonial courts was their jurisdiction over 
indigenes; jurisdiction over foreigners could only be exercised 
with their consent. Supervision of the courts fell to the Supreme 
Court which revised the cases monthly and reviewed the cases on 
appeal. The intention in setting up the statutory native courts 
was to oust traditional native tribunals. Nevertheless, the 
traditional native courts continued to function in the 
background.
Native Courts in Northern Nigeria 1900-1914
The Native Courts Proclamation of 1906, in line with Lord 
Lugard's policy of indirect rule, took note of the traditional 
system of dispute resolution in Northern Nigeria in establishing 
statutory native courts. Three types of courts were established;
27Nwabueze, at 70.
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(a)the Emir's court, consisting of the Emir and some members of 
his council, (b)the courts of the Alkalis, composed of Alkalis 
as sole judges, sitting with or without assessors, (c)in non- 
Muslim areas, where a Chief or Council existed, they constituted 
a court; in default, any number of persons might be appointed to 
form a court.
The native courts lost part of their territory to British courts 
but the subject-matter of the jurisdiction was left largely to 
customary law. In the Muslim North the Maliki code was used. 
Maliki code applied only in the native courts. It was applied 
dually with the Nigerian Criminal Code. Except in appeals from 
native courts, British courts exercised their criminal 
jurisdiction only under the provision of the Criminal Code which 
applied generally throughout the country. Any sanctions could be 
imposed by the courts as long as they were not repugnant to 
natural justice nor involved mutilation. Powers of imprisonment, 
absent generally in customary law, were granted to the courts. 
There was no provision for appeal by the British Courts nor for 
supervision by either the Supreme or Protectorate courts. The 
native courts established in Northern Nigeria more or less 
reproduced existing traditional courts.
Amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria
After amalgamation in 1914 a Native Courts Ordinance was enacted 
for the establishment of native courts throughout the country. 
The underlying principle was the preservation of existing 
structures and in the South, this meant the removal of the 
District Commissioner, now to be called the District Officer, DO, 
from the Presidency of the native courts. In the Western 
provinces, on removal of the DO, the composition of the court was 
based as far as possible on traditional native tribunals. The 
Chief's court was recognised; other courts were also established 
consisting of minor chiefs and family heads but no court was 
granted unlimited jurisdiction. In the Eastern provinces, there 
was little change except the removal of the DO. In fact, the 
courts' powers were reduced.
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Overall, though, the powers of the native courts were reduced by- 
two changes; the declaration of fifty-two townships in the 
country over which no native court could have jurisdiction and 
restriction of jurisdiction over indigenes in British colonial 
government service or who lived in a township without their 
consent. Thus, while the 1914 Ordinance tried to reinstate a 
situation of minimum disruption of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms, it also reduced considerably territorial and 
corporeal jurisdiction. There were a number of further minor 
changes to the native court system until the Constitutional 
changes of 1954 when federal government was introduced in the 
country. Each region enacted its own native or customary courts 
law, under which it established its own native or customary 
court. A Federal Supreme Court was directly established by the 
Constitution Order in 1960.
Any fusion of law has invariably been at the expense of 
indigenous customary law. Traditional courts had to conform to 
British laws and British concepts of equity and good conscience. 
The law of Nigeria is a diversity of laws - federal and regional 
statutes, customary laws, the Maliki code in the North and the 
principles of equity and statues of England and Wales.
5. Women and Colonialism28
Women had little contact and liaison with British administrators, 
so their roles as chiefs and contributors went unrecognised and 
they were not considered in the setting up of administrative 
bodies. There were three different types of administration in 
Southern Nigeria from 1914, the Sole Native Authority, SNA, 
system in South-West provinces, Warrant Chief system in South 
Eastern provinces and local township government in the colony of 
Lagos. Women were affected differently under each type of 
administration.
28see Mba, N. , NIGERIAN WOMEN MOBILIZED, op cit. in 
particular, Chapter II, 'The Effects of Colonialism in Southern 
Nigeria".
235
Sole Native Authority. SNA
Power became concentrated under a SNA and the traditional systems 
of chiefs and kingmakers who had acted as checks and balances 
were considerably weakened. This had an impact on power and real 
relations within the communities and also on relations with the 
colonial powers. The choice of a SNA was dictated by whom the 
colonial authority considered acceptable, not a person who had 
legitimate authority within the community. This meant that in 
turn, the roles and powers of women were weakened and in some 
cases lost. Some chiefs were members of the native authority 
councils with SNAs being responsible for their appointments. The 
councils were largely advisory but male chiefs were able to 
participate in the power structures such as the native authority 
councils and courts while women were not granted access. Female 
titles rapidly became vacant and meaningless. In Abeokuta, under 
the SNA system, no woman was ever a member of the advisory Egba 
Native Authority Council and no woman ever served on the native 
courts.29 The township iyalode societies remained and provided the
basis of women's organisations on a township basis. There was 
introduction of Christian titles, for instance Iyalode of all
Christians, and a channelling of female activity into the 
Christian church and this new network provided a means of 
organising women on a mass basis. At the celebration of the 
centenary of the founding of Abeokuta, women's titles were 
restored, but for ceremonial purposes only.
Warrant Chief
Under Warrant Chiefs, traditional societies and age grades lost 
their executive and judicial responsibilities which were absorbed 
by warrant chiefs and native courts. Warrant chiefs were chosen 
in what seemed an arbitrary manner30 and until 1929, no woman was 
ever chosen nor were they made members of the native courts. Not 
only were women excluded from the administration but courts also
29see ibid at 40 for further details.
30ibid at 41
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interfered with their traditional judicial responsibilities. 
Women were not allowed to discipline offending members of their 
associations. Under the warrant chief system, there was no 
consultation with men, let alone women.
Colony of Laaos
In the colony, traditional political order was retained and 
coexisted with the colonial administration.31 Women had been 
involved in the traditional government of Lagos through their 
leader, Erelu, the only high ranking female chief appointed by
the Oba. This title was retained under the colonial
administration. The Oba1s council organised a committee known as
ilu which was a unit of the palace, iga and was responsible for
maintaining law and order in town. The Lagos market women's 
associations were represented on the ilu and they were in charge
of the markets. Representatives of the market women from each 
market were invited to attend these meetings. The ilu committee
played an important role as the link between the indigenous 
traditional elite and the modern elite. Lagos Town Council, LTC, 
was responsible for markets and parks amongst other things. From 
1920 onwards, the market women and LTC were in conflict over 
allocation of stalls, fees, market sites and the maintenance of 
order and despite the connectedness of the market women and LTC, 
the colonial administration did not bring women into the council 
until 1944 when a woman called Mrs Abayomi was appointed to 
represent the "unenfranchised classes". In 1950, LTC was fully 
elected by adult suffrage and one woman, Mrs Henrietta Lawson, 
was elected. From 1953 to 1962, six women were elected but none 
were market women.
In general, women were excluded from the decision making process 
under the administration although the indigenous system was left 
intact and this excluded the influence of those disaffected by 
the administration until changes were made. What little
31ibid at 42.
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participation women had in the political process was reduced 
further and left them disaffected.
5.1 Political Activity32
In Abeokuta, the issue which rallied and politicised the women 
was taxation. In the whole of Nigeria, only women in Abeokuta and 
Ijebu native authorities paid poll tax.
The Egba United Government, EUG, was forced to propose direct 
taxation in 1914 after being threatened with the withdrawal of 
the British Government's support of the import duties on traders 
bringing goods from Lagos to Abeokuta. This proposal was a 
contributory cause to the Ijemo uprising in 1914; a mass 
demonstration against the oppressive policies of the EUG which 
required the calling in of troops from Lagos. The British 
government seized the opportunity to end the independence of EUG 
as a result of the ensuing massacre and on 1st October, 1914, 
Abeokuta was absorbed into the indirect rule administration 
consequent on amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces 
in 1914. As part of this, direct taxation was introduced in 
Abeokuta in 1917 to replace tribute and forced labour and it was 
also introduced into the other South-Western provinces by the 
Native Revenue (Southern Provinces) Ordinance No. 29 of 1918.
The attempt to carry out this ordinance in Abeokuta involved 
reorganisation of the administration and triggered an uprising 
in Adubi in June 1918. This uprising, in which hundreds were 
killed and railway and telegraph lines destroyed, was directed 
not only against taxation but also against the Egba 
administration and the changes introduced by the British 
authority. In the inquiry which followed, the most common 
complaint by witnesses was that after the men in the districts 
were conscripted for forced labour, their homes were investigated
32see Mba, ibid ppl35-164. I concentrate on activity by 
women in Abeokuta although there was political activity in other 
regions of the country, most notably the 1929, women's war in the 
East.
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by police and their wives arrested and fined for sanitary 
regulations. The general feeling was that the absence of men was 
used to exploit the women and raise additional levies. This 
mistreatment of women was one of the precipitating factors in the 
1918 rebellion but it does not seem as if the women were directly 
involved.
Tax collection in Abeokuta was the responsibility of the Ogboni
chiefs who were paid N1000.00 per annum. in return. The 
collection process was often brutal. Women were often stripped 
naked by tax collectors to see if they were old enough to pay 
tax. Such harassment was resented by the women and was severely 
criticised by the people of Abeokuta. The Abeokuta Society of 
Union and Progress, led by Reverend 1.0. Kuti, complained to the 
Alake that "The way in which our women are being treated, hunted 
down and dragged about on public streets by the alopa(sic) 
[native authority police] for non-payment of tax reflects 
unfavourably against the reputation of [Abeokuta] for progress."33 
In fact, in 1937, the society proposed that women be exempted 
from tax and men's tax increased.
The Abeokuta Women's Union, AWU, emerged from the Abeokuta Ladies 
Club, ALC, run by Mrs Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti, to represent the 
interest of women following the wider problems of price controls 
in the market and taxation of women. Membership consisted of both 
educated women and market traders. One of the first problems 
dealt with was the seizing of rice from the market sellers in 
1945 by a government contractor without payment.34 The traders had 
complained to the Assistant District Officer, ADO, who responded 
that the government requirement was for 1,800 tons of rice needed 
for Lagos and that no one in Abeokuta could sell rice until that 
need was met. The DO supported the ADO's position. A delegation 
of three members of the ALC and three members of the Nigerian
33P64:File No. 49. Important societies in Abeokuta. Cited in
Mba, ibid at 138.
34 see ppl43-145, ibid.
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Union of Teachers returned to the ADO and demanded that the 
seizure of rice be stopped. An investigation of the complaints 
resulting in the contractor being told that only the police could 
seize rice and that any seized rice must be taken to the police 
station. The delegation, with 25 rice sellers, went to see the 
Resident who insisted that all Egba people must do without rice 
until the government had fulfilled its quota and that the 
confiscated rice would not be paid for. The ALC continued to 
lobby on the issue despite the refusal of the Alake to discuss
the matter in council as controls were imposed by the government. 
The women went to press and published an appeal on 12th November, 
1945 in the Daily Service. As a result of the appeal, the rice 
control was lifted six days later in Abeokuta.
In early 1946 the ALC compiled a list of demands they termed 
resolutions on a wide ranging number of matters including 
improvements in the sanitary conditions and water supply of 
Abeokuta, financial support to adult education and importantly, 
taxation of women in Abeokuta. In the same year ALC became the 
Abeokuta Women's Union, AWU. Its diverse membership meant that 
its objectives "transcended the alleviation of hardship to the 
elimination of the causes of hardship."35 The aims and objects of 
the AWU, inter alia, were:
"To defend, protect, preserve and promote the social, 
economic, cultural and political rights and interests 
of the women in Egbaland.
To co-operate with all organisations seeking and 
fighting genuinely and selflessly for the economic and 
political freedom and independence of the people."36
In 1947 the Abeokuta Women's Union, AWU, demanded the abolition
35 at 145
36The Constitution, Rules and Regulations for the Women's 
Union, Abeokuta (Abeokuta:Bosere Press, 1948), p.l, quoted in 
Mba, ibid at 146.
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of the flat rate tax on women because they argued that women were 
already helping the men pay their taxes, women were usually 
responsible for the feeding and education of their children and 
women were already paying water rates and other SNA fees and 
therefore most of them could not afford the additional burden of 
the flat rate tax. The Alake and the British officials argued
that the women could afford to pay the three shillings per annum, 
that exemption was given to deserving cases and that Abeokuta 
could not manage without revenue from the women's flat rate tax. 
By 1946 the market women in Abeokuta felt alienated from the 
Alake and SNA Administration because of the damage done to their
interest by the flat rate tax and food price controls. With no 
representation under the SNA system, they could only appeal to 
the Alake either individually or collectively.
The crux of the women's opposition to the flat rate tax was that 
there should be no taxation without representation. The AWU 
demanded that women should be represented by members of the Union 
on the ENA council and all other committees that were concerned 
with Egba affairs. The AWU believed that only women 
representatives would protect the interests of women. The AWU 
rejected the use of violence as a tactic. They used civil 
disobedience, press releases, and demonstrations to the 
afin[palace]. The AWU considered that women's rights, interests
and freedom were being trampled on by the SNA and sought the 
abdication of the Alake who was the SNA and the SNA system. The
person of the Alake took a great deal of criticism in his role
as SNA. The strategy of the AWU was to put as much pressure on 
the Alake, Ademola II, to force him to abdicate and elicited
support from those, including men, opposed to the Alake and the
SNA system. In November, 1947 the Alake increased the flat rate
tax. Following the demonstration outside the palace on 2 9th and 
30th November, 1947, he ordered the arrest of Egba women for non­
payment of tax. The women mounted a 48 hour vigil on 9th and 10th 
December after a mass meeting of the Majeobaje Society, a men's
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society, expressed support for the women and urged the Alake to
increase the men's tax and abolish that of the women. The Alake1 s
response was that he was bound by the Ordinance of 1918 and that 
Abeokuta needed the revenue. The Resident supported the Alake.
Mrs Kuti was banned on 12th February, 1948 from the palace after 
an altercation there with the DO. In response to a five hour 
demonstration through the streets on 28th April, the Alake
finally agreed to suspend the tax on women, to appoint a 
committee to examine the tax issue and to admit to the ENA 
counci1, women.
Following these events, the Alake went on holiday to Jos. In his
absence the Ogboni chiefs who had been his strongest supporters
joined forces with the women for their own ends. They passed a 
resolution on 4th July which rejected the SNA system as "not in 
accordance with native law and custom",37 repudiated Ademola as 
the oba, charging that he had usurped their powers and privileges
especially tax collection rights and criticising him for specific 
abuses such as oppressive land and building policies and finally, 
called for an end to women's taxation.
On the Alake1s return, the Ogboni signalled their rejection of
him by the traditional method of sounding the bell and beating 
the drums. The Alake accepted all their demands, including the
end of the SNA system except for his abdication. The Ogboni
boycotted the meetings of the ENA Council and the women held mass 
demonstrations. The SNA administration came to a standstill after 
a third meeting of the council had to be cancelled and violence 
broke out on 2 6th July, when a group of young men demonstrated 
against the supporters of the Alake. On 26th July, Ademola II
relinquished his status as SNA administrator to become chairman 
of the ENA council. The women demonstrated again on 28th and 27th 
July, insisting on the Alake1 s abdication. The Resident and Chief
37quoted in Mba, NIGERIAN WOMEN MOBILIZED at 156.
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Commissioner for the Western Provinces advised him to leave 
Abeokuta after consultation because his presence was a threat to 
further disorder. Ademola left Abeokuta without formally- 
abdicating and both the AWU and Majeobaje Society continued to 
agitate for his abdication.
After Ademola's departure, an Egba Interim Council was formed to 
replace the Egba Native Authority Council. Membership of the 
council was extended to include four women who were nominated to 
represent the four sections of Abeokuta, two of whom were 
executive members of the AWU; Mrs Kuti and Mrs Soleye. Four 
additional members were drawn from the Majeobaje Society. The 
first act of their interim council was to abolish all taxation 
for women, including water rates and to increase the flat rate 
for men to compensate.
A key rationale for the abolition of taxation put forward by both 
the AWU and the Majeobaje Society was to ensure that women would 
no longer bear the burden of taxation and the men were willing 
to have their taxes increased to offset any monetary loss caused 
by abolition. Clearly, protectionist ideology underpinned the 
political activism of both the women and the men. It was 
discriminatory and inequitable to have women pay more tax than 
the men; but perhaps a more far-sighted approach would have been 
to agitate for equal taxes for both men and women. The aims and 
objects of the AWU resonate with ideals of equality and political 
representation of women which are still key issues today. Their 
fight for representation, centred on the platform of unfair 
taxation, was activism that is comparable to action for women's 
rights to this day. However, the fundamental difference lays in 
the fact that these women, while fighting for equal rights, 
accepted the complementary but secondary role ascribed to women 
by the society in which they lived. This is evidenced through the 
acceptance of a solution which allowed men to be solely 
responsible for taxation. This accords with cultural values, not 
specific to Yoruba society that men, as heads of households, are 
the primary breadwinners and bear responsibility for the costs
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of the family. Nonetheless, despite what may be considered a 
flawed approach to the abolition of taxation of women, the AWU 
managed to challenge, with the support of other groups who had 
their own agendas, the existing political structure and agitate 
for change. They wanted recognition that women need to 
participate and be represented in issues that directly affected 
them as women, and more generally, in issues that affected them 
as citizens.
However, the alliance between the Ogboni, the AWU and the
Majeobaje Society soon disintegrated. Some of the former began 
to agitate for the return of the Alake and a society was formed,
Egbe Atunluse, for that purpose. To counter the AWU, a women's
section was formed which remained in existence until its 
objective, the return of the Alake was achieved in 1950. The
Ogboni in the Egba Central Council objected to the representation
of the Majeobaje Society and the AWU on the council and worked 
against the interests of the women at every turn; for instance, 
they consistently opposed the proposal to admit women into the 
Appeal Court.38
Alake Ademola finally abdicated on 3rd January, 1949 in view of
his continuing unpopularity and unrest in the area but returned 
in December, 1950 with renewed Ogboni support. The Egba Central
Council was constituted as the native authority and comprised 13 
ex-officio chiefs, 69 members elected by adult males and four 
women appointed by the four local councils into which Abeokuta 
was then divided. The four women were Mrs Kuti, Mrs Soleye, Mrs 
Odusola and Mrs Osimosu; all executive members of the AWU. By the 
admission of women into council, Egba women were re-integrated 
into participation in the executive organ of government for the 
first time since pre-colonial days and gained a power base in 
their society although it was a power base unequal to that of 
men.
38see Mba, ibid, p. 58.
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The composition of the Egba District Council was changed at the 
end of 1950 in accordance with a new constitution drafted by the 
Egba Constitutional Council. In the newly constituted Abeokuta 
Urban District, the AUDC, the number of ex-officio members was 
increased from 13 to 19. It had originally been proposed that the 
number be increased to 23, four of whom were to be female title 
holders; the iyalode, otun iyalode, osi iyalode and ekerin
iyalode. Since these titles were vacant it was decided to
eliminate women ex-officio members rather than create new title 
holders. On the new council there were 52 elected members from 
Abeokuta town, four from Otta native authority, one from Imala 
and 35 from the districts, totalling 69. The number of women 
elected to the council remained four and this number was objected 
to.39
On 30th November, 1950 the AUDC decided by a narrow majority to 
recall Ademola as Alake. The AWU and the Majeobaje Society
directed terms under which he was to return which included non­
interference with the administration of ENA beyond executing 
duties as chairman of Egba council. There was further conflict 
over the payment of water rates by women from which they had been 
exempted since August 1948. In March 1953, a group of women were 
arrested for non-payment. Agitation over payment continued until 
the Western Region government introduced a new system of taxation 
and took over levying of water and electricity in the whole of 
the western region. Still, only women in Abeokuta and Ijebu had 
to pay the rates. The AWU continued to campaign against this and 
in 1959, Mrs Kuti was arrested for non-payment although the case 
was later discharged. The government eliminated water rates for 
women in 1960, the offical explanation given by the Premier of 
the Western Region, Samuel Akintola was that "socially and 
economically, the earnings of the vast majority of women in the 
Region are so intertwined with those of their husbands that
39Ibid at 60.
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accurate assessment of women for rates is impossible."40
Elsewhere in the country, other groups of women were protesting 
against payment of tax. In Lagos, market traders also complained 
against payment of income tax by women on the grounds that they 
were already supporting families, were paying water and 
improvement rates and they also contended that taxation of women 
in Lagos was against native law and custom. As a result of 
campaigns, the minimum taxable income was raised from N50 to 
N100.41
"The Lagos market women - like women in Abeokuta and 
the Eastern Provinces - did not accept the colonial 
administration's argument that if women earned as much 
as men, they should pay tax along with men. Nor did 
they accept the doctrines of their feminist sisters in 
Europe and America at that time, who insisted that 
women were the same as and equal to men, possessing 
equal rights and obligations - that is, that they were 
entitled to equal work for equal pay, with an 
obligation to pay equal tax. The Nigerian women 
believed rather that women were equal but separate - 
that they had special interests which must be 
protected, and that because of their place in society 
and their particular problems, they should not pay 
taxes.1,42
Indigenous Yoruba society enabled representation of various 
groups such as women who had a forum for addressing the issues
40quoted in Mba, NIGERIAN WOMEN MOBILIZED at 160.
41 ibid, p202ff for further details of activism by Lagos 
women. It was possible to tax women on their earnings because 
most women traded in markets. At the time, there was a small but 
growing elite of professional women who perhaps were teachers but 
in general, women tended to earn an income or supplement any 
maintenance from their husbands, if married, with some form of 
petty trading.
42ibid at 204.
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which affected them in the Iyalode societies. Nonetheless the
society was essentially patriarchal. Women's roles in society 
were considered secondary and complementary to men's roles and 
it appears that women themselves concurred with this. The 
political activity described above illustrates the fact that
women were prepared to take a secondary role. It will be shown 
in the next section, however, that institutionalised 
discrimination against women in Yoruba society takes a complex
form. As women and individuals, Yoruba women inherit and own 
property on equal terms. Yet, as wives, their rights become 
limited.
The political activity described above took place at the time 
leading up to independence in 1960. The description of societal
organisation, application of British laws and the uneasy mix
between the two was well in place by independence and in fact 
this structural organisation remains to date in essence with 
various amendments to laws as and when necessary. The implication 
of this for women lies in the fact that indigenous structures 
provided representation, however imperfect. Colonialism with its
importation of different political structures reduced the 
importance of these societies, introduced a different system of 
laws and organisation and detached indigenous structures of 
representation from the new locus of power; the centralised 
state. The reality is that these problems and conflicts exist to 
date.
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PART II PRESENT CONFLICTS:WOMEN'S RIGHTS 43
1.Empowerment vs Traditional Roles.
The previous section looked at political activism by women, in 
particular, Yoruba women, under colonialism in asserting their 
rights to representation and equality. This activism was marked 
by an acceptance of the societal role ascribed to women and while 
this resulted in a limited success, the principles they 
campaigned to achieve are of relevance today. The legal system 
in existence during that period leading up to independence in 
1960 remains in essence. Family matters; inheritance, property, 
divorce, custody, are still governed primarily by customary law.44 
A statutory system exists also and it is the conflict and 
potential for conflict between the two systems, particularly in 
the area of family law that impacts heavily on women and 
undermines their rights.
43In addition to academic texts, there are a number of 
reports on women's rights in Nigeria by local NGOs. See Atsenuwa, 
A.V. (ed) “Human Rights:The Nigerian Experience", Legal Research 
and Resource Development Centre, 1995, "Unequal 
Rights:Discriminatory Laws and Practices Against Women in 
Nigeria", Constitutional Rights Project, 1995 and "Eliminating 
Discrimination Against Women - The Report of a Conference 
organised by Constitutional Rights Project, CRP, and the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation", Constitutional Rights Project, 
1995. Obilade, A.O.,(ed) WOMEN IN LAW, Southern University Law 
Center and Faculty of Law and University of Lagos, 1993 and Kalu, 
A.U. Sc Osinbajo, Y., (eds) , WOMEN AND CHILDREN UNDER NIGERIAN LAW, 
Federal Ministry of Justice Law Review Series, Vol 6, General 
Editor, Prince Bola Ajibola, n.d, are excellent, comprehensive 
accounts on the status of women in Nigeria. See further, Oyajobi, 
A. , "Gender Discrimination and Fundamental Rights of Women in 
Nigeria", 1991, JHRLP Vol 1, No. 1, 75, Karibi-Whyte, A.G., JSC, 
"Customary Law of Succession in Nigeria and Wills Law" and Augie, 
A.A. , Hon Justice, "Women, Children and Nigerian Law", both in 
All Nigeria Judges Conference Papers, 1993 at 162 and 223 
respectively.
44 section 69 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 9 (Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990 rev. ed; Cap 220(formerly MCA 1970)) 
expressly excludes the application of its provisions on 
maintenance and settlement of property to spouses married 
according to customary law. See also Uzodike, E.N.U., "Women's 
Rights in Law and Practice:Property Rights", chapter 13 in 
Obilade, A.O., (ed) WOMEN IN LAW, Southern University Law Center 
and Faculty of Law, University of Lagos, 1993.
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As with the issue of women's rights world-wide, in Nigeria, 
formal legal guarantee of non-discrimination does not equate with 
reality. Section 39 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria45 provides for equality of treatment or non­
discrimination on the basis of sex. Yet examples of 
discriminatory practices, at times supported by legal enactments, 
abound. The nature of the discrimination against women is 
coloured by cultural and religious practices and varies from 
region to region and within regions. On the whole, the overview 
of the position of women in Nigeria is that of a group subjected 
to variable and often arbitrary discrimination despite formal 
statutory protection. For example, it is only a misdemeanour to 
indecently assault a girl or a woman and it is punishable by up 
to two years imprisonment while indecent assault of a man is a 
felony punishable by up to three years imprisonment.46 Covert 
discrimination in the form of administrative barriers erected to 
prevent the enjoyment of equal rights also exists; for example, 
the police do not allow women to stand bail for accused persons, 
women are not allowed tax relief on the upkeep of their children 
even when principally responsible for them whereas men are 
allowed this tax relief and a husband's consent is required to 
issue a passport to a married woman or to add the names of the 
children to her passport.
These barriers are clearly coloured by a societal perception of 
the role and value of women vis-a-vis men in society. In the 
eastern states, women cannot own land other than for use for 
farming, the principle of primogeniture in inheritance is
45 the 1989 Constitution, which was supposed to replace the 
1979 Constitution never came into force. When General Abacha took 
power in 1993, Decree 107 of 1993 was passed which reverted to 
the 1979 Constitution. A new Constitution, the 1995 Constitution 
is expected to come into force at some point in the future. At 
various points during the struggle for power in the country, the 
Constitution is usually suspended by the incumbent military 
administration although Chapter IV on fundamental rights may 
remain in force.
46see further Omorogbe, 0.0., "Perspectives on Urban and 
Rural Women",at 86ff in Obilade, WOMEN IN LAW, op cit.
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applied. The eldest male in the family holds and shares farm land 
for cultivation. Women cannot inherit land from their father of 
their husband but may be allotted land for cultivation. In the 
north, young female children may be married without their consent 
with serious health implications consequent on sexual activity 
at such an early age being endemic.47
These discriminatory practices against women are influenced to 
a certain degree by cultural and religious practices as mentioned 
above. The situation is compounded by the fact that regulation 
of family law, the site of most of these practices is, under 
statutory law, governed by the customary law of the particular 
region. Custom, a mirror of accepted usage, is not easily 
legislated against, assuming there exists the will to outlaw 
certain practices. Therefore, while the Constitution contains 
guarantees on equality of rights and principles of non­
discrimination, the ambit of its protection is effectively 
limited since a large area where its jurisdiction would be most 
useful has effectively been excluded.
Further, state ratification of international instruments is of 
limited usefulness. In order to be able to rely on certain legal 
principles, awareness of these principles is a prerequisite and 
access to justice a necessity. Legal discourse as a fulcrum for 
change is still very much a growth area. Indigenous mechanisms 
for dispute resolution still subsist and are considerably cheaper 
and more accessible for the majority of people. The recognition 
of instances of discrimination against women, however, is a 
useful starting point. It is useful in identifying the core 
areas, the problems, and the ways in which people have chosen to 
redress these problems is invaluable in seeking to identify the 
way forward to incorporate the language of rights into the most 
frequently used methods in combatting discrimination.
47see discussion of the case of Karimatu Yakubu in Chapter
2.
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The next sections will look at the nature of Yoruba women's 
rights under marriage, custody rights and property and 
inheritance rights.
"We...need to appreciate that the issue of women's 
rights (within the family as with anywhere else) is 
much affected by the competing values of [the] multi- 
systems of law."48
2.Personal status laws49
2.1 Marriage
Marriage under traditional Mores50
There are four forms of Yoruba marriage; marriage by mutual 
consent of the parties, marriage through levirate (of a brother's 
widow), the gift of a girl child in marriage by her father and 
marriage by mutual consent of the parties' relatives with payment 
of a dowry. The latter is the most typical even though social 
changes mean that the parties may have come to a mutual agreement 
to marry before the relatives' consent is sought. Where the 
family is either Muslim or Christian, the religious ceremony is 
performed in addition to traditional arrangements. The Muslim 
Nikai ceremony is performed in the case of Muslims. This of
course will give rise to certain consequences under Shar'ia law. 
In the case of Christians, the traditional ceremonies add nothing 
to the validity of marriage under English law.
Once it becomes clear that the parties intend to marry, both
48Atsenuwa, Ayodele, V., "Women's Rights within the Family 
Context:Law and Practice", in Obilade, A.O. (ed), WOMEN IN LAW, 
Southern University Law Center and Faculty of Law, University of 
Lagos, 1993, at 117.
49 see for instance, Kasunmu, A.B. & Salacuse, J.W. NIGERIAN 
FAMILY LAW, Butterworths, London, 1966.
50see further Fadipe, N.A. , THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE YORUBA, op 
cit at 65ff.
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family's relatives are involved to a large degree. They make 
enquiries to ascertain that the parties are not related, however 
distantly and they enquire to ensure that the other family is of 
good stock, for example, that there are no hereditary diseases 
in the family and that the family is morally sound. The girl's 
family is approached initially for their consent and they in turn 
consult their kin in addition to making the enquiries noted 
above. After a suitable time has elapsed they inform the boy's 
family whether the match is favourable or unfavourable. If 
favourable, the formal betrothal takes place at the ijohun
celebration which publicly marks the betrothal and it takes the 
form of the boy's parents sending on his behalf the bride price 
or the first instalment of the bride price, the payment of which 
is considered symbolic. The couple need not be present at this 
ceremony since it represents the consent of both families to 
become one family through their children. The girl's parents and 
relatives will usually be present although neither the boy or his 
male relatives will be present. The activities of both families 
do not hinder the continuation of the relationship although of 
course, if consent were withheld by the girl's family there would 
be great difficulty in continuing it since it could not result 
in marriage. Once betrothed, the male is considered the oko or
husband and the female the iyawo or bride with both sets of
relatives treating them as such. The male assumes certain 
obligations to his wife's family such as gifts of goods and 
services and manual labour when most families farmed.
Between the ijohun celebration and the day the bride is taken to
her husband's house the idana takes place. This is an important
payment by the oko equivalent to the dowry and the word itself
means the making of legal kinship. In Abeokuta, the dowry which 
is mostly symbolic, includes kolanuts, orogho, the last syllable
of which means to reach an old age, honey to symbolise sweetness 
or happiness, gin to symbolise ardency and ata, ground chilli,
perhaps for those who do not include alcohol in these matters to 
symbolise the spice of life. Traditional woven cloth is also
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included as is money the amount of which varies from district to 
district.51
After the idana, the date is fixed for the bride to go to her
husband's home by mutual agreement between both relatives 
although the father of the bride would usually set a date. The 
actual ceremony is igbeyawo which means literally the carrying
of the bride. This happens at the date the groom's family come 
to collect or carry the bride to her new home and is the nearest 
equivalent to the wedding ceremony. Of course, prior to that date 
a lot of negotiations and kinship links are established with 
consequential rights and obligations. Both parties will have been 
treated as husband and wife by their families and friends 
following the idana; the igbeyawo is simply the last act in a
line of actions to be taken by both families in ensuring that not 
only are their children compatible, but that both families are 
able to become one family. Yorubas say that you do not marry an 
individual, you marry the family. A husband is, however, not 
restricted to only one wife. It is regarded as a mark of 
distinction to have as many wives as he can afford. Each 
subsequent wife is married with the same ritual and the first or 
senior wife, and subsequent wives, if applicable, will approach 
the father and family of the intended wife for consent. She would 
also performed duties, carried out by her husband's relatives on 
the taking of the first wife, for the new bride. The Draft 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on 
the Rights of Women prohibits polygamy, except with the consent 
of both parties, under article 6(2) (a) . It is interesting to note 
that traditionally, the existing wife or wives play an integral 
part in the process of taking a new bride and in participating 
may be assumed to have concurred. Of course, there is no sanction 
traditionally for taking more than one wife and it is hard to 
envisage how an existing wife could refuse her consent unless she 
is prepared to leave the husband and any consequences that may 
follow from that course of action.
51see Fadipe, footnote 1 at 79, ibid.
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Once married, division of labour within the familial home 
consists of the wife being responsible for all household work. 
She is free to follow her own trade independently of her husband 
and he is obliged to supply her with the means for doing this. 
Her earnings remain her property. Her husband is obliged to feed 
her and give her a separate room in the compound. The wife 
retains exclusive enjoyment of her room or apartment. The right 
to remain in the home lasts only as long as the marriage. The 
right is not proprietary. This position is confirmed by the 1939 
case of Oloko v Giwa52 which held that an allotment of a house or
room by a man to each of his wives did not vest the house or room 
so allotted in the wife as her separate property. She is however 
entitled to her own property whether real or personal which she 
acquired through her own efforts before or during the marriage. 
She provides herself with clothing. Customary obligations of the 
husband include responsibility for protecting his wife against 
assaults and insults and responsibility for her debts. He is also 
directly responsible for her care.
Changes in society has meant an increase in marriage by mutual 
consent of the principal parties without payment of the bride 
price and abandonment of betrothal of girls in infancy without 
their consent. Levirate still occurs. In a recent case which came 
before the Supreme Court, Akinnubi v Akinnubi53, which was
concerned with whether the widow of a Yoruba intestacy could 
participate in the administration of her husband's estate, it was 
noted in the pleadings of the deceased's brother that the wife 
had been bequeathed to one of the deceased's brothers according 
to customary law. No pronouncement was made on this issue but it 
was mentioned also that the plaintiff wife did not agree or 
reject this decision to bequeath her but simply remained in Lagos 
where she lived.
5215 N.L.R. 31, 1939.
53 1997,2 N.W.L.R, 144.
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Statutory Marriages
Marriage under statutory law or non-traditional marriage is 
simply marriage under received English law. In 1863 the first 
ordinance on statutory marriage was enacted. It confirmed the 
existing practice of contracting Christian marriages and provided 
for the granting of licenses for marriages in Lagos. There was 
no specific provision for monogamy. This ordinance was replaced 
in 1884 by the Marriage Ordinance which was based on the same 
principles of monogamy as the English law of marriage. The 
ordinance was extended to the Protectorate in 1914. Under the 
ordinance a statutory marriage could not be celebrated if one of 
the parties was married by native law and custom to another 
person.54 Statutory marriages are regulated by the Marriage Act55 
which has application throughout Nigeria and it establishes the 
conditions and formalities for a valid monogamous marriage. 
These include the giving of notice to the registrar in the 
district the marriage is intended to take place,56 the publication 
of that notice,57 the fulfilment of residency requirements in the 
said district,58 the consent of the father or mother if the father 
is dead in the case of minors under 21 years old,59 the ceremony 
to be carried out within three months of the notice given60 in a
54 See KASUNMU, A.B.& SALACUSE, J.W., NIGERIAN FAMILY LAW, 
London, 1966 at 48ff.
55 Cap 218, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria rev. ed. , 1990,
commencement date, 31/12/1914 (as amended). This is essentially 
the same Act as the Marriage Act 1914 with amendments. 
Periodically, Laws of the Federation are compiled in one volume 
at a particular date and are cited under that reference 
irrespective of the date of the Act itself. The Marriage Act was 
previously updated in 1958 as Marriage Act, Cap 115, 1958, as
amended.
56 Section 7.
57 Section 10.
58 Section 11.
59 Section 18.
60 Section 12.
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licenced place of worship61 or under licence.62
Lord Lugard's indirect rule dictated that "[t]he British courts 
shall in all cases affecting natives (and even non-natives in 
their contractual relations with natives) recognize native law 
and custom when not repugnant to natural justice, and humanity 
or incompatible with any ordinance, especially in matters 
relating to marriage, land and inheritance."63 Section 35 of the 
Marriage Act provides that nothing in the Act shall affect the 
validity of any customary marriage. The Matrimonial Causes Act64 
also excludes the application of ancillary relief under the Act 
to customary or Muslim marriages. The repugnancy test was an area 
of tension. Whether or not a customary law is repugnant is 
decided on an ad hoc basis. However, it has been held that 
repugnancy to English law is not equivalent to repugnancy to 
natural justice.
In Dawodu v Danmole65, a case involving the distribution of the
estate of the deceased who left nine children by four different 
wives, the Federal Supreme Court in 1958 and the Privy Council 
upheld the Yoruba custom of idi-igi which provides that a
deceased's property for purposes of distribution should be 
divided into the number of parts as there are wives, each part 
to be further divided by the number of children had by that 
particular wife. The lower court, which was reversed, had held 
that idi-igi was not in accordance with modern notions of equal
treatment of children and was repugnant to natural justice. But, 
according to the Privy Council, "The principles of natural
61 Section 21.
62 Section 13.
63Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, 1913-1918, p83 quoted in 
Kasunmu & Salacuse, NIGERIAN FAMILY LAW, 18.
64 1970, Cap 220, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990,
commencement date 17/3/70.
651962, 1 WLR, 1053.
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justice, equity, and good conscience applicable in a country 
where polygamy is generally accepted should not be readily 
equated with those applicable to a community governed by the rule 
of monogamy. 1,66 Conversely, in Edet v Essien67 an action by the
plaintiff to claim the two children by his former wife on her 
remarriage on the grounds that they belonged to him as she had 
not paid the bride price was disallowed on the ground that it 
outraged notions of justice.
Nevertheless, the situation continues as it is with both 
customary and statutory methods of marriage co-existing. Many 
parties will perform both forms of marriage - traditional and 
civil - and if both parties are Muslim, the Nikai ceremony will
be performed also, since a Christian wedding fulfils both the 
religious and legal criteria. It is possible that many parties 
to a marriage may perform up to three ceremonies to fulfil 
traditional, legal and religious requirements. Each of course 
give rise to different rights, obligations and responsibilities 
and on dissolution different rights accrue. It is therefore 
difficult to ascertain which law to apply on dissolution. It has 
been held68 that a Church marriage supercedes a prior or 
subsequent customary union. It has also been held, in Jadesimi
v Okotie-Eboh,69 that a second marriage under the Marriage Act to
the same woman under customary law converts a potentially 
polygamous marriage to a monogamous marriage and all that ensues.
Should customary law, which includes Muslim law, be applied or 
statutory law? This potential conflict was not so easily 
resolved. "Marriage, whether under English or customary law, 
works a transformation of status and creates extensive legal
66ibid at 1060.
671932, 11 N.L.R. 47.
68 Salubi v Nwariaku, 1997 5 N.W.L.R., 442 per Akintan JCA at 
463, para C, a Supreme Court case.
69 1996 2 N.W.L.R. 128, Supreme Court decision.
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consequences fundamentally affecting not only the spouses but 
their children and relatives as well."70 Should a man and woman, 
and their children, ordinarily subject to customary law on 
contracting a marriage under the Marriage Act thereby become 
subject to the entire body of received law or should only 
particular acts be so governed? The courts have decided that 
English law of intestate succession is to be applied to the 
estate of a deceased person who married under the Marriage Act71. 
They also seem to indicate that the English law of legitimacy 
will govern the status of children born during the existence of 
an Act marriage.72 The problem is that the English family law in 
force in Nigeria developed in response to social and economic 
conditions of England. Is it rational, therefore, to apply 
English law completely to an Act marriage where, except for the 
monogamous nature of the union, spouses and their children are 
living a customary and traditionally African way of life?73 The 
tendency has been to apply customary law unless there is an 
intention, either express or implied, that English law is to 
apply, evidenced perhaps by a written will. Yet that will may be 
the only non-customary action of the deceased.
Nowadays, where marriage is contracted according to statutory law 
under the Marriage Act, the terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act
70Kasunmu & Salacuse, NIGERIAN FAMILY LAW at 27.
71see Administrator-General v Egbuna, 1945, 18 N.L.R 1.
12Cole v Akinleye, 1960, 5 F.S.C. 84.
73Kasunmu & Salacuse argue that in deciding what law to 
apply, the opinion of Van Lare, J.A in the 1959 case of Coleman 
v Shang should have a bearing:
"We are of the opinion that a person subject to 
customary law who marries under the Marriage Ordinance 
does not thereby cease to be a native subject to 
customary law by reason only of his contracting that 
marriage The customary law will be applied to him in 
all matters, save and except those specifically 
excluded by statute, and any other matters which are 
necessary consequences of marriage under the 
Ordinance."
1959, G.L.R. 390, at 401.
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apply on dissolution and it governs custody and property 
settlement.74 The relevant statutes are generally received English 
law; that is, the common law of England and the doctrines of 
equity, together with the statutes of general application that 
were in force in England on the 1st January, 1900 .75 Where within 
a customary union there is evidence, express or implied, that 
English law is to apply, then it will apply. In Jadesimi v
Okotie-Eboh16, the issue was whether a 1947 will executed by the
deceased was revoked by operation of the law following marriage 
in 1961 under the Marriage Act to the same woman he had married
under customary law in 1942 and to whom he remained married until
his death in 1966. The marriage under the Marriage Act was valid 
as a monogamous marriage and converts the customary marriage into 
a monogamous marriage, the sort of marriage contemplated by 
section 18 of the Wills Act 1837, the statute of general
application. Revocation of a will by marriage under section 18 
could not possibly have been envisaged in a situation of a 
remarriage by the same two persons. It was held that statutes of 
general application could be curtailed by local circumstances and 
if it had been the deceased's intention to vary or revoke the 
will he would have done so. Since he did nothing, he must have 
intended the will to remain in place.
74 See below on dissolution, custody and property rights.
75 Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, Cap 192 Laws of the 
Federation, 1990 which states:
(1)Subject to the provisions of this section and except in so far 
as other provision is made by any Federal law, the common law of 
England and the doctrines of equity, together with the statutes 
of general application that were in force in England on the 1st 
day of January, 1900, shall, in so far as they relate to any 
matter with the legislative competence of the Federal 
legislature, be in force in Nigeria.
(2)Such Imperial laws shall be in force only so far only as the 
limits of the local jurisdiction and local circumstances shall 
permit and subject ti any Federal law.
(3)For the purposes of facilitating the application of the said 
Imperial laws they shall be read with such formal verbal 
alterations not affecting the substance as to names, localities, 
courts, officers, persons, moneys, penalties and otherwise as may 
be necessary to render the same applicable to the circumstances.
76 1996, 2 N.W.L.R., 128
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For our purposes, tension between the two systems is relevant 
because of the precedential nature of existing case law prior to 
the establishment of an element of certainty in the applicable 
law. The application of statutory law in certain instances has 
led to a significant improvement in the rights of women and at 
the same time, dismissal of certain customs on the grounds of 
repugnancy to natural justice will not have taken into sufficient 
account the societal structure which gives rise to the custom or 
the organisational and indigenous political structure that may 
exist to validate such customs. This in no way supports clear 
instances of discriminatory or blatantly unjust customs but it 
is important to identify that well-intentioned legal changes may 
leave a vacuum and deprive the parties, who are intended to 
benefit from the changes, of support within their society.
2.2 Dissolution
Yoruba custom does not recognise divorce within the meaning it 
has in English law. Under custom, a Yoruba woman cannot, or 
rather, should not be married more than once. Separation and 
ultimately estrangement is keenly discouraged and both parties' 
kin will always intervene to reconcile the parties however 
bitterly the reasons for separation are felt. Parties are 
expected to overcome any disagreements to make the marriage work 
and are under severe pressure to remain married. The pressure 
to remain married is further maintained because children are 
regarded as belonging to their father. A wife who feels compelled 
to leave her husband would also have to leave her children and 
so many women remained married despite any unhappiness they may 
feel. Exceptionally, a wife may divorce her husband for "habitual 
laziness, drunkenness, bad company (such as associating with 
burglars) and infectious disease."77 Divorce, when unavoidable, 
was effected by ife, refund of what was paid during courtship.
On divorce, the woman loses the right to be provided with a home 
and she must vacate the matrimonial home. Where a Muslim marriage
77Fadipe, N.A., op cit note 3 at 90.
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has also taken place it is possible that divorce will be affected 
by requirements under Islamic law. It is debatable which 
customary law will take precedence and the reality is that 
estrangement and ultimately dissolution will be affected by both 
Yoruba custom and Islamic law. Dissolution of a Christian 
marriage is in essence dissolution of a statutory marriage and 
is governed by statutory law. Section 15 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act78 lists the ground for dissolution of marriage which 
is irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This may be demonstrated 
in certain ways, including, non-consummation, unreasonable 
behaviour and adultery. Section 69 of the Act expressly excludes 
the application of its provisions on maintenance and settlement 
of property to spouses married according to Muslim law or 
customary law. The Supreme Court has also held that the Married 
Women's Property Act, 1882, a statute of general application, 
does not apply to Muslim or customary marriages.79
2.3 Custody
Under statutory law, section 71 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
provides that the best interest of the child is paramount and the 
court may make such an order as it considers proper. Under Yoruba 
customary law, the mother has no custodial rights on dissolution. 
Under Islamic Law, priority is given to the mother as long as she 
remains unmarried. Custodial rights do not automatically revert 
to the father were the mother to remarry; female maternal 
relations in the order prescribed in the Qu'ran would have 
custodial rights.
78Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 rev.ed., Cap 220
(formerly MCA 1970).
19Amadi v Nwosu , 1992, 5 N.W.L.R. 273 at 282.
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2.4 Inheritance and Property Rights80
The economic organisation of the Yoruba, particularly, with 
regards to control of land, is essentially communal. Allocation 
was according to need, a young man on marriage is allotted a 
portion to farm or use as he wishes and he has considerable 
rights over it.81 There have been changes in this form of communal 
ownership, influenced by modernisation and industrialisation but 
no doubt there still exist within communities, the understanding 
of communal access and control over familial land.
Succession82
Historically, no wills were made. On intestacy, real property 
devolved on the children as family property. However, oral 
deathbed dispositions were not unknown. The general requirements 
were that the gifts should be made in the presence of capable 
witnesses, the beneficiary need not be present and dispositions 
were not limited to property. It is possible to create family 
property by will83 although it is not necessary since the children 
who are supposed to benefit would in any case take by operation 
of the law. A will, may however, be useful.to vary the operation 
of the law and custom on participation by members, to include 
other members or designate a different head of the family.84
Yoruba custom dictates that the eldest son succeeds the father 
after death. Responsibility for and care of, younger siblings
80see Fadipe, N.A. , op cit note 3, ppl34-146. See also
Coker, G.B.A., FAMILY PROPERTY AMONG THE YORUBAS, London and 
Lagos, 1966, especially chapter 2 on and tenure in Nigeria and 
Lloyd, P.C., YORUBA LAND LAW, Nigerian Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, Ibadan, OUP, 1962.
81see further, Fadipe, N.A., op cit, ppl69-180 on 
traditional Yoruba land ownership principles.
82 see Coker, G.B.A, op cit., Chapter 11.
83 Ceaser A. A. Young v Benjamin A. Young, February, April- 
May 1953, W.A.C.A. Cyclostyled Reports, pl9, cited in Coker at 
250.
84 see Coker, G.B.A, op cit., at 251.
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will devolve on him. Any matter to which the family would look 
to the father, such as the resolution of the marital problems of 
his married sisters or half-sisters, would be brought before him. 
He is followed in line by the second eldest son. Within the 
extended family, seniority is the governing factor and the most 
senior male member of the family is made the head. He is 
responsible for the maintenance of peace, order and stability 
within the community of the extended family. This invariably also 
necessitates the material means to support and maintain the 
status of the family within the wider community.
Inheritance
Traditional Yoruba85 custom stipulates that the principal 
beneficiaries86 of the deceased are his mother's children, male 
and female. His children have no right to their father's property 
which can be asserted against his siblings. The latter had a duty 
to provide for the deceased's widow(s) and children. The children 
are generally allowed to remain undisturbed in the compound and 
use and possession of farm land was undisturbed. Adult children 
who are married and had previously been allotted land for 
maintenance during their father's lifetime had land he left 
divided up among his sons. Property left by a woman are governed 
by the same principles; her siblings are her principal 
beneficiaries. This custom remains valid but the rights of the 
deceased's children to be principal beneficiaries of their 
parents is now recognised in Yorubaland. In a recent case, Rabiu
v Abasi87 it was held that real property of the deceased under
Yoruba customary law goes to his children to the exclusion of the 
other blood relations; therefore the grandchildren of the 
deceased whose children predeceased her do not share in family
85 There are variations to this among the different Yoruba 
groups.
86Kasunmu & Salacuse, op cit, chapter 15 on succession under
customary law.
87 1996 7 N.W.L.R. 505
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property.
Family Property88
The Yorubas have a system whereby the immoveable property of the 
head or founder of the family, usually the father/husband, 
becomes family property for the use and possession of his 
descendants, both immediate and future, on his death or 
intestacy. Family property is created by the act of the parties 
or by operation of the law. Historically, people did not create 
family property as such, it was understood that the property of 
the founder of the family becomes family property for the use and 
possession of future generations. The nature of title of the 
original owner is immaterial to the creation of family property.89 
The founder may buy it, inherit it or simply dedicate the 
property as family property.
All the children, male and female become owners of the property 
and possess the absolute title to the property. It is not 
possible to alienate one's share or interest in family property; 
it is a possessory right. Improvements to property by a family 
member does not divest it of its original character as family 
property.90 Should partition or sale of the family property occur, 
the children take per stirpes, the share of their deceased 
ancestor. Family property should exist for the benefit of the 
family as a whole, every member of the family has a right of 
enjoyment of the property including residing in it and it cannot 
be disposed of by will, although it may be created by
see generally, Coker, G.B.A., op cit., note 80. 
Succession and inheritance has been modified by religion, 
particularly Islamic law and the devolution of family property 
as described in the following pages may differ from family to 
family, Yoruba group to Yoruba group.
89 ibid at 71.
90 Rabiu v Abasi, 1996 7 N.W.L.R, 505
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testamentary disposition.91 Where rents are collected from the 
property by a child of the family from a part of the property 
allocated to her, the action does not convert family property or 
that part thereof into the property of the child. Family property 
is inalienable either inter vivos or by testamentary disposition. 
However, it is possible to effect sale of family property92 
through the head of the family with the consent of the principal 
members of the family. Sale by one or more members of the family 
without the consent of the rest is voidable. The interest of 
family members is limited in size not duration.93 Alienation of 
a limited interest in family property is not recognised in native 
law and custom.
The general rule is that the eldest son, Dawodu or heir, becomes 
the head of the family on the death of the father. He assumes the 
management and control of the affairs of the family for himself 
and the other children.94 This is in accordance with traditional 
custom. It has been held that a woman can be the head of a 
family.95 It was held recently, however, that the right to be 
appointed head of a family is not a civil right under section 
33(1) of the 1979 Constitution.96
The head of the family is required to carry out his duties fairly
91 Coker, op cit. at 71.
92 Coker regards sale of family property as an innovation 
brought about by impact of other systems, ibid at 51.
93 as per Lewis v Bankole, 1 N.L.R 82.
94see Olowu v Olowu, 1985, 3 N.W.L.R. 372.
95Lewis v Bankole, 1908 1 N.L.R. , 1929, 82. This decision 
was further confirmed in the 1986 case of Folami v Cole, 1986, 
2 N.W.L.R. Part 22, p367. So, if a female is the eldest child she 
becomes the head of the family.
960kechukwu v Etukokwu 1998 8 N.W.L.R, 513. This case had no 
gender aspects but rather turned on who had the right to be 
appointed head of the family and whether it was a right that 
could be protected under the Constitution. The court held that 
it was not a civil right.
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and equitably. While he is not liable to account to the family 
for rents and profits derived from the family property, if he 
squanders funds and does not use them for the management of the 
property, he may be removed as head of the family.97
Family members' rights98 in family property is as follows:
1. Every member has the right to reside in the family house.99
2. Every member has the right to be consulted in any dealings 
with the family property.100
3. Every resident member has a right of ingress into, and a right 
of egress, from the family house, and non-resident members have 
no such rights.
4. No member has any alienable interest in the family property.
5. Males as well as females have equal rights in the family 
property.
6. No one has a right to build his own house on family property 
without the consent of the others.
7. Every member has a right to ask for partition of the property 
if his rights are denied him.
8. Every member has a right of entry into the family house for 
the purpose of attending family meetings and, if a member of the 
family council, also for the purpose of viewing its state of 
repair.
9. The different branches of the family are entitled to be 
represented per stirpes on the family council and to share the 
proceeds of any alienation of the property in such proportion.
97 see further Coker FAMILY PROPERTY AMONG THE YORUBAS at 
174-75.
98 Coker, ibid at 132.
99 The right to occupy is not of de facto residence. The 
right may be attached to rents, for instance. See Coker at 133. 
Hovever, the rights of the children and wives of the founder of 
th= family to reside on family property are fundamental. Ibid at 
135.
100 The right to be consulted is qualified as 'the right of 
the principal members of the family to be consulted' . Aganran v 
Oljshi 1 NLR 67 per Pennington J. at p69, quoted in Coker at 139.
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10. The management of the family property and control of all its
affairs are powers vested in the head of the family.
Family property can be determined101 by alienation, partition or 
destruction of the whole property. A court may order sale of the 
family property where such a sale would be advantageous to the 
family and where the property is incapable of partition and there 
is no other way of providing a remedy for the claimant. Any
member of the family can ask for a partition but there needs to
be strong reasons, such as interference or obstruction in the 
exercise of rights attached to family property, given for the 
request. Where the property is partitioned, each part becomes the 
absolute property of the grantee. Allotment of rooms or premises 
for use by the head of the family does not vest absolute title 
in the allottee.102 The death of a family member determines his or 
her interest. Any children of the deceased member entitled to 
succeed to family property do so by operation of the law not 
through the parent. Forfeiture of a family member's interest 
affects the whole of that person's family unit. Forfeiture may 
occur through misconduct bringing the family into disrepute such 
as criminal acts or attempted alienation of an interest in the 
property without consent.
Women's rights under family property103
A man's affluence was measured by the number of wives he had104 
and are guarded as part of his property. Wives are considered to 
constitute part of the founder's immoveable property since they 
continue to be attached to the family after death. A widow with 
children is entitled to stay in the family property as long as 
her children are there and she is not obliged to leave by any
101 see Coker Chapter 5.
102 ibid at 113.
103 see Coker at ppl78-185 on women.
104 To some extent, this still remains an indication of 
affluence.
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rules of native law and custom. A widow without children is not 
entitled to any portion of the husband's property. She could be 
taken on by any junior male member of the household and thereby 
remain as a member of the family on that basis, but otherwise, 
she has no rights to remain. While succession to family property 
is substantially patrilineal, women as daughters and sisters are 
entitled to participate in family property together with males.105
An essential characteristic of the right in family property is 
that of the right to possession (although may be attached to 
rents etc) and participation in family meetings and councils. 
However, possession is difficult for women to exercise on 
marriage as she is considered to be a part of her husband's 
family and will moreover, be living elsewhere. Further, practical 
problems of distance from the natal home may preclude 
participation in family meetings and involvement in family 
affairs. This will restrict in practice a woman's right to enjoy 
her share of the family property. In law, however, it is 
established that " [b]oth sons and daughters inherit certain 
rights in their father's land".106 Men and women have equal rights 
to reside on the family property. "All his children are entitled 
to reside there with their mothers and his married sons with 
their wives and children. Also a daughter who has left the house 
on marriage has a right to return to it on deserting or being 
deserted by her husband. "107 In Thomasia Ayoola Ricardo v John
Lajorin Abal,108 it was held that a woman's sex does not deprive
her of her fundamental rights as a senior member of the family 
in relation to junior members in age of the family. On partition
105 Nimota Sule and others v Ajisegiri 13 NLR 146, quoted in 
Coker at 44, footnote 14.
106 Coombe C.J. at 54 in Mariana Lopez v Domingo Lopez 5 NLR 
50, 1904, quoted in Coker, ibid at 144-5.
107 Carey J. at 86 in Frank Akiremi Coker v George B. Coker 
and others, 14 NLR 83, quoted in Coker at 145.
108 7 NLR 58, Coker at 145.
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men and women take in equal proportions.109
A woman is not barred from inheriting from either parents or from 
siblings under Yoruba custom.110 As members of the family, 
daughters and sisters, women enjoy in theory full rights in the 
use and enjoyment or the proceeds thereof of family property. 
However, on marriage, their rights are de facto curtailed because 
they are considered full members of their husband's family and 
are expected to participate and concentrate their efforts on 
their new family. Obligations that are a corollary to the rights 
of family property membership such as participation in family 
meetings and councils, consultations on family matters may not 
be capable of being fulfilled and, in practice, this may be 
regarded as curtailing the rights. Fundamentally, the most 
important right of family property membership is possession and 
by residing elsewhere, most women, on marriage, unless they have 
returned on divorce or separation, will not be able to fulfil the 
most fundamental right.
As wives, women do not inherit from their husbands nor do men 
inherit from their wives. It has been said that, "a wife could 
not inherit her husband's property since she herself is, like a 
chattel to be inherited by a relative of her husband."111 The 
customary law position has been further supported in case law 
which confirmed that Yoruba native law and custom deprived the 
wife of inheritance rights in her deceased's husband's estate 
because devolution of property followed blood.112
Widows in effect have no rights and such rights that they do have
109 Nimota Sule and Others v M.A. Ajisegiri, 13 NLR 146, 
cited in Coker at 145.
110see Adedoyin v Simeon, 1928 9 N.L.R. 76 at 77-78.
niJibowu, F.J. in Suheru v Sunmonu, 1957, 2 F.S.C. 31.
112see Sogunro-Davies v Sogunro-Davies and Ors, 1929 2 N.L.R 
79 at 80, statement of Beckley J.
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are dependent on the right of their children, if any, to 
residency in the family property. The rationale for this lack of 
rights may be attributed to the whole notion of family property. 
All women will have some rights in the family property of their 
natal home. However, having not exercised that right during the 
duration of their marriage, they may be estopped, not in law 
(since they are entitled to return to the property by law) but 
in practice, from exercising that right after the death of their 
husbands because they will not have been able to perform the 
obligations of family property membership. Consequently, upon 
marriage, women's rights with regard to family property falls 
into the interstices between law and practice.
Yoruba native law and custom previously discriminated against 
women in that rights in the family property favoured men. This 
was confirmed in Marina Lopez v Domingo Lopez113 when Combe C.J.
said that originally, "the rights of the daughters of Yorubaland 
were not the same as those of sons with regard to their father's 
property." But in Salami v Salami114 it was held that the
plaintiff's right to inherit her father's estate along with her 
two brothers was not diminished by her sex. Under present Yoruba 
customary law, daughters have the same rights as sons over their 
father's property. They are entitled to remain in the family 
house. These rights do not terminate on marriage and in the case 
of divorce they may return to the family house with their own 
children.115
As noted above, under indigenous law and custom, wives and 
children succeed to real estate as family property. In order to 
be entitled to live on family property, the woman must have been 
married to the man according to traditional rites.116 The
1131924 5 NLR 50.
1141957, W.R. N.L.R 10.
115see Coker v Coker, 14 N.L.R. 83.
116 see supra, p251-254 of this work.
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important essentials of a valid customary marriage are the 
consent of the bride and her family and the giving and acceptance 
of ano or dowry.117 The legitimacy of the children is not an issue
and does not affect succession. There is no essential difference 
in Yoruba law between children born out of wedlock and those born 
within (although the concept of illegitimacy118 exists) as long as 
paternity is acknowledged.119
"...Under native law, a child's right of succession to 
his father's property can be legalised by mere 
acknowledgement of paternity, without the necessity of 
any form of marriage between the parents."120
Succession is essentially patrilineal, the legitimacy of children 
has no bearing on the right to succeed as long as paternity is 
acknowledged, a widow's right to remain in the family property 
depends on whether she has children and if she does, having been 
married under traditional rites, she may remain with them. A 
woman not married according to traditional rites may remain in 
the house if she has acknowledged children but if she has no 
children and is not a widow, she has no right to live in the 
family during the lifetime or after the death of the man. Male
117 Coker at 262. See also pp260-261 for details of the 
marriage ceremony. There exist variations in the ceremony as 
performed by different communities. N.A. Fadipe's description of 
the ceremony, described above differs slightly from Coker's and 
may be accounted for by the different practices if varying Yoruba 
communities.
118 Omo ale or an illegitimate child is the child of an 
adultress or unmarried woman; the latter being really someone 
whose partner is not easily identifiable. A couple may live 
together as husband and wife and will be considered and referred 
to as husband/oko or wife/aya and their children will not be 
considered illegitimate.
119 see Coker, pp263-274. A child may be legitimated and once 
paternity is acknowledged will succeed to family property.
120 Re Sapara, quoted in Coker at 266.
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children remain in the family home and can live there with their 
wives and children. A daughter may remain in the house and even 
after marriage may return with her children to live there.
Statutory Law121
If a person dies testate, the disposition of the property is as 
prescribed under law. The will may be made under the statutory 
wills law or customary law. If a person dies intestate, the 
devolution of the property will be according to the laws the 
deceased used during her lifetime with the type of marriage 
contracted during the deceased's lifetime used as an indication. 
Under common law, either spouse can inherit from the other, 
whether or not the deceased died intestate. Thus, while under 
customary law neither the husband and the wife can inherit from 
the other, a wife cannot deprive her husband of inheriting her 
estate by testamentary disposition. "There are still some 
recognised status which at customary law affect the capacity to 
make a will. For instance a wife cannot by the exercise of 
testamentary disposition deprive her husband of his right to 
succession in her estate."122
On dissolution, settlement of property within a marriage under 
the Marriage Act123 is governed by section 72 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act; that is, the court may order such settlement to the 
children of the marriage or either or both parties that it 
considers just and equitable in the circumstances. Application 
for relief must be made in the petition. An applicant for relief 
need not have made any contributions to the property.124
121see further Atsenuwa, Chapter 7, ibid and Uzodike, E.N.U, 
"Property Rights", Chapter 13 in Obilade, A.O., WOMEN IN LAW, op 
cit.
122Karibi-Whyte J.S.C. in Idehen v Idehen, 1991 6 N.W.L.R., 
Pt 198, p382, a Supreme Court case.
123Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 rev. ed. , Cap.
218.
12AKafi v Kafi, 1986, 3 N.W.L.R. Part 27, 175.
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On intestacy under statutory law, Section 3 6125 of the Marriage 
Act applies to people who marry under the Act and its application 
is restricted to the geographical area of Lagos. It has however 
been held in a Supreme Court case, Salubi v Nwariaku,126 that
although section 36(3) restricts the application to the Colony 
of Lagos, the interpretation given to the section by the courts 
is that its provisions are applicable throughout Nigeria. The 
estate which would under English law go to the Crown is 
distributed in accordance with Customary law. The personal and 
real estate of the deceased is distributed in accordance with the 
provisions of the law of England relating to the distribution of 
personal estates of intestates i.e. the Statutes of Distribution, 
1670, Administration of Estates Act, 1685 and Intestates Act, 
1890 .127 The widow of an intestate with issue is entitled to one- 
third of the deceased's estate with the remainder distributed 
amongst the issue in equal shares. If there are no children, the
12 5 Section 36 Marriage Act, Cap 115, Laws of the Federation, 
1958 :
(1) Where any person who is subject to native law or custom 
contracts a marriage in accordance with the provisions of this 
Ordinance, and such person dies intestate, subsequently to the 
commencement of this Ordinance, leaving a widow or husband or any 
issue of such marriage; and also where any person who is the 
issue of any such marriage as aforesaid dies intestate 
subsequently to the commencement of this Ordinance
The personal property of such intestate and also any real 
property of which the said intestate might have disposed by will, 
shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of the law 
of England relating to the distribution of the personal estates 
of intestates, any native law or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding: Provided that -
a)where by the law of England any portion of the estate of such 
intestate would become a portion of the casual hereditary 
revenues of the Crown, such portion shall be distributed in 
accordance with the provisions of native law and customs, and 
shall not become a portion of the said casual hereditary 
revenues; and
b)real property, the succession to which cannot by native law or 
custom be affected by testamentary disposition, shall descend in 
accordance with the provisions of such native law and custom, 
anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding.
126 1997 5 N.W.L.R. 442 at 464-465.
127see Uzodike op cit., note 44 at p324.
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widow is entitled to half with the remainder devolving on the 
deceased's kin. It has been held that children born outside 
marriage to a deceased on his intestacy may share in his estate 
because under section 39(2) of the Constitution no one shall be 
subjected to deprivation by reason of the circumstances of his 
birth. Consequently, the court in Salubi v Nwariaku128 deemed the
term “illegitimacy” as unconstitutional and illegal, a 
progressive ruling which is consonant with Yoruba customary law 
which does not recognise the concept of illegitimacy.
Section 36 is not contained in the Marriage Act, Cap 218 Laws of 
the Federation 1990 and is presumably repealed. Its omission from 
the 1990 compilation of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria was 
noted in Salubi v Nwariaku129 but there was no decision on whether
it had in actual fact been repealed based on that omission since 
on the facts of the case, the section 36 applied to the marriage 
in question having been contracted under Cap 115.
The principle in Cole v Cole130 applies on the death of an
intestate who marries according to Christian rites outside the 
colony, i.e. not under the Marriage Ordinance, as it was then, 
in which case English law of succession will prevail over native 
customary laws.
Generally, women married under statutory law are entitled by law 
to inherit parts of both their deceased husband's real and 
personal property. Daughters are entitled to share equally with 
their brothers the real and personal estate of their father. 
There is no discrimination in law as to who may apply for letters 
of administration; the wife131 is entitled to do so jointly with
128 1997 5 N.W.L.R, 442 at 470.
129 At 460 ff.
130 1898, 1 N.L.R., 1929, 15
131 Under Yoruba customary law, a widow under an intestacy is not 
entitled to apply for a grant of letters of administration nor
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any of the children who have attained majority. The core problem 
in these cases, however, is that custom is predominantly
enforced.132 This may be due to ignorance of rights under the law 
or pressure by kin to follow tradition. If death rites are
performed according to custom, pressure to deal with property 
after burial according to tradition may not be easily avoided. 
Enforcement of rights using the legal system is not common; 
financial constraints may be a factor and perhaps also an 
unwillingness to go through the legal process. Where there is no 
legal support for discrimination, cultural practices militate 
against women's rights.
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,133 which Nigeria has ratified without reservations 
requires States Parties, under article 2(f) and under article 5, 
to take appropriate measures to abolish customs and practice 
which constitute discrimination against women. While this work 
concentrates on Yoruba women, who tend to be discriminated
against primarily as wives, there exist worse instances of
discrimination across the country in differing customary 
traditions. Case law demonstrates that judges do not always 
question the validity of customary laws or indeed the gender 
aspects of customary laws in the light of Constitutional 
protection, regional treaty obligations and international treaty 
obligations. For example, in a 1994 case, Olowu v Olowu,134 Bini
customary law on inheritance was confirmed. The eldest or first 
son of the deceased inherits exclusively the last house where the 
deceased lived and died and if he had only one house, the first
may she be appointed as co-administrator of her deceased 
husband's estate. She may, however, successfully sue on behalf 
of her children as their next friend. Akinnubi v Akinnubi 1997 
2 N.W.L.R, 144.
132 see Obilade, WOMEN IN LAW op cit which is good is 
illuminating the disparities between law and custom and how this 
affects women.
133 UN Document A/34/46.
134 4 N.W.L.R, 90, a Court of Appeal case.
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son inherits the house to the exclusion of all the other 
children. The case concerned the estate of a Yoruba man who 
naturalised as a Bini man. One of the deceased's sons contested 
the devolution of the property under this tradition amongst other 
issues. Ige J.C.A said on that matter, “If the appellant has any 
grudge against Bini Native Law and Custom he should have objected 
to his father's naturalisation as a Benin man in the lifetime of 
the father and not wait to contest ownership of a house which he 
was looking forward to inherit. ”135
As mentioned earlier, in the case of Akinnubi v Akinnubi, the
deceased's wife was bequeathed to the deceased's younger brother 
according to tradition. Since the tradition is correct the court 
made no comment on the practice or the value judgements behind 
them. Once the customary law or tradition has been verified, the
courts tend not to question the law itself or at least consider 
any gender aspects which ought to be incorporated for a modern 
society. Discriminatory practices also breach article 18(3) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which says that 
“The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination 
against the woman and the child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions”. Yoruba customary on custody of the 
child belonging to the father clearly breaches Nigeria's 
obligations under CEDAW, since Yoruba women do not have equal 
rights of custody or guardianship. Current practice also breaches 
article 4 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the rights of Women on equality between 
the sexes, article 6 (2) (b) on equal rights in marriage and 
article 6(7) on equal rights with regards to children. While 
Yoruba women already have the right to own and acquire 
property(article 6(8)), there is clearly room for improvement in 
relying on regional and international rights obligations for the 
promotion and protection of women's human rights in Nigeria.
135 Ibid at 97.
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The legal system in Nigeria has resulted in the existence of 
plural law of rights and succession to property on intestacy. 
Some of the elements of customary law are clearly discriminatory. 
This is to a certain extent compounded by Constitutional 
provisions for the application of customary law in the area of 
personal laws. The provision of section 20 of the 1979 
Constitution provides that the State shall protect and enhance 
Nigerian culture. Is this irrespective of whether certain 
cultural practices are discriminatory and contrary to specific 
sections of the Constitution and in direct contradiction to 
Constitutional provisions for the equal and non-discriminatory 
application of the law?
The Land Use Act136 provides another illustration.137 In southern 
Nigeria generally, the mode of ownership of land is communal 
ownership with possessory rights allowing use but with the land 
being held by the head of the family on behalf of the whole 
family. Under section 1 of the Land Use Act, 1978, all land 
within the territory of each state of the country became vested 
in the governor of that state who holds in trust and administers 
the land for the use and benefit of the entire people. All urban 
land came under the control and management of the governor of the 
state with land in rural areas controlled and managed by the 
local governor in the area of jurisdiction in which the land is 
situated. Those who held land subject to customary law became 
entitled to a limited right described as a customary right of 
occupancy. The right and power of families over such land is 
limited in the sense that only the local government in the area 
in which the land is situated can grant the customary right of 
occupancy. In urban areas, they are entitled to a statutory right 
of occupancy which is granted by the governor of the state.
Section 24(a) of the Land Use Act, 1978 provides that in the case 
of a customary right of occupancy, the devolution of the deceased
136Cap 202 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 rev ed.
137 see Uzodike op cit., note 44 at 301.
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occupier's right shall be regulated by the customary law existing 
in the locality in which the land is situated. Most customary 
laws of succession exclude women from benefiting, the Act further 
entrenches the custom which excludes women from inheriting. The 
supremacy of customary law in the area of family law means that 
the status quo with regards to discriminatory practices remains 
with little likelihood of change unless the judiciary takes 
action. This is difficult since most statutory enactments 
specifically state that the regulation of, for instance, property 
and inheritance are outside the scope of the enactment which tend 
on the whole to be fairer.
"Customary Laws were formulated from time immemorial.
As our society advances, they are more removed from 
its pristine social ecology. They meet situations 
which were inconceivable at the time they took root.
The doctrine of repugnancy in my view affords the 
courts the opportunity for fine tuning customary laws 
to meet changed social conditions where necessary, 
more especially as there is no forum for repealing or 
amending customary laws. I do not intend to be 
understood as holding that the courts are there enact 
customary laws. When however customary law is 
confronted by a novel situation, the courts have to 
consider its applicability under existing social 
environment."
CONCLUSION
Gender discrimination in Nigeria, based on the study of the 
Yorubas, is institutionalised in a complex form. A distinction 
is made between a woman as a daughter and sister and a woman as
138Nwokedi, J.S.C in Agbai v Okogbue 1991, 7 N.W.L.R., Part 
204, 391 at 417, also quoted in Obilade, A.O., WOMEN IN LAW at 
314 .
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a wife. Once a women is married and becomes a wife, she is 
regarded as her husband's responsibility and she is expected to 
defer to his judgement and authority as head of the family. 
While she may work, own property, real and personal and maintain 
her own finances, she remains co-dependent with regard to her 
role with her husband within society. As a result of this lower 
status she suffers instances of discrimination; she requires her 
husband's consent before she can be issued with a passport or 
have her children added on to her husband. This sort of 
administrative barrier is not sanctioned by law but is a direct 
result of the lowlier status of women in society.
In terms of education139 and opportunities for education; the 
wealth and education of parents play a large role in determining 
the sort of education their children, male or female, receive. 
The 1979 Constitution contains provisions for equal and adequate 
educational opportunities at all levels. The constraints against 
equality of opportunity include gender stereotyping in who needs 
the opportunity (women marry so do not need much, if any, 
education), sex stereotyping in occupational choice, school 
location and religious and cultural factors which may result in 
early marriage. Low female enrolment140 in schools is a reflection 
of the sexual division of labour in most homes. Girls are kept 
at home to help parents (their mother) with household chores or 
with petty trading. If the girl child tries to combine both it 
will obviously affect her schoolwork. Education is seen as an 
investment and parents prefer to give boys the opportunity of 
education as they are seen to carry on the family line and their 
education in that case enhances the status of the family.
Within the home, while no customary law prescribes domestic 
violence as lawful, there is tacit approval when it is considered
see Omorodion, F.I., "Women's Rights in Law and 
Practice:Education", chapter 9 in Obilade, WOMEN IN LAW.
140 see Chapter 2, Part III, on Regional Institutions for 
figures on school enrolment under the section on the Lagos Plan 
of Action.
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as chastisement or correction of the wife. Section 55 of the 
Penal Code allows chastisement of one's wife as long as it does 
not amount to grievous hurt and if correction is recognised by 
the applicable customary law. Grievous hurt includes deprivation 
of any member or joint, loss of an eye, hearing or the power of 
speech, inter alia.141
As with rights issues, in general, formal protection does not 
always equate with real rights protection. In terms of women's 
rights, the institutionalisation of gender discrimination based 
on prejudicial attitudes that are woven into the fabric of 
society, its rituals and norms; its culture, make it difficult 
to redress the balance through law alone. Attitudes need to 
change and with it the elements of cultural heritage which play 
a large part in perpetuating the institutionalisation of gender 
discrimination.
Cultural values are undoubtedly a fundamental and essential part 
of any society. They inform the organisation of the society, both 
political and social. They are however, dependent on a complex 
structure of familial and community relations to operate 
successfully and effectively. These values, whether they have the 
force of law or are moral imperatives evolve from a certain web 
of rights and obligations which must remain sufficiently intact 
for the values to have continued legitimacy and efficacy. The 
complex web upon which the values depend deliver the rationale 
behind certain rules and norms.
However, custom itself evolves and societies do not remain 
static. Given the specificities of a country like Nigeria, an 
artificially constructed state that has not yet developed or had 
the time to develop a sense of cohesion or national unity, local 
communities within the state, and the customary values and laws 
of that community (demarcated along ethnic lines perhaps) are
141 s241 Penal Code, Cap 89, The Laws of Northern Nigeria,
1963 .
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going to attach a preponderant importance to the people of that 
community as opposed to a detached federal government to which 
they have no immediate or obvious allegiance. Where customary 
laws are inadequate and inappropriate for modern life because 
they are discriminatory and because that discrimination is gender 
based, rights protection and enforcement under international 
treaty obligations is going to be extremely difficult. First of 
all, human rights are rights against the state and the state is 
not generally regarded as a protector of rights,142 secondly, the 
government does not represent the will of the people in any 
sense143 nor is it accountable and thirdly, because it is removed 
from the rules that govern the personal issues of most people 
having devolved that responsibility to customary law, the 
relevance of government/state and any kind of action in these 
areas is a moot point. Therefore, the notion of enforcing 
individual rights in this manner, if we overlook cultural 
relativist arguments for the moment, is a non-starter. The 
fundamental hindrance to reforming certain elements of culture 
is that of allegiance in a fragmented state. It affords 
continuity, stability and reassurance against a background of 
political instability which further detaches citizens from the 
state.
Notwithstanding this intransigence to change, one of the 
essential elements of custom is that it is susceptible to change. 
Nigerian is a rapidly developing and evolving country. The 
structures upon which certain norms depend are changing. There 
are movements from rural to urban areas. The extended family 
network upon which family property, for instance, depends on for 
its success in the provision of a home for future generations no 
longer exists in the way it did when the notion was most useful. 
If possession is the sine qua non of inheritance in family 
property and most of the family are dispersed, inevitably, if the
142 see for example, Civil Liberties Organization Annual
Report 1993 op cit.
143 see Chapter 3 on self-determination.
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property is not partitioned, it will be sold. In time, one 
customary law will be modified and ultimately changed. This also 
means that for women, who perhaps always had a natal home to 
return to on divorce that they will have no safety net. The 
customary law that women do not inherit from their husband is 
dependent on the idea of family property. If this no longer 
exists, or if their limited right becomes attached to rent, not 
only is the purpose of family property defeated, we now have 
women for whom no provision is made because of changes in 
society. Where this sort of situation exists, notwithstanding any 
formal customary law rights, women will find themselves 
dispossessed and discriminated gainst by the operation of the 
law.
These difficulties make it imperative that feminist theory on the 
issue of the protection of women's human rights take note of the 
effect of culture. All societies have gender based 
discrimination. But the specificities of a dynamic society with 
no state welfare, authoritarian government, increasing 
industrialisation and the upheaval of traditional societies means 
that groups of women will find that they have little or no rights 
protection.
PART III FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
Cultural practices which affect women, whether adversely or not, 
tend to be those of a personal nature i.e. personal status laws. 
These tend to be regulated by customary law. It is the difference 
between cultures in its regulation of these acts within the 
private sphere which gives rise to concerns for women's rights 
since their rights are more likely to be affected in these areas. 
The relegation of these issues to the private sphere has its 
roots in Western ideology144 which effectively separated issues
144 see Kim, N. , "Towards a Feminist Theory of Human 
Rights:Straddling the Fence between Western Imperialism and 
Uncritical Absolutism", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol 25, 
1993, 49 at 67-68.
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affecting women from the spheres of power. This same argument is 
being advanced under the guise of cultural relativism with 
regards to acts in the private sphere affecting women.
Feminist critique of cultural practices which are manifestations 
of institutionalised gender discrimination suffer the same charge 
of cultural imperialism as proponents of the universal nature of 
human rights standards.145 There is without doubt the danger that 
practices of other cultures are viewed from an ethnocentric146 
position which informs reactions to them. That reaction itself 
may also be uninformed of the interconnectedness of the social 
framework within which these practices operate. On the latter 
point, Nzegwu147 is of the opinion that the role of women within 
a society must be properly understood in its context, the values 
attached to that role and the worth of an individual must be 
contextualised rather than applying value judgements from another 
culture in determining the status of women. She argues that the 
mono sex system misunderstands the dual sex system, where sex 
difference are valued, because the dual sex system seems to value 
motherhood and the complementary role of women which Western 
feminists classify as the loci of women's oppression. She points 
out that the dual sex system values women within these roles and 
they are accorded due respect such that women's roles are not 
identified with oppression. The refusal of women to identify 
their roles in their culture as oppressive is misunderstood and 
interpreted by Western feminism to mean that they do not 
recognise their own oppression.
In practical terms, however, what is seen as discriminatory
145 see Chapter 2, Part I on cultural relativism vs 
universalism.
146 see further Gunning, I., "Arrogant Perception, World- 
Travelling and Multicultural Feminism:The Case of Female Genital 
Surgeries", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 23, 1991-1992, pp 
189-248.
147 Nzegwu, N. , "Gender Equality in a Dual-Sex System:the 
case of Onitsha", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol 
7, 1994, 73.
283
behaviour will depend on the positionality of the observer. Non- 
discriminatory behaviour means equal treatment but if women in 
Nzegwu■s dual sex system are of the view that they are valued in 
their roles and, further they have representative roles within 
their society, then the issue of equal treatment is moot. Their 
needs are perceived to be fulfilled by the society in which they 
live. The problem with illustrations and examples of societal 
organisation in which women have participatory roles is that not 
only have these structures been affected and even decimated by 
European influence and colonialism, these structures are no 
longer the loci of political power they once were. Yet, the 
disconnection between the formal state as the guarantor of rights 
and the community of heteregoneous ethnicity is such that these 
structures retain an importance even without political power.
Further not all cultural practices are discriminatory. As 
illustrated with the Egba Yoruba, while it is primarily 
patrilineal, women have equal rights of inheritance and take in 
equal shares. Conversely, however, there is clear discrimination 
in terms of custody rights. Discriminatory acts are not all 
pervasive. A woman, married or not, can hold property, real or 
personal, she can work but she will not inherit from her husband. 
This lack of capacity to inherit from her spouse may be traced 
to the concept of family property. Obviously, in other parts of 
Nigeria there are differences and differing discriminatory acts; 
for instance, the Igbos practice primogeniture. The crux of the 
problem seems to be that customary law developments have not kept 
apace with modern, industrial developments and the concomitant 
demands of an increasingly individualised society. Where 
traditional structures have been eroded, new developments such 
as societal support have not developed quickly enough to replace 
them.
In critiquing cultural practices, we need to remember that 
cultural development is an intrinsic part of the right to self- 
determination and any challenge to culture challenges the right 
of a people to determine how they live. Notwithstanding this
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critical point, the former societies which represented women and 
their concerns no longer exist in the same form as before. 
Political power no longer rests with traditional rulers and 
traditional forms of ruling. Feminism, as a tool of empowerment, 
is important in making women aware of their legal and political 
rights within the new system of political power. Feminism can be 
a tool to enable women to participate fully, bad governance 
permitting, in their political systems. Participation, based on 
legally enforceable women's and human rights, in the cultural 
milieu of each women can enable challenges to any oppressive and 
discriminatory cultural practices on the terms of that society. 
Whatever the dictates of culture, however women's roles are 
valued in a complementary aspect, political power in the modern 
state is important. Feminism, through its various148 challenges to 
the legal order can enable the inclusion of women in the 
political structure. Reliance on other legal principles such as 
self-determination and the right to development, particularly, 
the inclusive and participatory elements of both, will ultimately 
assure that women, whatever their culture, can enjoy full rights 
as enumerated in the international bill of rights and under 
CEDAW. The necessity for feminist legal theory to be 
representative in terms of race and culture, as factors which 
affect the ability of a large proportion of the world's women to 
be economically, socially and culturally equal, cannot be 
underestimated.
148 see Chapter 4, Part I (1) on concept (s) of women's rights 
for the various challenges.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The failure of dominant trends of feminist legal theory to 
represent all women stems, not in its inapplicability to all 
women, but in its present omissions as to salient defining traits 
which must be comprised within the theory. Race is important in 
efforts to combat all forms of discrimination. In a human rights 
context, culture and its effects are extremely important. 
Cultural relativists arguments inherently challenge human rights 
law. Yet, the primary site for institutionalised discrimination 
is within the private sphere where cultural practices are 
dominant. Feminist theory rests on solipsism and makes the 
personal political. It is therefore imperative to have the 
diversity of all women's experiences and how they experience it 
represented in feminist legal theory. Feminist legal theory must 
challenge and must have the capacity to challenge all forms of 
discrimination however complex and whatever its form.
This work stated at the outset that feminist legal approaches to 
international human rights law fail African women in the 
reconceptualisation of the legal order. Identification of this 
failure is important because feminist theory can work to ensure 
equal rights for all women. By the same token any identified 
omissions are equally important because not all women will be 
represented within the substance of that theory. While striving 
for equality between men and women, we must not overlook equality 
between all women and equality for all women.
I began this work to try to explore if there existed a concept 
of African culture that could promote and protect women's human 
rights in Africa as distinct from a Eurocentric perspective. From 
the outset I was convinced of the value of feminist approaches 
in identifying the differences of women's experiences, working 
towards a recognition of these experiences and assuring women's 
rights in all strata of society. Had there existed an alternative
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African form of protection, the thesis would have developed along 
the lines of finding a common ground in working towards 
protecting women's rights despite any identified differences in 
approach.
What I discovered during the course of my research was that there 
certainly existed culture within differing African communities 
but that there did not exist an African legal or political 
culture that differentiated Africa from other parts of the world 
save in its development. Developmental aspects are of course 
important because they affect implementation and because they 
serve as a continuous reminder of the unequal balance of power 
between many African countries and the developed world. That 
should not obfuscate the fact that legally, in terms of rights 
protection, African institutions are predicated on the same 
principles as other regional and international institutions. I 
have been unable to ascertain in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, the African Charter on Children's Rights or in 
the Draft Protocol on Women's Rights any quintessential African 
value or model of rights protection nor did I find there to exist 
in African regional mechanisms, political or economic, an 
intrinsically African model of organisation. The promulgations 
and the institutions follow an established pattern of 
organisation and are based on the same legal principles as other 
regional and international models.
It is a fact that different groups of people have different 
cultures. I do not believe that values attached to different 
groups differ fundamentally with regard to human rights 
standards. Culture is important; it is the lifeblood of a 
community. I believe that all peoples should have the right to 
organise socially in whatever manner they wish but with a form 
of rights protection. Cultural manifestations of 
institutionalised gender discrimination is predominantly located 
in the private sphere, it is within the private sphere that 
women's rights are adversely affected and therefore it is 
important not to allow arguments of culture and cultural
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relativism to obfuscate the gender based aspect of this form of 
discrimination. It is my opinion that arguments of cultural 
relativism are arguments to preserve institutionalised gender 
discrimination or gendered relativity. Feminism is about women's 
experiences and how social, cultural and economic factors are 
experienced differently by women; but this leads to essentialism. 
Culture is about socialisation and it is therefore possible, in 
making public women's experiences, to influence a change in that 
socialisation. Feminist legal theory and the methodology of 
essentialism can influence change in any cultural setting but 
only if the theory itself is not distilled into a particular 
female experience. At present, essentialism represents White 
middle class Eurocentric women. It needs to be imbued with other 
factors, such as the cultural manifestations of institutionalised 
discrimination within the private sphere in other regions, to 
enable challenges to be made in those other settings using the 
same methodology.
For example, native law and custom among the Yorubas is 
predicated on an extended familial basis which consists of rights 
and obligations or duties among members of the family. 
Traditional society has however been affected and transmuted by 
a variety of factors; colonialism, post-colonialism, increasing 
industrialisation, movement from rural to urban areas and a 
societal organisational framework of the state which exists 
independently of the smaller regional communities which are 
identified along ethnic lines. Allegiance of individuals, 
generally, is primarily to their communities, followed by their 
wider ethnic affiliation and finally by identification of 
nationality with the state. This disparity or dislocation of 
allegiance means that, in effect, the role of the state in the 
protection of cultural mores is detached. It also means that 
there is limited perception and identification of the state as 
the protector of rights. Consequently culture and customary rules 
and regulations are important regulators of that community and 
are not readily abandoned.
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The role of the family in Yorubaland, as within other 
communities/ is paramount. Within the family, women have a 
circumscribed and complementary role. Personal status laws are 
defined by roles within the family. While it is primarily 
patriarchal, the rationale for this may be ascribed to the status 
women have within the society. Daughters in general, have equal 
rights to sons in the use and possession of family property, the 
paramount property in any family unit. Wives do not because the 
legal effects of their marriage do not restrict in any way their 
rights in their natal home. In practice, because on marriage they 
are considered a part of the husband's family (custody and rights 
to the children of the marriage belonging to the father) their 
role in the use and possession, and participation in family 
affairs of the family of birth, is considerably constricted. De 
jure, according to native law and custom, they have full rights, 
de facto, their rights are limited. Coupled with the lack of 
rights in their marital home based on the rationale that they 
have rights elsewhere, women find themselves in an anomalous 
position of having little de facto personal status rights.
Therefore, on divorce or widowhood, women may find themselves 
without rights of maintenance or inheritance since statutory 
ancillary relief provisions do not apply to customary marriages. 
Custodial rights belong traditionally to the father or to his 
family on his death. Since family property belongs to all the 
members of the family equally and can usually not be alienated 
or may only be alienated with the consent of all the members of 
the family, it is difficult to realise proceeds of any share a 
woman may need to support herself on divorce or widowhood. It is 
of course open to her to return to her family of birth to take 
possession, but this may mean that she has to leave her children 
with her husband, or his family, if he is dead.
The complex nature of personal status laws and its effect on 
women cannot be readily remedied without an appreciation of the 
society in which those women live. A woman's right depends and 
is inextricably interwoven with the rights of other members of
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her family and cannot be easily extricated. While there have been 
changes in society, the changes have not been sufficient to 
enable the promotion and protection of individual rights without 
the alienation of other rights within the family unit.
The realities of culture and indigenous law and custom will 
transform individual rights protection into a battle among family 
members. The existence of a modern state and the notion that 
individual rights, being rights against a state, do not take into 
account allegiance, cohesion and unity within a state. Primary 
allegiance and identification remains with one's ethnic grouping 
and its modes of organisation, political and social. Therefore, 
in the area of personal laws, without an understanding of and 
sensitivity to culture, rights protection within the 
international framework of individual rights against the state 
offer an incomplete solution for women living within a cultural 
framework that merges the rights of the family. Therefore, 
feminist approaches to international human rights law needs to 
be informed by the realities of culture.
Cultural differences inform the type of gender subordination 
suffered by women. Given that feminist theory primarily developed 
in the West, the main thrust of the theory has been concerned 
with issues important in that context although they may have 
application in other settings. By definition, it omits issues and 
concerns intrinsic to another culture because it is not based on 
the complexities of societal organisation and gender 
subordination in that milieu. The value of feminism is that it 
advocates participation and inclusion. Its application is not 
limited to a particular culture although some of its substance 
is. But, as a potentially representative force for all women, its 
substance needs to be informed by the values of other cultures 
so that it may be successfully applied outside its context of 
origin.
In any multicultural setting, race and racial discrimination are 
important factors which shape the experiences of groups of
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people. Women who are part of a racially defined group will 
experience life differently to women who are part of the dominant 
culture. Women of the same race who are ethnically different will 
have different experiences in different locations. Racial 
discrimination and gender discrimination are not mutually 
exclusive. The accumulative effect of these forms of 
discrimination shapes the life experience of Black women. Their 
experiences will shape their solipsism and this in turn will 
affect approaches to combatting their particular form of 
discrimination. Issues of race and an understanding of how race 
affects or compounds gender subordination need to inform feminist 
legal theory.
In Chapter 3, I discussed self-determination and the right to 
development to illustrate how both these rights either in theory 
or in application have not resulted in parity between men and 
women and how they have not resulted in autonomy for women. 
Institutionalised discrimination has hindered their application 
to women even though both self-determination and the right to 
development are inclusionary, participatory legal principles. If 
culture is about socialisation, it is in the implementation 
mechanisms and in efforts to implement women's human rights that 
we must imbue with a sensitivity to the specificities of that 
culture. It does not mean that human rights have no application 
to that culture; it simply means that we must endeavour to give 
it cultural legitimacy. To do this we need to be aware of the 
practical effects of culture, developmental factors that may 
hinder implementation and seek to ensure recognition for women's 
human rights within any societal structure. Feminist approaches 
to international human rights law, being an inclusionary theory, 
can enable this. Reliance on established legal principles such 
as the right to development and the right to self-determination 
and their participatory, accountable elements can allow us to 
claim women's rights in all strata of society, whether it is in 
the public or private sphere.
Accepting that feminist legal theory has value in application to
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other settings apart from its place of inception, it is important 
that the theory is informed by the effects of culture and
cultural practices which will affect its implementation. Women's 
rights are an integral and indivisible part of human rights. 
Cultural relativist arguments challenge the application and more 
importantly, the implementation of human rights. Consequently, 
cultural relativist arguments also challenge feminist legal 
theory. Feminist legal theory itself challenges the legal order 
on which human rights are based on the grounds of its
androcentric and exclusionary nature and through its various
concepts attempts to introduce a more inclusionary element.
The legal order on which the Nigerian legal system is based is 
derived from a western colonial heritage and consequently 
feminist challenges to the patriarchal structure of that legal 
system and order subsists. At the continental level, regional 
organisations such as the OAU are based in substance and form on 
existing models of regional organisation and rely on the same 
legal principles. Again, feminist challenges to that legal order 
subsists.
Additionally, these regional organisations make reference to 
African values and their protection. I have attempted to 
demonstrate that there is no notion of 'African Values' evidenced 
in these organisations. Not only do the regional documents on 
human rights protection not exhibit an identifiable notion of 
African values, it is impossible for a continent to have values. 
Secondly, they are based on internationally recognised principles 
and refer to their allegiance to these values and thirdly, their 
institutional models are based on established international and 
regional models of rights protection. The recent adoption of the 
Protocol of an Africa Court of Human Rights demonstrates this 
point. Further, even if there existed such a notion of African 
Values, these values are specifically gendered and on that basis 
are to be challenged on internationally accepted principles for 
the promotion and protection of women's human rights. Where 
values which may be termed African exist, they exist in social
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relations and organisations and especially in the context of 
personal status laws. The importance of feminist theory as a 
political force is evident in this context. Indigenous modes of 
political organisation had established mechanisms for some form 
of representation of women, however imperfect. The colonial 
heritage of most African states introduced new laws and 
regulations and decimated a lot of the existing structures. 
Artificial states comprised of heterogenous groups with different 
cultures and languages became subject to a new political power 
from which they were and remain disaffected. Political 
instability, lack of social cohesion, little allegiance to the 
state, little or no identification with the state save in 
nationality issues, have all resulted in a disaffected populace. 
Although indigenous mechanisms of government and social 
organisation have little political power nowadays, they still 
subsist and people are attached to them. In spite of the cultural 
lag and reduced political participation in these systems, they 
retain an incalculable value for many groups.
Yet, the only way to achieve change and political power is to 
participate in the 'new' political system. As part of the general 
process of the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Nigeria, as part of the democratisation process and the struggle 
for accountable, representative, transparent government, the 
protection of women's rights as human rights must be integral. 
Feminism, as a theory of empowerment, can enable women to fight 
for political power and obtain representation in the present 
political system. It can do this because of its inclusionary 
nature. It can do this if it is informed by issues of race and 
culture and if essentialism means all women's essentialism.
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APPENDIX
DRAFT PROTOCOL 
TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND  
PEOPLES1 RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS PROTOCOL:
CONSIDERING that Article 66 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights provides for special protocols or agreements if necessary to supplement 
the provisions of the African Charter and that the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government has in June 1995, endorsed the decision of the African 
Commission on Human and People's Rights to elaborate a draft protocol on the 
Rights of Women;
CONSIDERING that Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights enshrines the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status;
CONSIDERING also that Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights calls on all African states to eliminate all discrimination against 
women and to ensure the protection of the rights of women as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions;
RECALLING that women's rights have been recognised and guaranteed in all 
international human rights instruments, notably the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and are now
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recognised as being inalienable, interdependent and indivisible human rights;
NOTING that women's rights and women's essential role in development have 
been reaffirmed in the United Nations Plans of Action on the Environment and 
Development in 1992, on Human Rights in 1993, on Population and 
Development in 1994 and on Social Development in 1995;
CONSIDERING also that the plans of action adopted in Dakar in November 1994 
and in Beijing in September 1995 call on all Member States of the United Nations 
to take concrete steps to give greater attention to the human rights of women in 
order to eliminate all forms of discrimination and of gender-based violence 
against women;
NOTING that Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter on Human and People's 
Rights recognise regional and international human rights instruments and African 
practices consistent with international norms on human and peoples' rights as 
being important reference points for the application and interpretation of the 
Charter;
CONCERNED that despite the ratification of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights and other international human rights instruments by a majority 
of African States and their solemn commitment to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women, discrimination against-women in Africa continues;
NOTING that many people in Africa continue to perceive human and peoples' rights as 
being the exclusive preserve of men despite the fact that women play a fundamental 
role in peace and development in Africa;
HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING:
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ARTICLE 1
For the purposes of this present Additional Protocol, and in conformity with Articles 2 
and 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights discrimination against 
women means any distinction, exclusion or restriction based on sex whose effects 
compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women - 
regardless of their matrimonial status - on an equal basis with men, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in all aspects.
ARTICLE 2
Women shall enjoy on the basis of equality with men the same rights and respect for 
their dignity and contribute to the preservation of those African cultural values that are 
positive and are based on the principles of equality, dignity, justice and democracy.
ARTICLE 3
In order to eliminate effectively all forms of discrimination against women, State Parties 
to this Protocol shall take all necessary measures to integrate a gender perspective in 
their policy decisions, legislation, development plans and all spheres of life.
ARTICLE 4
In order to attain equality between the sexes, State Parties to this Protocol shall:
a) take specific positive action in those areas where discrimination against women in 
law and in fact continues to exist;
b) Modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
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which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for men and women.
ARTICLE 5
In conformity with Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights, States Parties to this Protocol shall:
a) never sentence pregnant women to death;
b) prohibit all forms of trafficking;
c) prohibit the commercial exploitation of prostitutes;
d) prohibit medical or scientific experiments on women;
e) prohibit all traditional and cultural practices which are physically harmful to women 
and girls and which are against recognised international norms (including force- 
feeding, genital mutilation, infibulation, etc.
f) protect women against rape and other sexual assaults as war crimes and punish 
them as such.
ARTICLE 6
1. No marriage shall take place without the free and full consent of both parties.
2. The minimum age of marriage for men and women shall be the same and shall not
be less than the age of majority;
a) Polygamy shall be prohibited except otherwise consented by both parties;
and in any country where polygamy exists, the law shall strive to work towards its
elimination;
b) Women shall have the same rights as men in marriage;
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3. In order to be legally recognised, every marriage shall be recorded in writing and 
immediately registered, in the presence of the husband and wife, with the competent 
authorities;
4. The husband and wife shall by mutual agreement choose their place of residence;
5. A married woman shall have the right to keep her maiden name, to use it as she 
pleases - jointly or separately with her husband's surname - and to give her maiden 
name to her husband and children;
6. A married woman shall have the right to retain or change her nationality or to 
confer it on her husband and children;
7. A man and a woman shall have the same rights and responsibilities towards their 
children;
8. During her marriage, the wife shall have the right to acquire her own property and 
to administer and manage it freely; and in cases of joint ownership of property the 
husband and wife shall have the same rights.
ARTICLE 7
1. Divorce or annulment of a marriage shall be effectuated only by judicial order. 
Women shall have the same rights as men to seek divorce or annulment of a 
marriage and, after divorce or annulment, with respect tot he children and property of 
the marriage.
2. It shall be prohibited to subject widows to inhuman, humiliating and degrading 
treatment.
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3. In the case of death of one spouse, nobody shall have the right - whatever the 
matrimonial regime - to deprive the surviving spouse of the right to live in the former 
matrimonial home. The surviving spouse shall have the right to continue to live in 
the matrimonial residence as long as need be and if the general interest of the 
family has been taken into consideration.
4. After the death of the husband, the widow shall be by law the guardian of the 
children and she shall have the right to remarry if she wishes;
5. A widow shall have the right to inherit her husband's property.
ARTICLE 8
With reference to Article 7 & 25 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, States Parties to this Protocol shall:
a) take all appropriate measures to facilitate the access of women to legal services;
b) put in place adequate structures to inform women and make them aware of their 
rights
ARTICLE 9
In conformity with Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
States Parties to this Protocol commit themselves to:
a) take specific positive action to promote the equal participation of women in the 
political life of their countries, ensuring that:
b) women can participate without any discrimination in all elections;
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c) women are represented equally with men in all electoral and candidate lists;
d) include women equally with men at all levels of the development and execution 
of state policy.
ARTICLE 10
1. In conformity with Article 23 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, women shall have the same rights as men to promote and maintain peace 
and to live in peace.
2. State Parties to this Protocol commit themselves to take all appropriate 
measures to involve women, on an equal basis
a) in programmes of education for peace and a culture of peace;
b) in the structures for conflict' prevention, management and resolution at local, 
national, regional and international level, in particular within the mechanisms of the 
OAU;
c) in the local, national, regional and international structures for the establishment and 
management of camps for refugees and displaced persons and for the distribution 
of food.
3. State Parties additionally commit themselves to reduce military expenditure 
significantly in favour of spending on social development, while guaranteeing the 
effective participation of women in the distribution of these resources;
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ARTICLE 11
1. On the basis of Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in 
this Protocol violence against women shall mean all acts directed against women as 
women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, or psychological harm or 
suffering, including the threat of such acts; or the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on 
or' deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life.
2. State Parties to this Protocol commit themselves to take all appropriate measures 
to:
a) prohibit all forms of violence against women - physical, mental, verbal or sexual, 
domestic and family - whether they take place in the private sphere or in society and 
public life including sexual harassment, sexual abuse or exploitation, rape, etc.;
b) identify the cause of violence against women and take measures to eliminate 
such violence;
c) punish perpetrators of such violence committed against women;
d) Provide for the rehabilitation and reparation for victims of such violence.
ARTICLE 12
1. In conformity with Article 17 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
women shall have equal opportunities with men.
2. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:
a) eliminate all discrimination towards women in education;
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b) eliminate all references in text books and syllabuses to the stereotypes which
perpetrate such discrimination.
3. State Parties shall take specific positive action to:
a) promote an increased literacy rate among their citizens and in particular 
among women;
b) ensure that primary education is free and compulsory for all and that secondary 
education is free and compulsory for girls.
c) promote the education of girls by providing free education through grants and 
bursury.
ARTICLE 13
With reference to Article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
States Parties to this Protocol shall guarantee women equal opportunities to work.
In this respect, they commit themselves to:
a) promote equality in the terms of remuneration and conditions of work for women;
b) ensure transparency in employment and dismissal relating to women;
c) allow women freedom to choose their own job, with decent conditions of work, 
and to protect them from exploitation by their employers;
d) regulate the occupations and economic activities dominated by women, in 
particular the informal sector of the economy;
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e) put in place a system of protection and national insurance for women working in 
the informal and formal sectors of the economy;
f) introduce a minimum age of work and prohibit children form working below that 
age, and to prohibit the sexual exploitation of children;
g) recognise the value of and to protect the work of women in the home;
h) guarantee adequate pre- and post-natal maternity leave;
i) recognise motherhood and the upbringing of children as a social function for 
which both parents must take responsibility, as well as the state and employers.
ARTICLE 14
1. With reference to Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, women shall have the same right to health as men. As part of this right, they 
shall have the right to control their fertility, including the right to decide whether to 
have children, how to space their children, to choose any method of contraception 
and to protect themselves against sexually transmitted diseases.
2. State Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate measures to:
a) ensure that adequate and if necessary free health services are available to 
women especially those in rural areas;
b) establish pre- and post-natal health and nutritional services for women during 
pregnancy and while they are breastfeeding.
ARTICLE 15
303
1. Every woman, like every man shall have the right to adequate supplies of 
wholesome food.
2. State Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate measures to:
a) guarantee to women access to clean drinking water, to sources of domestic 
fuel, to land, and to the means of producing food;
b) establish adequate systems of supply and storage to ensure food security. 
ARTICLE 16
Every woman, like every man, shall have the right to housing and to acceptable 
living conditions in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, State Parties to 
this Protocol commit themselves to grant to women, whatever their marital 
status, access to state provided/social housing sufficient for their needs.
ARTICLE 17
1. Women shall have the right to live their life in a positive cultural environment 
and to participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies.
2. State Parties to this Protocol shall take all appropriate measures to protect 
women and society from the harmful effects of all forms of fundamentalism and 
from any other cultural or religious practices contrary to this right.
ARTICLE 18
1. In conformity with Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, women shall have the right to live in a healthy environment.
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2. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:
a) involve women in the management of the environment at all levels;
b) promote research into renewable energy sources;
c) regulate the management, processing and storage of domestic waste;
d) ensure that the proper standards are followed for the storage, transport and 
destruction of toxic waste.
ARTICLE 19
1. With reference to Articles 21, 22 & 24 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, women shall have the right to fully enjoy their right to 
development.
2. State Parties to this Protocol shall take all appropriate measures to:
a) ensure that women can participate fully at all levels in the development and 
execution of development policies;
b) ensure that women have access to credit an to financial, economic andnatural 
resources;
c) take into account indicators of human development specifically relating to women 
in the working out of development policies.
d) ensure that in the implementation of trade and economic policies such as 
structural adjustment programmes, the negative effects of such
measures do not affect women.
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ARTICLE 20
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature, ratification and accession by the 
Member States of the OAU.
2. Instruments of ratification or accession to this Protocol shall be deposited with 
the Secretary General of the OAU.
3. This Protocol shall come into force one month after the deposit of fifteen 
instruments of ratification or accession.
4. For each of the States Parties that ratify or accede to this Protocol after its 
coming into force, the Protocol shall come into force at the date of deposit of the 
instrument of ratification or accession.
5. The Secretary General of the OAU shall inform the Member States of the OAU 
of the coming into force of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 21
This Protocol may be amended is a State Party makes a written request to that effect 
to the Secretary General of the OAU. The Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government adopts the draft amendment after all the States Parties have been duly 
informed of it and the Commission has given its opinion. The amendment shall be 
approved be a simple majority of the State Parties. The Commission may also, 
through the Secretary General of the OAU, propose amendments to this Protocol. 
The amendment shall come into force for each State Party which has accepted it one 
month after the Secretary General of the OAU has received notice of the acceptance.
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